

November 1986

South Africans of Gujarati-Indian descent: cultural, structural, and ideological dynamics within their community

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SOUTH AFRICANS OF GUJARATI-INDIAN DESCENT:
CULTURAL, STRUCTURAL, AND IDEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS
WITHIN THEIR COMMUNITY

A Dissertation
Submitted to
The Temple University Graduate Board

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Gary D. Klein
November 1986

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I must first thank the Mohamed family, who generously provided crucial support that enabled me to embark on this research. I miss both them and their wonderful friends. My research was conducted under the tutelage of Professor Fatima Meer at the University of Natal. Professor Meer, academician and activist, gave scholarly advice and assistance at every phase of the data collection process. I was very fortunate to be in her company. She arranged contacts with several individuals who contributed some of their valuable time to my research needs, making it possible for me to write this thesis. My life has been enriched by these personal encounters.

I would like to acknowledge James and Ros Conrad, who, in time of need, when I was not granted state permission to reside in an Indian Group Area, offered to share their flat with me and my wife. I thank them and their vibrant, spirited maid, Anna. I am deeply indebted to the Cachalias in Johannesburg, the Motalas in Pietermaritzburg, and J. Ebrahim in Pretoria for providing residential arrangements and assistance during my research visits.

My most cherished moments were spent in the homes, offices, and shops of the interviewees, whose identities I will not divulge. I am very grateful for their sacrifice of time and for their openness with me. I would like to publicly acknowledge S.M. Thaker and P.V. Lakhani for introducing me to Gujarati Hindu interviewees and clarifying several questions I had about India.

On an institutional level, I am most thankful for the help offered by the Sociology Department at the University of Natal. They provided me with office space, a teaching assistantship, and most important, a sense of inspiration. I was aided in innumerable ways by Hilstan Watts, Department Chair, Barbara DeWitt, Head Secretary, and Jean Howard, Secretary. The Computer Center's programmers skillfully assisted me with the burdensome task of creating the Who's Who file.

I received generous and helpful assistance from the staffs of the Afrikana Library at Martin West Center, the Indian Documentation Center at University of Durban-Westville, and the University of Natal Library. Although I did not make use of materials collected in the Natal Archives and the Durban Treasurer's Office in this thesis, the staffs of both institutions were also tremendously helpful. I hope to use this material in the near future.

There are many other South Africans who made my research stay a rewarding one. They, as well as those already mentioned, are in no way responsible for the final product of this dissertation. [The data was fit into my own theoretical interests.] All objections to what I have written should be directed to me and no one else.

I am very grateful for having a top-notch dissertation committee at Temple University. Before thanking members of my final committee, I want to acknowledge members who were previously on my committee but left Temple and the Philadelphia area. They are Mah-Hui Lim, John Western, and John Houghton. Each one made perceptive comments that contributed to the final product. Two of my committee members were my mentors when I arrived at Temple, and my thanks to them extend throughout my graduate career. They are Julia Ericksen (chair) and Eugene Ericksen. Both wrote very useful comments on chapter drafts and gave me the necessary freedom to be creative along with some direction. In addition, Julia assisted with my South African arrangements. Leo Rigsby, departmental chair, and Joanne Follmer, graduate secretary, went beyond the call of duty to advance this dissertation to fruition. Bob Kidder served on my committee and made several sharp comments at our meetings. Last, but not least, Doug Porpora, a late committee member, has had a profound influence on my own analytical thinking, and took a genuine interest in my progress well before he became an official committee member.

Upon return from South Africa in 1983, there were several individuals, in addition to my committee and Temple's Sociology Department, who assisted me in very important ways. The Dunns provided comfortable working and living conditions on their farm as my wife and I were getting settled and needed inspiration throughout, the Paradises provided a small apartment in their house that became home, and members of the Social Science Division at Widener University and the Sociology Department at Glassboro State College provided an abundance of intellectual stimulation and emotional warmth. Lynne Kotranski and George Leon showed a special concern for my employment needs. Reverend David Gracie was a powerful source of moral support. Ira Goldstein, Assistant Director of the Social Science Data Library at Temple University, provided expert computer assistance and good humor. Two very important contributors to this thesis in its final stages are Lucille D'Amato and Claudia Voss Lewenstein. Lucille typed my never-ending edits on the computer under deadline pressure and taught me the word processing program, so that I could continue to edit after the oral defense. Claudia was hired to do line-editing after my oral defense, which she did exceptionally well. But she also offered invaluable advice on reorganizing chapter sections and expressing myself more clearly. Claudia and Lucille made it possible for me to finally complete this thesis.

My family has been my foundation. There are no words of gratitude that come close to expressing my appreciation for all of their support. My mother and brother always gave me positive reinforcement and relaxation on my home visits. My father knew how important it was for me to write this thesis, and he was overwhelmingly giving with financial support and sound advice. In the final stages of the project he went out of his way to have a co-worker, Eti Harris, at Schering Corporation, assist me with computer tips and she printed the thesis on the laser-printer. My father also expertly drew the maps of South Africa and India which appear in this thesis.

Most of all, my wife, Lauren, has contributed in infinite ways, enabling me to persevere and complete this thesis. No words can do justice. Without all of her support and patience in times of need I would have fallen short of my ambitions. I dedicate the dissertation to her and to the oppressed in South Africa.

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Figure 1: Gujarat



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Figure 2: Emigration Sea Route





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Chapter 1: Introduction

1). Introduction

In this thesis I will examine the relations that a small minority group in South Africa have with the ruling white and the majority black sectors of the population. Through an examination of the internal class and ethnic structure of the Gujarati Indians of South Africa, and an analysis of the roles they play between the whites and blacks, I will analyze this small minority group's prospects of becoming further unified with the progressive forces for fundamental social change.

South Africa is one of the most complex and conflict-ridden regions of the world. Since the Nationalist Party came into power in 1948, implementing the ideological doctrine of apartheid, there have been frequent predictions and anticipations that the political system will crumble. So far it has not, and many maintain that it will endure even the present turmoil. While apartheid's durability derives from many sources, one critical factor has been the lack of solidarity among and within anti-apartheid movements (Adams and Moodley, 1986:77-117). I will focus on certain sociological factors which might have a bearing on internal solidarity among those seeking social liberation in South Africa. To do this, I will concentrate on

the most economically fortunate, yet politically powerless minority group--the Gujaratis. What deters a sense of solidarity from emerging between the Gujaratis and other players in the struggle and what promotes it? By focusing on sociological forces which either facilitate or impede Gujarati-Black cohesiveness, we can better understand some of the underlying tensions in South Africa which influence social change.

The Gujaratis share an origin as "free passengers" from the state of Gujarat, India, which is on India's west coast, north of Bombay. The label of free passengers indicates that this group paid their own passageway to South Africa to trade as free persons. The Gujarati population currently numbers nearly 90,000, and they constitute approximately 95 percent of Indian South Africans with free passenger origins. The remaining five percent of passenger Indians come from diverse regions in India. The passenger Indians are greatly outnumbered by those South Africans of Indian descent who arrived to labor under contracts of indenture. The indentured Indians were recruited from southern and north-central regions of India, promised freedom upon completion of their contracts. Their descendants now number approximately 800,000. Their lives never intersected with the Gujaratis until settlement in South Africa. In total, Indian South Africans constitute approximately three percent of the South African population.

The indentured Indians initially arrived in 1860, and the pioneer passenger Indians began arriving approximately a decade later. The arrival date of Aboobaker Amod, the first passenger Indian, a Meman-speaking Gujarati, has not been precisely determined. The pioneers supplied the dietary and clothing needs of the indentured laborers, who worked primarily on sugar plantations in the British colony of Natal. The pioneers were Muslim (Meman and Vohra), while subsequent migrant waves were two-thirds Muslim and one-third Hindu. About 90 percent of the indentured Indians were Hindu. The early Gujarati settlers were welcomed by the plantation owners and somewhat protected by their status as free British subjects. Subsequent settlers expanded their business activities by providing life necessities in scattered areas, and they captured the African market. They were less warmly received by the white colonists, particularly the traders, and their rights rapidly deteriorated (Meer, 1969; Ginwala, 1974; Bhana and Pachai, 1984). Free immigration was restricted in 1897 and virtually halted in 1913.

The situation of the early Gujarati settlers, and to a large extent later settlers and South African-born descendants, is analogous to groups which have been coined "middleman minorities" in the ethnicity literature. The middleman minority experience, in a modified form, makes the Gujaratis a particularly interesting group to study in terms of their class and ethnic roles in South Africa. Like other migrant minorities who occupy middle-ranked roles in their

new societies, such as Jews, Chinese, Koreans, and Armenians, the Gujarati-Indians have concentrated in entrepreneurial business activities and maintained intra-ethnic solidarity. These economic and cultural characteristics are ideal-typical of middleman minorities (Bonacich, 1973). Largely as a result of their class location and cultural practices, the Gujaratis, as other middleman minorities, have served as a scapegoat minority.

Gujarati scapegoating intensified after the imposition of the apartheid system which segregated and weakened certain racial sectors, and enabled another sector to reap political, economic, and social advantages. The Gujaratis are the most fortunate of the 85 percent of the South African population exploited by apartheid. Many whites in particular, see the Gujaratis as alien traders who are unpatriotic and willing to do anything for a quick profit. Many blacks are tempted to see the Indians, particularly the Gujaratis, as the oppressors rather than part of the oppressed, largely owing to the Gujaratis' visible commercial occupations. This has led to outbursts of African violence against Indians, the most devastating occurring in 1949, when official estimates for the Indian community were as follows: 50 deaths; 503 injuries; destruction of one factory, 58 stores, and 1,285 dwellings; and damage to two factories, 652 stores, and 1,285 dwellings (Moodley, 1976:219).

In hopes of tempering the hostile treatment they suffer, middleman minorities are usually politically cautious, moderate, and inward turning (Bonacich and Modell, 1980:16). Ethnic loyalty comes first, with an emphasis on mutual assistance in establishing small commercial establishments without antagonising elite or subordinate groups. This is a rational economic adaptation to advanced capitalism, in that reliance on communal assistance serves to cut costs in many ways, and the absence of strong emotional sentiment toward non-ethnic customers facilitates a rational pursuit of profit (Bonacich, 1980). Although the Gujaratis, on a general level, tend to fit this characterization in South Africa (Kuper, 1960; Moodley, 1980), their concrete political history has been extraordinarily complex and variable (Pahad, 1972; Girwala, 1974; Moodley, 1976; Tayal, 1980). For instance, recent attempts at co-optation by the Afrikaner Nationalist Party, such as the 1983 referendum establishing a tricameral legislature comprising whites, Coloreds, and Indians, have been met with strong resistance, such as election boycotts and mass rallies, in which Gujarati activists played a key role. However, a significant proportion of parliamentary representatives and other state-appointed administrators have been Gujarati, and they have tended to show outward support for white minority rule. In short, the Gujaratis should not be perceived as a static or homogeneous bloc in terms of their political consciousness and past and present roles in social struggle.

To arrive at the proper questions for examining the Gujarati choices in allegiances in the South African conflict, we must understand the sociological forces which underlie their decision making. In an effort to gain this understanding, I have used a variety of data about the Gujaratis and applied the theoretical perspectives of Edna Bonacich and Antonio Gramsci. The "middleman minority theory", largely developed by Edna Bonacich, will be used to illuminate cultural and structural obstacles to Gujarati-Black solidarity. Gramsci did not promote a theory per se, but rather a set of assumptions and concepts to examine social change. The Gramscian orientation will be used to examine ideological factors which strengthen Gujarati-Black unity. I will use the Gramscian usage of the term "hegemony" to describe the type of subordinate-group unity I am referring to--a moral and intellectual atmosphere which encourages a shared spirit of resistance to all forms of oppression emanating from dominant groups. This is in contrast to dominant group hegemony, how the term hegemony is most frequently used.

To understand my choice of the middleman minority theory and the Gramscian orientation as the theoretical tools for this study, it is first necessary to profile the Gujaratis. I will provide basic historical information and focus on the consequences of pre-apartheid and apartheid legislation on the Gujarati community before presenting these perspectives and my research questions.

One final note on my use of racial terminology in this work. The use of racial and ethnic terminology in classifying groups in South Africa is a very delicate issue. The Afrikaner-backed government has imposed four official racial labels in order to further divide the population into a caste-like society: White, Asiatic, Colored, and African. The Gujaratis constitute about 10 percent of the so-called Asiatic race (the Indians over 95 percent). The Asiatics make up approximately 3.0 percent of the total South African population. The so-called Coloreds (mixed-race) make up about 9.0 percent of the population, while the Africans represent 73 percent, or nearly three out of every four South Africans. Together, Asiatics, Coloreds, and Africans constitute 85 percent of the total population. In an effort to debunk racial and ethnic labels of a divisive nature, and spurred on by the Black Consciousness Movement, many of the 85 percent have chosen the identity label of "black" as a sign of unity. In the remainder of this thesis, I will use the term black to refer to the so-called Asiatics, Coloreds, and Africans, when speaking of them as one unit, in the post-1970 period. Since this identification did not originate until the latter 1960s, I will use the more common (and politically moderate) terms of "nonwhite" and "non-European" in reference to the pre-1970 period. When a specific historical period is not being referred to, I have opted to use the term black.

2). The Gujaratis

To understand the path that led the Gujaratis from their homeland in India to South Africa, we must place their migration in historical context. In the late nineteenth century the British Empire stretched over large parts of Asia and Africa. By the 1850s, imperial Britain had consolidated its rule over India as well as the Cape Colony and Colony of Natal in South Africa. The British South African colonies coexisted with the Afrikaner republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, which were all eventually united in 1910 to form the Union of South Africa.

British control of its colonial territories resulted in international exchanges of people and goods that might not have developed otherwise. Because Britain emancipated the slaves in 1834, other means of cheap labor were sought by colonists seeking the accumulation of capital. The South African colony of Natal had fertile land which was ideal for tropical cultivation, but it was short on labor power. British protocol proscribed coercing Africans into laboring for the colonists. Africans were relatively secure in their tribal economies and unwilling to work long hours for meager wages as laborers throughout the year (Meer, et.al., 1981).

In 1860, an indentured labor scheme with India was established and continued intermittently until 1911. Nearly 90 percent of current Indian South Africans have indentured origins. The indentured Indians were mainly recruited by agents in southern and

north-central India. They were predominantly Hindu, and usually spoke Tamil, Hindustani, or Telegu. A smaller proportion were Muslim who spoke Urdu. Most were contracted by British emigrants who owned sugarcane plantations, after being induced to come to South Africa by recruiting agents who worked on a commission basis. Their lives under indentured labor contracts (which covered a minimum of five years and were usually extended because of the tax burdens of electing freedom) were, to put it bluntly, "a new kind of slavery" (Tinker, 1974; Tayal, 1978). Living conditions were cramped, wages were low, work hours were excessive, and no viable outlet for grievances was available.

The second stream of migration, beginning a decade after the indentured arrival and sharply curtailed at the turn of the century, was of free passenger British Indian subjects. Owing to the importance of India to the British Empire, Indians were promised rights as free British subjects, such as immigration to any colony in the British Empire. The first waves to take advantage of this right were Gujarati Muslim traders from western India who served the needs of the indentured Indians. It was not uncommon for these early settlers to have been traders in other British colonies, such as Mauritius and Fiji.

The vast majority (approximately 95 percent) of passenger Indians were born within the borders of Gujarat (see Figure 1). Since free immigration was theoretically open to any Indian, it is interesting

that free passengers to South Africa came mainly from such a concentrated area. The active Gujarati overseas migration in the latter nineteenth century may be partly explained by Gujarat's historic role as a focal point for trade. The small class of Gujarati merchants who ventured overseas in prior centuries probably filled the imaginations of other Gujaratis who were restricted to their local villages. The primary sources of Gujarati migrants were the vicinities of the ports of Surat (India's chief port in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) and Porbandar. Some of the migrants had experience in trade, but most were peasant farmers who were ruined by British land policies.

Even though the Gujarati migrants originated from a few distinct concentrated regions, they lived in numerous separate villages. This dispersion becomes evident when examining the biographical portraits appearing in The 1939 Indian Who's Who (Bramdaw, 1939-40). Although this volume is not a random sample of the Gujarati or broader Indian South African population, it contains a significant component of the economically successful and associationally active members of the population. The volume comprises 228 Gujarati entrants who were at least 43 years of age in 1939. Five were born in South Africa, the birthplaces of four were not included, and 219 were born in Gujarat. Of the 219 born in Gujarat, 147 (67.1 percent) were born in the Surat region (76 Muslims and 71 Hindus) and 72 (32.9 percent) were born in Saurashtra--also called Kathiawar (55 Muslims and 17 Hindus). There

were 88 separate birthplaces, only three of which were cities or large towns (Surat City, Navsari, and Porbandar). The village of Ranavav, Saurashtra contained the most entrants (20), followed by the village of Kholvad, Surat (18), Navsari, Surat (15), and Porbandar, Saurashtra (14). Only nine cities, towns, or villages were birthplaces for five or more of the 219 Gujarati Who's Who entrants born in Gujarat. This indicates that migrants were from predominantly rural areas and came from many different villages (though they were close together).

The Gujaratis and the other passenger Indian groups, which were much smaller in number, settled first in Natal, where the indentured Indian population was located. However, a substantial number migrated to the Transvaal, which was prospering in the latter nineteenth century owing to mineral discoveries, most notably gold. Ex-indentured (free) Indians, primarily Tamils, were also attracted to the Transvaal for employment opportunities, such as hawking (Arkin, 1981:58-81). A smaller number of Indians settled in the Cape, where Muslim Malays, who came to South Africa as slaves and are classified as Colored, had formed an entrepreneurial niche. Only a very small number of Indians were permitted to reside in the Orange Free State by the Afrikaner population (see Figures 2 and 3).

The issue of immigration rights into South Africa and across provincial borders was one of several issues that promoted insecurities among passenger Indians. Despite the Indians' status as

British subjects, the white colonists, both English and Afrikaner, repeatedly sought measures to restrict their upward mobility. They were more accepting of the Indian in a subordinate role, such as that of indentured laborer (coolie). Gujarati traders, other passenger Indians, and ex-indentured laborers who gravitated into trade, were accused by many whites of under-charging, under-living, and swamping the whites. The latter charge led to various efforts to restrict immigration, and later to attempts at repatriation. By the turn of the century, the Orange Free State had prohibited Asiatic entrants, and Natal, the Cape, and the Transvaal (which became a British dominion after the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902) all made Asiatic entrance requirements exceedingly difficult. Literacy in a European language based on an arbitrary test administered by an immigration officer was required for all new immigrants (which gave an advantage to whites who were not British subjects over Indian British subjects), and substantial proof of previous legal domicile was required to re-enter and bring in family members. The British were very rigid in administering the immigration laws (Joshi, 1942; Bradlow, 1978). Gandhi, who got his political activist start in South Africa, served as the legal representative of many Gujaratis who contested the implementation of these laws. He organized his first passive resistance struggle over the issue of immigration rights to the Transvaal, where Gujarati traders burned their registration passes in defiance of the registration laws. Many

endured periods in jail (Huttenback, 1971). Not all Gujaratis were united in this and other protests, as those who were more secure in their settler status and economic position were more willing to accommodate to the authorities than were others (Ginwala, 1974; Moodley, 1976; Tayal, 1980).

On a cultural and economic level, the primary division in the Indian community was between those of passenger and indentured origins. "Generally, passenger Indians came from a higher standard of living in India than did the indentured; they wore better apparel, enjoyed a higher degree of vernacular education, and ate better food...The passenger Indians kept up their links with their ancestral home by constant communication in writing and in person and preserved their exclusiveness by the importation of wives from their own villages and castes" (Kuper, 1956:129). On the other hand, the indentured were huddled together without consideration of caste, were rarely united into families, had no time to honor cultural traditions, and for the most part were unable to keep communication channels open with relatives in India. They also had less resources to organize political interest associations. Therefore, the passenger Indians (95 percent Gujarati) took the lead in organizing political activities. The legal restrictions on their immigration, land, and trading rights received the most attention. In the following section I will discuss how these restrictions led to a major split in the political consciousness and action of the Gujarati community.

3). Apartheid and the Gujaratis

Apartheid is the legal implementation of policies which result in separation of race groups. Apartheid became formal state policy in 1948, when the Nationalist Party was elected into office. Although some utopian apartheid ideologues have expressed notions of a "separate but equal" society, apartheid has been used to maintain and enhance white domination. It has offered democracy for the less than 20 percent white minority and tyranny for the remaining who are classified into one of three color-castes: African, Asiatic, and Colored (van den Berghe, 1967). Although the formal policy was instituted in 1948, South Africa has been beset with a rigid system of racial stratification ever since the settling of Dutch Boer farmers (later called Afrikaners) in the western Cape province in the latter seventeenth century.

The Boer settlers imported slaves, tightly controlled the Hottentots (and through "forced" miscegenation with both groups created the "Colored" race) and carried out genocide against the Bushmen (Wilson and Thompson, 1969). The poorer Boers trekked to new lands, using Hottentots as serfs, and were restricted from further expansion by Bantu groups (whose descendants are now the "Africans"). As Britain expanded its colonial rule over India in the early nineteenth century, it also established rule in the Cape. With

the abolition of the slave trade in 1834, the Boers began to search (trek) for a new territory where they could be independent and own slaves. Many went to Natal but for only a short period, since the British soon annexed Natal. They then traveled on to the Transvaal and Orange Free State, subdued African nations, and with diamond and gold discoveries in their two established republics, were led into further clashes with the British Imperialists (Patterson, 1957).

Two Anglo-Boer wars were fought, the second and larger of which ended in British victory in 1902. This led to the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, under joint control of local Afrikaner and English settlers. At the time of union, Indians were settled mainly in Natal and the Transvaal, the indentured and ex-indentured population primarily in Natal, and the passenger Indians more evenly distributed between the two, with about 10 percent of them in the Cape.

The South African economy's rise to become the most industrialized in Africa led to an intensification of racial cleavages. White economic frustrations, particularly among the working class and an aspiring Afrikaner bourgeoisie, were largely held in check by English control of the multinational sectors. The Afrikaners and other less fortunate whites were becoming hegemonic, with racialist ideologies that later were codified into the apartheid doctrine (Simons and Simons, 1969). The Afrikaner Nationalist Party came into power in 1948, assisted by a 60 percent Afrikaner electorate, who were situated primarily in the working class.

The first law to segregate Indians into separate trading and residential areas dates back to 1885 in Transvaal, well before the term apartheid was coined and became official state policy. Ironically this law was never rigidly enforced until the British colonized Transvaal following the second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). One of Britain's stated motives for entering the war was to protect her British Indian subjects from discriminatory treatment at the hands of the Boers (Pillay, 1976:80-105). The British colony of Natal also attempted to implement segregationist policies against the Indians well before apartheid became official state policy. Since 1896, bills were forwarded to Natal's legislature to eliminate the franchise, deny trading licenses, eliminate new immigration, segregate Indian trading areas, tighten up immigration restrictions, issue special passes to Indians, restrict land acquisitions, and to not honor cultural practices such as marriage rites (Joshi, 1942). Many bills were softened in parliament, or failed to become law, owing to the role of Indian South Africans in the international arena (Pachai, 1971). The movement for independence in India used the issue of Indian exploitation in British colonies to condemn British rule, and the British attempted to appease more moderate sectors by portraying British rule in as favorable a light as possible. Thus British administrators in India supported the cause of Indians overseas, and they insisted on keeping the Indian issue separate from Colored and African concerns in South Africa. They played a role as

compromisers with the white colonists in curbing discriminatory legislation bearing upon the Indians (Joshi, 1942; Girwala, 1974).

The little international protection provided to the Indians dwindled in the 1940s. The moderates had less international pull to soften discriminatory treatment, as India was less significant to the fading British empire. Stringent anti-Indian bills were enacted. These laws in particular divided the Indian elites, who were in the main, Gujarati (Pahad, 1972). The Transvaal Indian traders were harder hit prior to the 1940s, during which time the Natal traders enjoyed a "comparative security". Pahad states that in Natal class divisions among Indians were more sharply delineated, and the traders felt less defiant (1972:243).

The major act in the 1940s against Indian businessmen in Natal has been called the Pegging Act. It froze (pegged) property transactions in Durban between whites and Indians. This was in response to outcries by land investors and residents that Indians were invading white areas. The intensifying world war restricted avenues of investment, and Indians with assets were willing to pay higher prices for properties in white residential areas. Their degree of penetration was exaggerated, according to government commissions, and attributed to white prejudices (Rajah, 1968:40-42). Nevertheless, due to white agitation, the Pegging Act stood, with slight modifications regarding permission to invest in specially exempt areas. It was the first act of parliament imposing legal

restrictions on Indians, with Indians specifically mentioned in the statute, something Gandhi had vehemently opposed.

The larger Indian merchants, relatively small in number, sought conciliatory, diplomatic methods to reduce white hostility. They were concerned with preserving what they had, and were more willing to consent to restrictive legislation, such as the Pegging Act, if their present assets were not in jeopardy. This reticence created cleavages in Natal much like those that had already formed in the Transvaal. The larger businessmen of Gujarati passenger origin led the moderate political associations with assistance from a small, educated elite and European journalists and lawyers. The smaller traders and professionals took the leading roles in the radical associations, and manual workers were also involved in mass meetings and rallies. The radical associations contained greater numbers of Indians of indentured origin and sought alliances with other non-Europeans. The radicals pointed out that the moderate tactics of negotiation and compromise, and dealing with Indian issues separately from other non-European issues, brought no relief, as indicated by the new stream of restrictive legislation. They sought to induce a "militant and defiant spirit amongst the people [in the belief that] only by common united front struggle; could the non-Europeans hope to overthrow white supremacy" (Pahad, 1972:251). The moderates took the pragmatic approach, seeking immediate gains or minimal losses for the middle class Indians by distancing their issues from other

non-European issues and seeking acceptance by the white community (Kuper, 1960:47-53).

While the radicals and moderates both contended for Indian loyalty, the former organizing passive resistance marches and boycotts and the latter seeking government support against anti-Indian agitation, two important events materialized. India achieved national independence and the Nationalist Party was voted in office in South Africa under the "apartheid" platform. A devastating law which restricted Indian land and trading rights, the Group Areas Act of 1950, was codified into law. It has since undergone amendments, and is still in place. It divided the population into four racial groups in order to segregate them into distinct areas, preserving for whites the choice areas. Africans were subsequently given citizenship status in tribal reserve areas previously established by the British colonialists. These became known as homelands, or bantustans, and they constitute only 13.5 percent of the total land mass. Separate townships in "white South Africa" were demarcated for legally employed Africans (considered as migrant laborers), Coloreds, and Asiatics. Minimal political rights were granted to the townships in the form of local representatives who could "advise" the government. Entire communities were forced to leave areas assigned to another race, and what little integration had occurred in some communities ended. The Indians who were accused of penetrating white areas were required to move to less desirable

Indian areas and were grossly undercompensated for their properties. The act has been implemented gradually, and racial boundaries have been frequently revised, inhibiting investment in many places that were in danger of being reassigned to another race group (Rajah, 1981). Frene Ginwala describes some of the consequences:

By the end of 1975, 89,480 Coloured and Asian families with 459,911 members were moved from their homes compared to 1,594 white families with 5,898 members. A further 142,561 Coloureds and Asians and 733 whites were still to be moved...The impact in the Transvaal where the majority of Indians were dependent on commerce has been most far-reaching. Over 92% of the traders have been affected by the proclamations...Of the 5,058 traders disqualified in terms of the Act, nearly 75% are still waiting to be resettled. Those who have been resettled have done so at considerable financial loss, as they received no goodwill for their old businesses, were often unable to recoup cost of stock, and the prices paid for their premises in forced sales were artificially low...All sections of the Indians have suffered from the forced sale of their homes. The Group Areas Board is responsible for proclaiming areas for specific groups, it fixes prices, and has the first right to purchase...Properties are sold at prices as high as 4,000% - grim evidence that 'purchase' from the Indians amounts to expropriation (Ginwala, 1977:13).

Not every Indian lost financially from the changing economy and apartheid legislation, however. In spite of being undercompensated for expropriated business and residential properties, the most successful businessmen, mainly Gujaratis, profitted economically.

With the concentration of Indian capital in fewer hands, they were able to form consortia to take advantage of opportunities for land ownership, building ownership, commerce, and industry. Ginwala states:

It is this small group that owns such land in the group areas not owned by the white authorities - the large blocks of flats, the department stores and hotels, as well as the luxury homes. The accumulation of capital and availability of credit has enabled this group to expand into industry. Though miniscule in comparison with white-owned concerns, more than 20% of Indian industrial workers in Natal are employed in Indian-owned factories (1977:15).

In short, the Group Areas Act has not been uniformly disadvantageous for all Indians, as those with more capital were able to expand. Even though apartheid has had negative repercussions for most Indians, they nonetheless continue to share an intermediate role with the Colored and a small stratum of educated Africans. They have better living areas, better educational facilities, better jobs, and are less brutalized by the police than are majority Africans. In spite of numerous restrictions, the Indians have more opportunities to obtain land and trading licenses in urban areas than their African counterparts (Moodley, 1980). In 1975, the average Indian's household wages were approximately one-half that of whites, the

average Colored's, approximately one-third, and the African's, one-eighth (1980:225). The Indians have become more stratified by class, as the poorer Indians, primarily of indentured origin, were relocated to ghetto townships, whereas the wealthier Indians, primarily of passenger origin, were relocated to better suburbs (though less attractive than white suburbs) (Meer, 1975). Although no statistics are available, the average Gujarati family probably commands a little more wealth than the average white family, although the wealthiest whites are significantly wealthier than the wealthiest Gujaratis. Also, the Indians have to pay more for businesses and homes, due to their restricted, inflated markets.

The Indians with assets to lose are the most fearful of black majority rule. These fears are accentuated by past historical events in Uganda and Kenya, where Indians were evacuated after political independence. Their middle-ranked status in entrepreneurial pursuits and their more recent hiring by European firms for middle-level jobs, frequently as supervisors of Africans, compounds the negative stereotypes Africans hold of them. Recent attacks on Indians at the beaches and skirmishes on township borders, reinforce this conclusion.

The Nationalist Party often purports to be the Indians' friend, by enabling them to preserve their identities in their segregated areas with state protection. This view has also been expressed by Indian elites who have participated in government-sponsored

committees and administrative capacities. The following is a typical expression of this point of view by a Gujarati elite:

The fact is that that is how we want it, and that is true of most Indians in Africa. Our customs and religions differ from those of the other racial groups, and we prefer to live with our own kind. We would, for example, not want our children to attend school with children of other racial groups, nor would we want our young people to belong to White or Black groups, and acquire their ways of life or adopt their habits.
(Joosub, 1972:431)

Such views fit into the conservative-moderate ideological framework. They are an insular response, fearing the loss of identity under black rule as well as the accentuation of informal and formal discrimination under white rule. White rule is preferred as the lesser of two evils. Political energies are directed to proving good faith towards the government in order to minimize the severity of anti-Indian legislation. Despite fears of a loss of economic and cultural protection under black majority rule, compelling Gujarati interests could be served if all the legal disabilities and humiliations of apartheid were terminated--namely equality of opportunity and full citizenship. Yet the Gujaratis' material interests may not be served by supporting forces against apartheid and the oppression of blacks. Recent attempts by the state to accommodate middle groups (Coloreds and Indians) with the removal of some petty apartheid restrictions and the establishment of a

tricameral parliament scheme are additional incentives to prefer social stability. The conservative-moderate viewpoint is that the Gujaratis' small business niche would more likely be protected under white minority rule.

To more completely assess the factors influencing Gujarati cooperation with black political aims for equality, both cultural and structural factors must be examined. What is it about the Gujaratis' cultural legacy which promotes unity with whites, unity with blacks, and insular responses to racial struggle? What roles do the Gujaratis' economic, political, and social location in South Africa have on influencing them to link up with contending forces? Can the Gujaratis, being so small in number, have any bearing on the outcome of the larger struggle? Can we expect different contributions from Indians with indentured origins? I will use two sociological perspectives, to address these questions.

4). Research Questions and Tactics

The goal of this study is to answer questions regarding the prospects that the Gujaratis will react to the present political turmoil of apartheid by aligning themselves with the black majority to overthrow the oppressive social system. My goal can be attained by using the tools of research questions stemming from two theoretical frameworks, the "middleman minority theory" and the "Gramscian orientation".

The middleman minority theory (Bonacich, 1973) was constructed to explain the emergence and maintenance of certain ideal-typical characteristics which define a middleman minority. A middleman minority is a minority group within a society who originate from a land other than their present home, or are descendants of those who migrated. Middleman minorities have strong ethnic ties, and concentrate in entrepreneurial business. These characteristics typically engender hostility from the surrounding society, and this hostility in turn strengthens the group's cohesiveness and pursuit of its entrepreneurial activity. The theory consists of three perspectives (cultural, contextual, and situational) to explain why certain groups become middleman minorities and are in turn victimized because of it. The cultural perspective focuses on those cultural traits of certain minority groups that facilitate migration and business success. The contextual perspective concentrates on structural properties of the recipient society as causing migrant minorities to fill buffer roles between elites and masses. The situational perspective focuses on the immigration experience in which ties with the homeland are maintained and weaker ties to the land of residence result.

The question I will address in Chapter 2, with the assistance of the middleman minority theory, is "What cultural, contextual, and situational factors assisted the Gujaratis in occupying an intermediate position in the South African stratification system?"

This question is an important one to begin with because its answer directs us to obstacles to subordinate group hegemony. By focusing first on those Gujarati cultural resources that give them an advantage in business, then on contextual parameters that create structural gaps between Gujaratis and subordinates, and finally on the Gujarati tie to India, we can more clearly see the barriers to Gujarati-Black cohesiveness.

The question I will address in Chapter 3 also derives from the middleman minority theory. It deals with variation in one of the three "core" variables identified by Bonacich (the theory's main architect), "ethnic solidarity". Middleman minorities, although mainly distinguished from other minorities on economic criteria, also exhibit strong ethnic solidarity, largely through the establishment and maintenance of intra-ethnic organizations. A basic question arising from the theory's focus on ethnic solidarity is "To what extent have the Gujaratis maintained ethnic solidarity over time, and why?" Since ethnic solidarity is seen as a product of class location and hostile perceptions from the outer society, and a contributing factor to entrepreneurial success and negative stereotypes, its intensity and scope hint at plausible obstructions to the formation of Gujarati-Black bonds.

Modeled in part on Bonacich and Modell's (1980) use of survey data collected by the Japanese-American Research Project, my data base, created with community assistance, pools data from the 1939 and

1971 Indian South African Who's Who volumes. These two volumes, the most extensive sources of data on middle class South Africans of Indian descent, list the associational membership of each entrant and provide other useful information to measure dimensions of ethnic solidarity. Furthermore, information that could account for variation in ethnic solidarity, such as age, ethnic background, level of education, and occupational location (owner of small business, owner of large business, employee, professional) were measured with the biographical information. Using multivariate analysis, the entrants with Gujarati passenger origins can be compared to the entrants with indentured origins.

Over 1000 male adult entrants of Indian descent appear in the 1939 volume and more than 1500 male adult entrants of Indian descent are in the 1971 volume. These numbers are impressive proportions of the middle class adult male Indian population. For instance, the 1936 Census classifies 5889 Asiatics as managers or proprietors of retail and wholesale business (less than 5 percent of Asiatics were non-Indian). The 1939 Indian South African Who's Who contains 651 active managers or proprietors of retail or wholesale business, in excess of 10 percent of the 1936 census total for Asiatics. Also, whereas the Gujaratis have always constituted less than 15 percent of the Indian South African population, they make up over 50 percent of the entrants in both Who's Who volumes. Roughly four percent of all Gujarati males over 30 years of age were entered into the 1939 volume

and roughly two percent were entered into the 1971 volume. The two samples do not appear to be skewed in criteria other than class standing and gender, which will be discussed in Chapter 3, along with other characteristics of the data base.

Working within the middleman minority theory, I felt a pressing limitation from the theory's lack of dynamism in handling ingroup-outgroup relationships. The middleman minority theory contains an inner logic that presupposes middleman minorities cannot be a driving, progressive force in struggles for democratic and equal societies. Because of structural constraints, their only deep concerns are preservation and extension of their own capital interests and the maintainance of ethnic community life. This causes boundaries to emerge and be perpetuated between themselves and the working class, and specifically between themselves and other blacks in the South African context. Applying this theoretical framework to the Gujaratis in South Africa, implies that as long as the Gujaratis are in entrepreneurial pursuits and share ethnic sentiments, prospects for genuine solidarity with other oppressed groups are dim.

I would like to transform these implications of the middleman minority theory into research questions. Rather than assume that the Gujaratis will engage their social surroundings in a set manner, I view ideology as possessing enough potency to either obstruct or promote social and political solidarity with other sectors. The middleman minority theory is useful in answering some questions, but

it leaves many more unanswered. It fails to address the role of ideology in narrowing cultural and structural boundaries between subordinate groups, such as between Gujarati and other black South Africans.

Gramsci's writings, though less systematic in nature than the middleman minority theory, address the issue of how groups within an economic and political context are involved in ideological struggles. Ideologies can be either supportive of or resistant to traditional hierarchical elements of the status quo. The central focus of the Gramscian theoretical orientation is the struggles of oppressed groups to create a unified popular will and the attempts by oppressors to weaken that will. When subordinate groups possess a unified will based on the overriding need to expunge all forms of oppressive social orders, a necessary moral and intellectual atmosphere is set for revolutionary social change. This is not an easy accomplishment, owing to advantages that dominant groups have in disseminating their conservative ideological viewpoints. The common person is frequently influenced by a mixture of dominant group and subordinate group ideas which fuse with practical experiences and convert into a fragmentary, contradictory consciousness (Cheal, 1978).

According to the Gramscian orientation, "It is never correct to attribute an 'appropriate' consciousness or political organization to a given group simply on the basis of its economic location in a

society" (Omi and Winant, 1983:44). Instead, social groups are seen as interpreting their own interests with the aid of social and political ideologies. In this context, the role of intellectuals becomes key to the forging of hegemonic relations with either dominant or subordinate groups. So does the moral and cognitive receptivity of rank and file group members to new ideologies. Immediate, everyday cultural life predominantly influences the political thinking of both intellectuals and rank and file members (Salamini, 1974; Boggs, 1976; Mouffe, 1979; Hall, 1986).

Gramsci's concern with the role of intellectuals in raising the popular consciousness of the masses led to my interest in Gandhi's influences as an organic intellectual. Organic intellectuals, according to Gramsci, align themselves with the emerging progressive forces and seek to elaborate ideas which will move people to ignore their autonomous interests in favor of their collective interest to overcome oppression. They are opposed by traditional intellectuals, who have a specialized responsibility to perpetuate the existing power arrangements with legitimating ideologies (Hall, 1986:21). Gandhi, a Gujarati passenger Indian himself, spent nearly 21 years in South Africa before establishing his political base in India. As a lawyer and political activist, he formulated and attempted to put into practice the universalist philosophy of satyagraha. This philosophy is an extremely broad, inclusive one that advocates cultural and political unity based on a shared "spirit of resistance"

among all who are oppressed. It also advocates the absence of hate or jealousy of oppressors. Gandhi did induce many Indian South Africans to burn registration passes, to march against travel restrictions, to support strikes, and to be active in political protest. He did not succeed, however, in breaking down communal and class barriers among Indian South Africans, nor did he link up with African protests (Tayal, 1980). While his universal ideology was not fully instilled in the consciousness of his Indian compatriots, Gandhi may have broadened their awareness of oppression and planted seeds for greater unity in subsequent struggles.

The question I will address in Chapter 4 is "Did Gandhi establish an ideological basis to push the Gujaratis to actively support black hegemony and the end of oppression in South Africa?" I will largely rely on Gandhi's propaganda organ, the Indian Opinion newspaper, to expose some underlying ideological messages coming from Gandhi. I will attempt to ascertain whether Gandhi and his selected editors espoused the ideological ingredients needed to promote a unified spirit of resistance. This question follows where the first two questions left off. The preceding questions dealt with distinct class and ethnic characteristics of the Gujaratis and the extent to which their ethnic solidarity has been formally displayed over time; now the focus is on the prospects for cultural and political unity with others who do not share social and economic characteristics. Gramsci's perspective gears empirical analysis to ideological factors

which may contribute to the formation of a broad-based hegemony, and as such, empirical and theoretical analyses of propaganda organs are important research endeavors.

The second Gramsci-inspired question concerns the current receptivity of Gujaratis to various political ideologies. According to Gramsci, not only can organic intellectuals move a population to popular struggle, that population also must be open to progressive ideologies. Even though Gujaratis are oppressed economically, socially, and politically in South Africa, they are still as a group economically privileged in comparison to the remaining black population. Knowing the fate suffered by Indians in Uganda and Kenya, South African Gujaratis certainly have reason to feel more secure in a small business niche with white rule than with black rule. The Gramscian orientation, however, does not belabor the issue of objective interests. The subjective interpretation of interests becomes of paramount importance (Abercombie, 1980).

In seeking to locate factors which may influence subjective perceptions of political interests, I was led to consider the role that ethnic identity and its concomitant sense of communal consciousness might have. The interconnection between ethnic self-understanding (whether on the basis of ethnic origins, religious affiliation, or racial classification) and political ideology has not been creatively researched to my knowledge.

A dynamic conception of inner cultural life, with its stress on active struggle in one's immediate milieu to create a social identity (E.P. Thompson, 1963), sees the struggle for personal cultural liberation as a prerequisite to active, conscious participation in broad social change activity (Boggs, 1976). This led to the research question, addressed in Chapter 5, "Is there an interconnection between communal consciousness and political ideology?" If there is, it adds support to the notion that communal self-identity has an impact on receptivity to particular political ideologies. This question will be handled in Chapter 5 with the use of excerpts from 50 interviews with Gujarati South Africans. The interviews were open-ended and averaged nearly two hours in tape-recording time. I used a conceptual schema advanced by Watt (1963) to code communal consciousness and coded political ideological assertions before crosstabulating these two variables. I also examined whether certain Gujarati sectors (class, ethnic origins, and age) appear to systematically differ on these variables. But with my small sample, I could only propose hypotheses based on my findings which require further research.

My final question is "What conclusions can be drawn concerning the applicability of the two theoretical perspectives to the Gujarati future in South Africa?" Although we can not determine whether white rule or black rule or some form of power-sharing will emerge out of the present turmoil, we can see the Gujaratis as significant actors

in the current struggle. They could tip the scale in one direction or another in what is becoming a closer contest as support for the apartheid system is weakening. As a middle-group, they can serve to intensify antagonisms between and within the contending forces and reinforce the status quo. Or they could serve to promote a progressive moral and intellectual atmosphere to facilitate the construction of a new social order. This question will be handled in Chapter 6, the concluding chapter.

Chapter 2: The Gujaratis as a Middleman Minority in South Africa

1). Introduction

In this chapter I will analyze factors responsible for the emergence of Gujaratis as a middleman minority in South Africa. The term middleman minority is used in the sociological literature to depict minority groups who originate from a land other than their present home, who have strong ethnic ties, and who concentrate in entrepreneurial business. The middleman minority theory seeks to explain the emergence and maintenance of ideal-typical middleman minority characteristics. The theory has political implications in that it exposes sociological factors which serve to pull the minority group in a moderate political direction and intensify hostile perceptions of them by other oppressed groups. In the South African context, the middleman minority theory illuminates plausible impediments to Gujarati-Black cohesiveness.

The Gujaratis fit the profile of a middleman minority as outlined by Blalock (1967) and Bonacich (1973). They migrated from Gujarat to trade in South Africa. They have concentrated in trade and commerce, and more recently expanded into the professions. They have maintained internal cohesiveness through the establishment of numerous cultural, religious, educational, and welfare associations. They have been victimized as a scapegoat minority. On this general

level, they fit the middleman minority ideal-type as do other minority groups throughout the world, such as other Indians, Jews, Chinese, Koreans, Greeks, and Armenians.

In this chapter I will first review the literature on the middleman minority theory. Three theoretical perspectives emerge from the middleman minority theory (Bonacich and Modell, 1980; Turner and Bonacich, 1980), and I will summarize each in turn--the cultural, the contextual, and the situational. Then I will apply each of these perspectives to the situation of the Gujaratis in South Africa, to explain their occupation of the middleman minority economic niche. By better understanding the factors determining their economic status, we can better assess the Gujaratis' overall position in the larger context of South Africa race relations.

2). Middleman Minority Theory

What are the definitive characteristics of a middleman minority? The first sociologist to define the term was Hubert Blalock (1967). Blalock defined middleman minorities as migrant minorities, and in some instances non-migrant minorities with "mixed blood", who serve as economic middlemen between elites and masses, primarily as traders. Bonacich uses the same term but includes all middle-ranked entrepreneurial positions, such as owners of small pieces of productive property and independent professionals (however, she does

not include indigenous minorities). Bonacich's rationale for this economic inclusion is that these various types of businesses are essentially family-operated, they rely on ethnic assistance, and they are premodern in orientation, as are trading businesses that serve as go-betweens between capitalists and consumers. Bonacich describes the definitive economic characteristics of middleman minorities as follows:

(They) are essentially "petit-bourgeois" in orientation. They do not engage in the kind of activity that epitomizes industrial capitalism, namely, the hiring of contracted wage labor from which profits are extracted. Instead, they tend to work as a single unit in which the distinction between owner and employee is blurred. Their shops depend on the use of ethnic and familial ties, not on impersonal contracts. (1980:214)

Middleman minorities are strong competitors in small business operations. They keep labor costs down, rely on mutual assistance for capital and labor, are thrifty, and work long hours. Migrant Jews, Chinese, and Indians are known especially for these traits, although the list of groups that have been conceptualized as middleman minorities is longer (see Bonacich and Modell, 1980:269-271).

These economic characteristics most clearly distinguish so-called middleman minorities from other minorities, but middleman minorities also display a set of characteristic social traits. Turner and Bonacich outline them:

The prominent social characteristics of middleman minorities include: (a) the clear tendency to be migrants to a recipient society; (b) the propensity to form and maintain a separate community or district in the recipient society; (c) the desire to maintain distinct cultural traits, such as language, values, and religious beliefs; (d) the propensity to cultivate high degrees of internal solidarity through extended kinship ties, school and religious organizations, and preference for endogamy; and (e) the tendency to avoid politics, except when directly related to their interests. (1980:146)

In short, middleman minorities maintain a high degree of "ethnic solidarity". Bonacich points out that internal divisions do arise according to regional, linguistic, religious, and political differences. Nonetheless, in relation to their receiving society, middleman minorities are internally solidary (1973:586).

Furthermore, middleman minorities are noted for eliciting hostility from the surrounding society, and they tend to be victimized by both elites and masses. Turner and Bonacich sketch these characteristic relations:

Middlemen minorities also tend to have somewhat tense and hostile relations with the majority population. They are frequently singled out as targets of (a) violent attacks; (b) discriminatory laws severely limiting their political power; (c) informal practices of discrimination; and (d) a series of distinctive unfavorable stereotypes about social "clannishness" and economic "shrewdness" and "unscrupulousness". (1980:146)

These tense and hostile relationships far exceed the actual threats that middleman minorities pose to the economic livelihood of others. Because these groups are visible, relatively successful economically, and vulnerable, they become an easy target and ideal scapegoat for deeper frustrations and societal problems (Blalock, 1967). Striking against them does not carry the negative repercussions of striking against economic or political elites, and it shifts blame away from elites. This hostility restricts new avenues of employment and allows only minimal ties to be formed with non-members of the ethnic group. European Jews epitomize the middleman minority; their commercial skill can be largely attributed to their social exclusion from majority populations.

In summary, three core variables define middleman minorities: ethnic solidarity, concentration in small business roles, and societal hostility. All are mutually reinforcing by way of six causal linkages. Ethnic solidarity promotes concentration in small business roles because it enables swift distribution of advantageous resources, such as low-interest loans, credit, labor assistance, and needed information. Ethnic solidarity also promotes societal hostility because it leads to accusations of clannishness, disloyalty, and unpatriotism. In the opposing causal direction, concentration in small business effects ethnic solidarity by generating frequent ethnic contacts in the course of conducting business. Economic interests are served by building a trustworthy

reputation within the ethnic group. Concentration in small business also has a causal influence on societal hostility, as it leads to jealousy over amassed wealth and fear of competition. Societal hostility, in turn, promotes ethnic solidarity because it results in segregation and exclusion of the minority group. It establishes a climate of fear which encourages the minority group to turn inward in order to protect itself. The remaining causal linkage is from societal hostility to concentration in small business roles. Because of societal hostility, prospects for employment in the mainstream economy are severely limited and a dangerous environment encourages easy-to-liquidate lines of business (Bonacich and Modell, 1980:20-22).

Though presented in an abstract manner, these variables and their interconnections can be applied to Gujaratis in the South African context. In order to fit these variables or sets of characteristic social traits to the Gujarati South African experience, further refinement of the theory is necessary.

The middleman minority theory incorporates three subtheories or perspectives to explain why the three sets of characteristic traits emerge and then perpetuate themselves. The three perspectives are called the cultural, contextual, and situational. Turner and Bonacich (1980:145) note that sociologists in the middleman minority tradition tend to apply one or the other of the three stated perspectives, but not all simultaneously. They contend that each

perspective contains valuable insights with regard to the emergence and persistence of middleman minorities yet is limited to particular aspects of a broader reality. They advocate the inclusion of all three perspectives in a "composite theory" of middleman minorities, proclaiming that each structurally grounded perspective complements the other. After briefly reviewing these perspectives, I will apply each one to generate hypotheses concerning the Gujaratis' role in South African race relations.

The cultural perspective focuses on those minority group cultural traits that reinforce middleman minority economic and social activity. This perspective largely derives from the school of ethnicity which emphasizes the transplantation of cultural values and practices from the homeland to the host society (Glazier and Moynihan, 1963; Gordon, 1964). The cultural perspective has been applied to middleman minorities by Light (1972; 1979). He argues that group solidarity, communal exchange networks, and values such as independence, thrift, and a work ethic, originate in a middleman minority group's cultural heritage. Groups that do not gravitate into middleman minority roles do not have the same internal organizing capacity or cultural predispositions, according to Light. Light supports his contention with data revealing that Chinese- and Japanese-Americans have higher rates of self-employment than Black-Americans and Mexican-Americans, even though all of these ethnic minorities are disadvantaged in the mainstream American

economy. Light attributes this to cultural background factors, such as rotating credit associations, made possible by an ethos which encourages networking, mutual assistance, and hard work. This unique capacity has been aptly coined a "culture of entrepreneurship" (Tambs-Lyche, 1980).

I will focus on the mercantile history of Gujarat which may have promoted an especially strong culture of entrepreneurship among the Gujaratis. I will also examine cultural features of the migrant ethnic groups, such as religious conversion for the Muslim migrants and middle-caste ranking for the Hindus, which may explain their formation of tight-knit networks and accommodation to South African society.

The contextual perspective concentrates on the role of structural properties of the recipient social system in causing middleman minorities to emerge and persist, rather than on cultural attributes. Bonacich and Modell describe three applications within this perspective (1980:24-27); they are not exhaustive but illustrative of common contextual approaches. One is the "traditional-societies approach". It argues that outside minorities conduct trade and moneylending during the modernization period because such activities represent the breakdown of the traditional moral order where goods had value in use rather than in market exchange. According to this approach, traders are seen as a cause of that breakdown, and they are therefore despised and treated as

pariahs. This contextual approach predicts that middleman minorities disappear in modern capitalism, since trade and commerce gradually lose their negative moral image and are therefore appropriated by more powerful groups.

A second contextual approach looks at the political climate and sees elites encouraging migrant minorities to participate in trade. The elite do so because the minorities can be easily prevented from gaining power, unlike indigenous groups. Bonacich and Modell state: "They can be preserved as outsiders, disenfranchised, threatened with the possibility of expulsion if their economic power gets out of hand, and heavily taxed into the bargain" (1980:25). This approach directs us to questions pertaining to the political roles Gujaratis are constrained to play in order to maintain an ethnic business sector.

A third approach views middleman minorities arising in societies with a status gap (social gulf) between dominant and subordinate groups (Rinder, 1958-59; Shibutani and Khan, 1965; Blalock, 1967). According to this approach, when dominant group members are demeaned by interacting with subordinates on a face-to-face basis, outsiders are recruited to fill the role of go-between. In that capacity, their higher position is visible to the subordinate masses. They become ideal scapegoats in periods of crisis. By serving as a buffer for the dominants against the anger of the masses, they assist dominant group hegemony.

I will focus primarily on the status gap theory. This theory helps explain why the Gujaratis may be playing an important role in stabilizing the status quo of apartheid and capitalism. By providing services to blacks, black self-sufficiency is dampened, and the Gujarati economic skills can promote feelings of inferiority in blacks. White feelings of superiority may be reinforced by avoiding servicing of blacks.

The third theoretical variant is the situational perspective, mainly developed by Bonacich in her seminal article on middleman minorities (1973). It focuses on the historical situation of the migration experience rather than on the culture of origin or on the contextual conditions of the host society. Bonacich takes Simmel's portrayal of the "stranger" as her starting point. The stranger is the recurrent wanderer who never fully belongs to the recipient society and enacts the role of trader. Bonacich locates the roots of the stranger phenomenon in the "sojourning" orientation of strangers (Siu, 1952). Sojourners see themselves as temporary migrants who plan to return to their previous homeland to settle. Often, return is not economically, politically, and socially feasible, but the desire to return remains, creating an ambivalence towards the place of residence. The strong attachment to the ancestral homeland promotes concentration in easy to liquidate middleman lines of business (in case they do return), encourages hard work and thrift for the purpose of accumulating capital as fast as possible, and it

preserves ethnic ties and culture. The phenomenon of this sojourning mentality has been noted by the following researchers of Asian minorities: "Even in cases where return migration is unlikely, the sojourning mentality continues to influence the actions of group members, who persist in a stance of aloofness from mainstream society, retain the customs and institutions of the homeland and behave in many ways, as if they were transients rather than permanent settlers" (Aldrich, Jones and McEvoy, 1984:192). They are also known to send money earned in the receiving society to the homeland.

Bonacich sees sojourning as a necessary, yet insufficient condition for the middleman form. (Some sojourners do not become middlemen but rather are employees or have sizeable, non-liquid investments.) Sojourning is conducive to easily liquidated or transportable occupations, such as trade and independent professions. The communal solidarity evoked from a special orientation toward the homeland allows for special economic treatment of ethnic kin and the control of internal competition (1973:585-6). Bonacich claims that culture is not simply being transplanted, since first generation migrant Chinese, Indians, and Jews were rarely small businessmen in their homelands, but became middlemen in just about every country to which they migrated. Furthermore, some of the source countries of middleman minorities have sojourning immigrants who dominate small business activity, such as Parsis in India (1973:588).

The issue of whether the Gujaratis have maintained a "sojourning mind set" has distinct implications in the South African context. I will use case study interview excerpts to show evidence of substantial variations in orientation towards India among older, middle, and younger generation Gujaratis. I will discuss how the intensity of the special tie to India creates greater suspicion and mistrust of Gujaratis by blacks.

3). The Cultural Perspective

According to the cultural perspective of the middleman minority theory, when certain migrant groups leave their homeland, they take with them cultural values and practices promoting entrepreneurship. These practices are transplanted from the ancestral homeland to the new society. Light believes that certain disadvantaged migrant minorities, particularly those from Asia and the Near East, have developed a culture built upon mutual assistance. This bond provides a collective support system for developing businesses. Other disadvantaged minority groups are unable to form effective social networks for business success, according to Light, because they do not have as mutually cooperative a cultural legacy.

In this section, I will use the cultural perspective to discuss some cultural resources which may have assisted the Gujaratis in occupying a middleman minority niche in South Africa. The cultural

perspective first directs an investigation of the Gujarati homeland culture that might have been directly or indirectly transplanted by the migrants to South Africa. Gujarati culture in fact is not a uniform, cohesive one, but rather one divided along religious, caste, and ethnic lines. But within these varieties of Gujarati subculture a common theme of mutual support within the subgroup can be seen. Such mutual aid associations and revolving credit associations best represent these support systems. I will draw on information gathered through interviews of South African Gujaratis to describe the cultural support systems which helped the group succeed in its economic pursuits.

The South African Gujarati "culture of entrepreneurship" may be rooted in their homeland's historic role in internal and overseas trade. Gujarat is a seaport region of India with a long and rich history of merchantile activity. The Surat and Saurashtra areas, home of those who migrated to South Africa, were especially important in internal trade (Gopal, 1975; Spodek, 1976). Gujarati overseas sailing dates back to the pre-Christian era, and trade along the east coast of Africa occurred well before the arrival of Vasco de Gama from Portugal in 1498 (Gopal, 1975). Trading, be it internal or overseas, was a central element of the Gujarat region for Hindus and Muslims alike. Surat became the central port in the late sixteenth century, until Britain made Bombay the main port in the nineteenth century. The dominant merchants were Hindu, followed by the Jains,

and only a small number of Muslims, both foreign and local converted Hindus, were large merchants (Pearson, 1974).

By the middle nineteenth century, the most active overseas traders were the Muslims who were converted in the fifteenth century from Hindu castes. For decades prior to their migration to South Africa, Gujarati Muslims, unburdened by Hindu caste restrictions, would go on long distance travels, which they called "safars" (Meer, 1969:16). They went to larger Indian cities, north to Burma, or to overseas destinations such as Mauritius and Reunion, in search of business prospects. They would return to their home villages once or twice a year. Although Muslims were the initial pioneers, the more successful ones soon sent for Hindus from their home regions to assist with clerical and administrative matters. The Hindus likewise gravitated into self-employed trade.

In fact, the direct Indian ancestors of the Gujarati South African migrants were not primarily engaged in commerce. Some held important posts in local governments, some had received valuable land gifts from the Moghuls, and a few were involved in shipping. "The vast majority, however, were impoverished peasant proprietors whose traditional economy had been shattered by the exorbitant land tax" (1969:16). Precise statistics have never been collected for the Gujarati South Africans. I did, however, obtain economic histories from 19 of my 22 older generation interviewees (over 65 in 1982). Of these 19, six had immediate ancestors who were bourgeois in class

standing. Four of these six had ancestors who were in wholesale trade and two had predecessors in industry. Of the other 13 informants, only one had an immediate ancestor--his grandfather--who concentrated in petty trade. Eight had agriculturalist ancestors--peasant proprietors, and two came from a long line of religious priests. Two were descendants of jewelers.

Although my interviewees covered a broad occupational range, the wealthier were disproportionately represented in my sample (see chapter 5 for methodology). My finding of six out of 19 Gujaratis with bourgeois ancestry is no doubt high. Although the majority of Gujarati emigrants did not have bourgeois or trading origins, the cultural perspective suggests that their exposure to a "culture of entrepreneurship" in western India affected their choice of trading professions in the new societies to which they migrated.

When the Gujaratis arrived in South Africa they concentrated in entrepreneurial pursuits. In spite of legal obstacles, they have been on the whole successful in trade and commerce in South Africa. Although data on Indian economic activity upon arrival are far from complete, three general themes concerning Gujaratis and trade emerge from inspecting available sources. First, the Gujaratis concentrated in trade in South Africa, but ran the occupational gamut from hawker to large merchant, and not all were successful in establishing their own businesses (Girwala, 1974; Tayal, 1980). Second, the Gujaratis were the only nonwhite group of substantial size to concentrate in

trade, with other nonwhites primarily engaged in working class occupations (Moodley, 1976). Third, the Gujaratis were able to out-do white traders in supplying basic commodities to customers because they accepted lower profit margins and were flexible to client needs (Arkin, 1981). Between the 1880s and the 1930s, the Gujaratis became the leading retail traders for the consumer needs of Indians, Africans, poorer whites (mainly Afrikaner), and Coloreds.¹ The Gujaratis and other smaller sectors of passenger Indians took the lead in establishing shops and hawking goods in the urban areas and outlying rural districts (Calpin, 1949; Meer, 1969).

To add to the sparse data on the economic activity of the initial Gujarati immigrants to South Africa, I asked appropriate questions to my 50 interviewees. The older generation interviewees had the most direct contact with the initial South African migrant in their immediate families. For 16 of the 22, the father was the first migrant, arriving anywhere from the early 1880s to the turn of the century. For two, the grandfather was the first migrant, one arriving from Mauritius in the early 1870s and the other from Reunion (a French colony) in 1899. Two of the three older females whom I interviewed were themselves the first arrivees from their immediate families, marrying sons of initial Gujarati emigrants. One male was an initial emigrant, but he did not arrive until 1947, to serve as a Hindu priest. (The Gandhi-Smuts Agreement of 1914 permitted six Indian-educated entrants to emigrate into South Africa per year to serve specific community needs.)

My interviewees discussed the economic livelihood of their initial family migrant (including the father-in-laws of the two women). Except for two religious priests, all pioneer migrants engaged in some form of trading business in South Africa. Most of them formed partnerships. Whether or not three of the businessmen engaged in business partnerships could not be determined. Of the remaining 17, six never engaged in partnerships with siblings, relatives, or ethnic kin. Five were largely involved as partners with their brothers, two with other relatives, and four with ethnic kin. Some started as partners almost immediately, others began as hawkers and assistants and gravitated into partnerships or separate businesses.

A major form of ethnic support these early migrants relied upon to succeed in business is the rotating credit association. These organizations have been of particular advantage to Asian minorities, who develop these economic support structures in their homeland (Light, 1972; Auster and Aldrich, 1984). It is interesting that of the six who did not engage in partnerships, ^{two of} their sons recalled that their father's engaged in rotating credit associations.

One Hindu jeweler's father, of the same occupation, was involved in a rotating credit association. His son recalls:

"They would put money in a lottery, like 30 people, and it came to £7 and 10 shillings. The man who wins pays the creditors on a gradual basis." (Mzonoa)

A Muslim interviewee also discussed the use of a rotating credit system by his father, called the jita:

"No, my father had lost everything, and I had nothing. At that time <1929> there was a system of a few people who gather on Sunday, bringing £5 apiece. Whoever paid more, could take the whole pot of money and pay later on. They call it jita, like gambling...My father and myself bought about three jitas." (Dzcoa)

Due to the nature of the interviews, which primarily focused on individual accomplishments and beliefs, interviewees were not heavily prompted to discuss formal or informal displays of mutual support by family members and ethnic kin in business. Therefore, less than half of the interviewees actually discussed formal or informal displays of mutual support. The following three quotes illustrate what may be common experiences of informal mutual support arrangements:

"Once my father got a loan, he started a successful business there. He then called my one uncle who was in Rangoon, Burma, where a lot of our village people had gone to. He then called each uncle one at a time saying it was good here and he needed their manpower so they should join the business." (Dzcoa)

"He asked some of his people from Ranavav to come and make money in this country. They would come along and he would keep them in his own room for three months, give them a language course, train them where to buy and where to sell. After three months he would tell them, 'Now boys, go this way and start finding your own field.' He

would tell employees who were very energetic and had know-how, 'Now you take over this store completely.' He was given the nickname Old Oaktree because so many branches derived from him."
(Ezrma)

A young interviewee, approximately 25 years of age, reported:

"There would always be some big merchant family who would lend to the guys coming up. This happened with my own father. His first job was sweeping my mom's uncle's shop. When my father wanted to go into business, he asked my mother's uncle, 'Can you help me?' The norm was, 'Here is the money, I'll start you off.' It was in a sense keeping up with the community spirit back home--the help aspect." (Czocya)

The sparse data I collected does not warrant the conclusion that ethnic obligations applied equally to all Gujaratis or that mutual assistance occurred on a regular basis. Fortunately, there is a store of data, such as in Indian South African Who's Who volumes, which show that many religious, cultural, educational, welfare, and sport associations existed (see Appendix A). These associations provide a setting for the establishment of mutual assistance networks. Here I will try to locate general underlying cultural factors which may have facilitated the formation of formal and informal mutual assistance networks. By probing into the legacies of the ethnic subgroups which constitute the Gujarati migrants, we can come closer to an understanding of their culture of entrepreneurship.

The two major Muslim ethnic groups that migrated from Gujarat, the Memans from Saurashtra and the Sunni Vohras from Surat, have much in common. They share a Hindu ancestry, having converted to Islam in the fifteenth century from middle level Hindu castes. This common religious experience may have promoted additional cultural resources for successful entrepreneurship. In this century, both Muslim ethnic groups have experienced substantial occupational mobility in commerce, trade, and the professions in South Africa and other international destinations. They were more likely to migrate than arabic Muslim groups in Gujarat and other regions of India. Their social mobility has been enhanced by well organized, formal associations and informal communal networks (Misra, 1964).

The word Meman comes from the arabic word "Mome", which means "people of believers". The Memans are converted Vaishya (trading) caste Hindus. An historically knowledgeable Meman interviewee informed me that prior to settling in Saurashtra, Memans lived in a village in Sind that is now part of Pakistan. Once converted, they migrated in the fifteenth or sixteenth century from this village to a town along a caravan route in Sind. The Memans migrated to further trade and to seek converts. But they found trading conditions unsafe due to piracy, and found themselves persecuted because of their religion. They decided to travel westward to Porbandar, the major port in Saurashtra. From Porbandar, they eventually moved in all directions and adopted many livelihoods; they became shopkeepers, shop assistants, fieldhands, and farmers.

In spite of their dispersion, the Memans established strong communal ties across geographical distances, and they developed a sophisticated business outlook. One Meman interviewee, who was 87 years old at the time of the interview, expressed with pride the reputation Memans have gained for being astute businessmen: "In England, the Scotchman is the cleverest man. Everyone says that. In India, in the Muslim community, the Memans are called the Scotch. We are close to them. We are very shrewd." He also spoke of how tightly-knit the Meman community was in Durban:

"The Meman community was small. When I came in 1907, there were 200-300 Memans. Now we are at least 2,000. The Memans all lived within one mile. We would meet each other daily. We'd go to each other's shop and see each other outside of shops." (Tzyoa)

In contrast to the Memans, the Sunni Vohras do not have a history of migration prior to the nineteenth century. In fact, Sunni Vohra means "indigenous Muslim". The Sunni Vohras' ancestors were agriculturalists in the central and southern villages of Gujarat. They did not gravitate heavily towards trade until the latter part of the nineteenth century, when their landholdings were becoming increasingly debt-ridden. At that time, they began to form numerous mutual-aid associations, which expanded and grew in number. Although the Sunni Vohras do not have the same commercial reputation as the Memans, they come close. They are one of the most upwardly mobile

and professionally advanced Indian Muslim groups, both in and outside of India (Misra, 1964).

Both of these Muslim subcultures, the Sunni Vohras and the Memans, are especially known for their numerous formal associations, serving economic and social needs of individuals and of the Muslim community at large. Their numerous multi-purpose associations in South Africa are listed in Who's Who volumes and associational directories (Brandaw, 1939-40; Manjoo, 1972; Dinath, 1972). In South Africa, these associations enhance the group's middleman minority status and provide strength to resist assimilation; their underlying impetus might have been the initial need to protect and support a Muslim identity after conversion in a predominantly Hindu society.

Although social networks, strengthened through the formal establishment of associations, serve middleman minority economic functions, only certain groups have a propensity to form tight networks. These groups, such as Meman and Sunni Vohra Muslims, have a cultural legacy which emphasizes the socio-emotive importance of group solidarity. Thus, an underlying cultural ethos could assist in the establishment of mutual aid associations in times when group solidarity is important for economic survival and progress. The common historical experience of religious conversion (from Hindu to Muslim) may be an important factor, in addition to geographical location, in explaining why the Memans and Sunni Vohras have both occupied a middleman minority niche throughout the world.

Gujarati Hindus in South Africa have also formed strong mutual assistance networks and mutual aid associations. Their associations have honored a range of communal distinctions (Nowbath, 1960). Although most Gujarati Hindus in South Africa have Vaishya caste origins, few were traders, per se, in India. Most emigrants, Muslim and Hindu, were peasant proprietors. As peasant proprietors, their families were involved in trading the commodities produced at home, usually to merchants. This activity served as a preparation to engage explicitly in commerce overseas.

The final aspect of Gujarati culture I will focus on is caste consciousness. In Indian society, caste dominated much of Hindu life. The status of the Brahmin remained supreme over the Kshatriyas, the Vaishyas, the Sudras, and the outcastes, who were ranked accordingly. In the typical village all of the main caste groups were represented. Despite having the highest status, the Brahmins were usually not as wealthy as were the Kshatriyas and the Vaishyas. This made adjustment to South Africa easier for middle-caste Hindus, who were placed in a new middle caste as a race group. They were also less likely to migrate to the Transvaal than were the Muslims, and remain in Natal under British colonial rule, as they were under the British in India. Furthermore, given that they were of a higher caste than the majority of Indian South Africans of indentured origin, also lighter in skin complexion (a correlative of caste), and higher in socio-economic status, additional support is

added to the thesis that they were not too uncomfortable with the racial-caste system. As long as economic success was at hand, and there were groups lower in the status hierarchy, the denial of "white" privileges could be accepted according to this application of the cultural perspective of the middleman minority theory.

One could also look at the role of caste consciousness in promoting an entrepreneurial ethic. It may have played an important role in providing the Gujarati Hindu immigrants with the necessary confidence to take risks in the new South African society. They could deal with elites as well as the masses, something that middleman minority activities require. Since light skin has been associated with superiority in color-conscious India, the light skinned Gujarati (the Gujarati Hindus and Muslims do vary in skin complexion, but most are light) had the added confidence and motivation to migrate and to prove themselves equal or superior in capabilities to the South African whites. In addition, Indian society prepared the Gujarati to handle manifest and latent prejudices of the South African whites.

Furthermore, caste consciousness may have served to distance the Gujarati from other Indians with darker skin as well as from Africans in South Africa. Even among the Gujarati themselves skin color bestows status. Two economically successful and associationally active caste groups are the Iohanas and the Patels (at the Vaishya caste level). They also tend to be somewhat lighter in skin complexion than other Gujarati Hindus.

In applying the cultural perspective, there are several cultural resources that can be considered as transplanted from Gujarat. Gujarat's historic role as a center of overseas commerce appears to have played a major role in stimulating a trade ethos. The historical experiences of the Memans and Sunni Vohras, who were the most likely Muslim groups to migrate and experience upward mobility, likewise proved advantageous. In addition to having some experience in trade, these converted Muslim groups are noted for particularly well developed mutual aid associations. Perhaps the conversion experience facilitated the need to maintain communal solidarity in order to reinforce a Muslim identity in Hindu environs. Also, it seems logical that they were able to establish better relationships with Hindus due to their similar background. This could also have served as an advantage when mutual aid across communal boundaries was needed. Finally, it can be asserted that caste consciousness would be a cultural resource transplanted from India which promoted middleman minority concentration in South Africa. For the Gujarati Hindus in particular, the opportunities and constraints of an ascribed middle status in India could serve as preparation for adjustment to South Africa's racial caste system.

The cultural perspective has been of assistance in generating plausible hypotheses on the Gujaratis' economic activity. To the extent that these cultural resources are instilled in the Gujarati consciousness, one can anticipate greater obstacles for

Gujarati-Black solidarity. This is because these traits enhance economic competition and mutual support for the ethnic group, but do not contain qualities which facilitate the formation of bonds across communal borders, especially with subordinated groups. This is not to say that such bonds cannot be formed between middleman minority and subordinate groups in a stratification order, just that the cultural perspective only deals with internal traits that have allowed certain minority groups to get ahead in entrepreneurial activities.

The cultural perspective does not deal with the social structure of the recipient society and how it enables certain minority groups to become so-called middleman minorities. In other words, it does not ask the question, "What was occurring in South Africa to open the door for Gujaratis to concentrate in middleman minority economic pursuits?" With this question we turn to the contextual perspective.

4). The Contextual Perspective

The contextual perspective concentrates on structural properties of the recipient social system, rather than on the minority group's cultural attributes, in causing middleman minorities to emerge. A prominent subtheory within the contextual perspective is the status gap theory (Blalock, 1967). It is based on the fact that in social systems with a wide gulf in power and prestige between dominants and

subordinates, these groups interact only when subordinates are serving dominants. Were the dominants to serve the subordinates' needs, the dominants would lose some of their needed aura of superiority. "Such a gap is formed in feudal societies between the aristocracy and peasants, in slave societies between free persons and slaves, in colonial societies between the colonizers and the colonized, and in racist societies between dominant and subordinate groups" (Bonacich and Modell, 1980:26). The maintenance of a status gap serves dominant group interests by establishing a normative basis for inequality and deference. It can be argued that the Gujaratis, as a middleman minority, served white capitalist interests by stabilizing the status gap and diverting the attention of subordinates from the source of their problems.

A basic mechanism that diverts the attention of subordinates away from their exploitation by the dominant class is the institutionalization of racial and ethnic antagonism through competition for scarce resources. Such antagonism prevents classes from relating to one another on the basis of common class interests or common elements of oppression and leads them to focus on narrow ethnic sentiments. Bonacich (1972) has proposed the notion of a "split labor market" to account for ethnic antagonisms between higher-priced and cheaper-priced labor. Whereas Bonacich focuses on large capital and the use of labor in her split labor market analysis, I will extend the same logic to large capital and the petite bourgeoisie, and therefore to middleman minorities.

In the split labor market, conflict arises between three sectors: large business, higher-paid labor, and cheap labor. When certain minority groups are willing to work for cheap pay (since no better alternatives exist), and an established laboring class is undercut by the influx of this cheap-wage labor, competition ensues between the laboring classes. This serves to benefit the capitalist class in its struggle with labor. To some extent it benefits higher-paid labor, which can impose exclusionary measures on cheaper labor.

Although middleman minorities do not sell their labor, they resemble cheaper labor in that they tend to sell goods at a lower profit margin than other entrepreneurs. This practice generates intra-class struggle across racial lines, as it hinders the accumulation of capital assets by more expensive entrepreneurs. Unless restrictions are imposed on the cheaper entrepreneurs, they will succeed at the expense of other entrepreneurs.

Prior to the Gujarati arrival as passenger Indians, an established white petite bourgeoisie worked as general dealers, grocers, salesmen, and farmers, performing services for all races (Arkin, 1981:71-81). Africans did not compete with them because the Africans had been effectively prevented from gaining a foothold in trade and commerce. In Natal, the Great Trek and Zulu wars dispossessed the Africans of much of their land. This, combined with hut taxes imposed by the British in 1849, broke the pastoral Zulus'

self-subsistent family economies (Meer and Mlaba, 1982). Like other African tribal groups, they were forced to periodically send family members away from their village communities to provide unskilled labor in white areas. The laborers never earned enough wages to generate capital, nor did they have access to necessary credit to become firmly established in trade and commerce (Motsuenyane, 1978). The ex-indentured Indians and Cape Coloreds offered limited competition but had similar difficulties in generating capital due to low wages, special discriminatory taxes, and other restrictions.² Intra-class competition primarily ensued between petit-bourgeois whites (and working class whites who felt blocked in their social mobility efforts) and the Gujaratis.

Who benefited from the presence of a migrant middleman minority, such as the Gujaratis, in South Africa? At first glance, consumers seem to have benefited in the sense that commodities were more available and sold at a cheaper price. But this benefit was superficial. Employers could lower or keep a lock on wages, thereby maintaining their labor force more cheaply. Working class blacks have always received low wages. The Gujarati presence did not benefit subordinate groups since the latter were at a disadvantage relative to the experienced, communally-assisted, middleman minority firms in the competition to attain petit-bourgeois status.

Dominant whites in South Africa stood to gain the most from the presence of a middleman minority. Afrikaners and English-speaking whites have differed in their tactics and use of ideology to support their hegemony, but their relationship to subordinate groups has been basically the same. Retail trade and the provision of various services to working-class Africans, Coloreds, and Indians is important for the economy. Dominant whites have needed a small powerless minority group to fill this niche. Why? It is the answer to this question which ultimately explains why the Gujaratis have received enough protection not to be ousted by racist white competitors.

One reason that it has not been in the interests of dominant whites to have white compatriots serve the consumptive needs of subordinates is that white hegemony would be weakened. To maintain a sense of solidarity based on racial superiority, it is essential that whites do not "serve" blacks. Also, in order to maintain a "white" hegemony, it is important that whites "run" the country, that is knowledge and authority are not too widely dispersed among blacks. As South Africa began to reap enormous economic benefits from its strategic raw materials such as gold, diamonds, and minerals, the economy required more managers and servicers of medium and large-scale capital, and the state more administrators (Legassick, 1974; Greenberg, 1980). The whites were too few in number to fill the growing industrial, financial, and administrative needs of the country to allow them to exert their energies into self-employment.

In addition, capitalist class interests benefited from greater competition in the petit-bourgeois ranks. Not only does competition generate greater ethnic antagonism, it limits the number of individuals who are able to rise to the capitalist class, minimizing competition. Furthermore, greater competition among the petite bourgeoisie facilitates a more rapid selling of capitalist class goods, owing to a greater number of sellers, their longer working hours, and dispersion into rural areas. As was the case with the split labor market, a split petty bourgeoisie strengthens the economic position of capitalists.

This is not to suggest that class splits along racial and ethnic lines result from conspiratorial design, but rather the splits result from the striving for income or profit maximization. Groups are willing to sell their labor or their goods cheaper than other groups. The racial and ethnic antagonisms which such competition engenders limit the prospects of class solidarity arising among subordinate class sectors. It provides a pool of workers willing to work for the capitalist class, yet who are unable to accumulate enough resources to offer them any competition. Thus the consequences of this economic arrangement benefit capitalist class interests, which results in their tacit support of it, even though fellow whites who are laborers or small business owners are not reaping as much benefits as they might otherwise be able to reap.

Gujaratis, as a middleman minority, can also serve important ideological functions in maintaining the status quo. For example, they can perpetuate the "myth" that Africans, Coloreds, and ex-indentured Indians, by and large, do not have the ability to move upward on the socioeconomic ladder. By knowing how to run a small scale business and by displaying hard work and a business sense, the Gujarati can be used to legitimate the status of subordinates in the stratification system. These subordinates must be kept in their place as they are needed as cheap, unskilled, and semi-skilled labor. Whites, by keeping themselves removed from blacks in their economic activities (except as supervisors), can keep their knowledge and skills a secret and mystery. This serves to perpetuate the myth that whites are special and deserving of more power, wealth, and status.

At the same time, by having a powerless, vulnerable minority occupy a position directly beneath the ruling class, the dominants are not threatened politically. Subordinates who would be more of a political threat compare themselves to the middle group. They perceive themselves as unworthy of the position held by that more deserving, over-ambitious minority group, much less the position of the ruling class.

In sum, the status gap between whites and blacks can be reinforced by having a distinct minority group occupy middle-ranked roles that entail serving blacks. In being more visible to blacks,

the minority also becomes the target of blame for black economic frustrations. When costs go up, the trader is often perceived as taking an unfair share of money out of the pockets of consumers. Rather than consider the broader economic forces that cause price increases, it is easier to blame the trader--especially when the trader's living standard is a notch or two above one's own (Blalock, 1967). Thus, Gujaratis as a middleman minority serve many useful economic and ideological functions for dominant whites. Apparent attempts to expel the Gujaratis and restrict their economic advances, have largely been methods by which the dominant whites have manipulated the Gujaratis for their own class interests.

The Gujarati maintenance of the middleman economic position is partially explained by the interest of dominant groups in a rigid hierarchical society to create ethnic scapegoats for societal frustrations, to encourage competition in the servicing of goods, and to create an appearance of a benefit to consumers when large capitalists actually benefit. Another perspective will add further insights into the Gujaratis' position by focusing on the group's immigration experience. To further explain the economic position of migrant minorities such as the Gujaratis, as well as occasional outbursts of hostility against them from various sectors of the surrounding society, the middleman minority theory offers the situational perspective.

5). The Situational Perspective

Bonacich (1973) stresses the significance of the "sojourning orientation" of middleman minorities. Subscribing to the "myth of return" (Anwar, 1979), the sojourner desires to return to the ancestral homeland, in spite of the realization that permanent return is not feasible for social, political, and economic reasons. Middleman minorities are often able to maintain symbolic and concrete ties with their homeland through visits, communication, and associational activities. The strength of the "sojourning orientation" generally lessens with subsequent generations, but can linger longer if societal hostility continues, and ties with the homeland are possible. Bonacich sees this attachment to the ancestral homeland as promoting the desire to make money as fast as possible and to be engaged in easily transportable occupations such as self-employed business. Migration, if it should occur, would then be far easier. Travel need not be to the original homeland but could be to regions where a tie with the homeland can be maintained (for instance, where an ethnic niche has been established).

In this section, I will discuss evidence of an initial sojourning orientation among the Gujarati settlers and investigate whether or not such an orientation exists in the minds of subsequent generations. Also, I will address the consequences a sojourning orientation can have for race relations in South Africa.

Based on my interviews and other more casual conversations, the first generation migrant Gujaratis had a very strong attachment to their home regions in India and frequently made extended visits. A typical recollection of the original tie, which may have been translated into the memories of subsequent generations, was expressed by a Sunni Vohra Muslim:

"The first pioneers who came to the Transvaal were people from Kholvad. In Natal, a lot of people came from Kathor. The two villages are separated by a river. The people from Kholvad came to Transvaal from Durban by stagecoach. The first person came in 1883. His name was Cajee. There was always inter-communication between the people in South Africa and their relatives and friends in India. After a certain period, they would go back to India. The communication was never broken.

My family members came here and settled after my grandfather came. My grandmother and I came in 1909 with my grandfather. He went back to India and returned with us. This was the situation all around...I was eight years old when I came."
(Gzroa)

Customarily, males established themselves in South Africa before bringing their families. Usually, they traveled back to India, got married, and produced offspring there. They would then return to South Africa to earn money, usually leaving their families behind. Immigration restrictions limited their leaves to three years, and by 1913 pressured them to bring their families to South Africa or return to India permanently (Joshi, 1942; Meer, 1969).

The 1936 South African Census offers empirical evidence that males preceded females in settling in South Africa. In the census, foreign-born Indians were classified by birthplace, and data on year of arrival was provided. Since Gujaratis constitute approximately 95 percent of the emigrants from Bombay, the data on males and females born in Bombay essentially refers to them.

In 1936, there were 2133 females living in South Africa who were born in Bombay and 5901 males--a rate of 36 females per 100 males. Of the small number of Indian South Africans who left India between 1871-1880 and were still alive in 1936, the female to male rate was 20 per 100 (less than the total rate). The rates for subsequent decades until 1911-1920 were even lower: in 1881-1890 it was 14 per 100, in 1891-1900 only 4 per 100 and in 1901-1910 only 10 per 100. It increased in 1911-1920 to 30 per 100, in 1921-1930 to 63 per 100, and in 1931-1936 the number of females to males was almost equal--94 per 100. A large number of the migrants from Bombay from 1913 onwards were children born in India who had to arrive in South Africa in their childhood in order to gain rights of domicile. Although only one of my interviewees was initially a passenger Indian (an educated entrant), 17 of the 22 older generation interviewees (over 65 years of age in 1982) were born in India. They came to South Africa by their sixteenth birthday in order to gain rights of domicile, often returning with their fathers after they visited India.

Often, fathers and sons lived in South Africa while the mothers and daughters remained in India. The men saved money and worked hard, assisted by their sons. An interviewee recollected his childhood experiences in this arrangement. He lived frugally then and still lives frugally today in a modest flat. (He is reputed to be at least a millionaire.) He stated:

"We lived in a place here in Queen Street with other relatives who were also partners with my father. We were all males in the cottage. The bulk of the Indians in those days did not bring their wives into this country. They just came for a couple of years and they go back again. We lived there for quite a while. Then a partner brought in his family from India, so we moved out to Madressa Arcade to make room for them. I boarded with my father and slept with him on one bed for six to eight months. I asked for my own bed and was given a place in the next room and I slept on the floor with a pillow and a blanket. Perhaps, he couldn't afford a bed, but we weren't short of anything--he gave me spending money and we ate good food at a hotel. Then after six months he bought me a steel bed at Lockhat Brothers for about 19 shillings and a mattress for about 80 cents." (Bzkoa)

I tried to assess the strength of the attachment to India held by my 50 interviewees. I pooled statements pertaining to experiences in India, trips to India, and perceptions of life in India. If no mention was made of India, or comments were only negative, they were coded as having a weak tie. If it seemed to me that they felt an especially strong attachment to India, they were coded as strong.

Otherwise, they received a code of moderate, which indicates a sense of attachment, but not as intense of one as a strong tie. The stronger the bond, the stronger the "sojourning cast of mind" (Aldrich, Jones and McEvoy, 1984:192). Those with the strongest attachment to India can be presumed to most strongly desire to settle in India if circumstances allowed. The codes I issued are displayed in Table 2-1.

Table 2-1
Frequency Distribution of Strength of Attachment to India,
Controlling for Age-Cohort

Strength of Attachment	Age-Cohort							
	<u>Older</u>		<u>Middle</u>		<u>Younger</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
<u>Strong</u>	6	(27.3)	0	(0.0)	2	(12.5)	8	(16.0)
<u>Moderate</u>	11	(50.0)	8	(66.7)	7	(43.8)	26	(52.0)
<u>Weak</u>	5	(22.7)	4	(33.3)	7	(43.8)	16	(32.0)
Total	22	(100.0)	12	(100.0)	16	(100.1)	50	(100.0)

In Table 2-1, we see that the older age-cohort did display a stronger attachment than the next two age cohorts; however, only 27.3 percent of them expressed strong feelings, close to the "ideal-type" sojourning mentality. It should be noted that although five members of the older age-cohort expressed a weak attachment, four of the five

(who were Muslim) expressed stronger attachments to Pakistan and Mecca. Only one older generation interviewee felt a weak attachment to all foreign destinations.

One older generation interviewee who had a strong attachment to India illustrates an underlying feature of the sojourning mentality. This interviewee and others with strong ties paint a picture of life there as *gemeinschaft*, in contrast to their perceptions of life as *gesellschaft* in South Africa. Ferdinand Toennies (1963) used the term *gemeinschaft* to depict a society where actions are controlled by love, understanding, common values, and customs. He found this type of society in pre-industrial, rural areas. He used the term *gesellschaft* to describe his perception of industrial, urban life, where there is a lack of norms of morality and individuals deceive one another in an environment of mistrust to advance private interests. The excerpt below comes from an older woman who had a rather privileged economic background as a member of the patel Hindu caste, yet famines and excessive taxes forced her family to shift from farming to business. She now lives in the heart of the urban Indian trading area in Durban. She reminisced with pride and nostalgia about village life in India, showing preference for that *gemeinschaft* life over *gesellschaft* city life in South Africa:

"My father and mother didn't work on the farm, they only supervised it. Local people, poor people, with no land worked on the farm and at the end of the year they would get a share of what came out. Our farm was 100 acres, and many people

used to work there. They used to farm vegetables, sugar cane, cotton, monkey nuts, and bajra, which is brown wheat. There was no equipment--just two ox and a wooden plough. They drew water from a well for the farming. They had lots of problems because of not enough water, but now they got machines to draw water in India. Before they had like a gutter so the water would go all over.

Life in the village is completely different. They work very hard. They get up at three in the morning and draw the milk. Before, we used to give sour milk and milk surplus free. My father had so many cows that he used to give it free. That's how life used to carry on. It was a very nice life, very quiet and nice. There was love for each other in the village, not like this city life.

My family no longer owns the farm. My brothers and and brother-in-law had to leave the farm by 1920 to seek business prospects in Bombay. Later the farm was sold because it went in debt." (Pzroa)

It is certainly difficult to probe deeply into the older generation's subjective orientation toward their land of residence, but elements of a sojourning orientation were moderately or strongly apparent among most interviewees. They recounted in sharp detail the earlier days when they, their parents, and perhaps grandparents maintained a strong tie to India. Many did not perceive South Africa as their home, even though they had lived there most or all of their lives. Some spoke of possibly moving to various international destinations where Gujarati settlements had been established, although it could not be easily ascertained to what extent they felt pulled to those destinations versus feeling pushed out of South Africa.

None of the middle generation interviewees expressed to me deep attachments to India, however, two-thirds did express moderate ties. Two of them were born in India, and three others with moderate ties went to India for schooling purposes. None of the four with weak ties went to India for anything more than a brief visit. (Only one middle generation interviewee had never been to India.) Below are two excerpts of interviews from middle generation informants with moderate ties, followed by two from informants with weak ties (none expressed strong ties). They illustrate the two types of responses to the Indian homeland:

"I like India to go out and visit. I visit India every three or four years and I like to travel once every year. I wouldn't like to live in India permanently. There are various cities in India like Bombay, Banglor, and Burma that are very nice cities but basically there are two reasons why I don't like it there. One is the climate. Although it's pretty hot out this way, it's much hotter in India. I find that the climate doesn't agree with my health. The second thing is if I have to start a business there, I would be completely lost. You know, the way of life in India is quite different from how you earn a livelihood here.

I'm not critical of everything in India. I would say in the cultural sphere, there are some fantastic opportunities for a way of life in India. There are many philosophical currents and the people are very hospitable; they are very, very friendly. The people are very friendly people." (Pztma - moderate tie)

"I know ever since I've been to Rajkot, Kathiawar in my early youth, I normally make it a point to meet all those that are relatives, even if it's only for five minutes to say, 'Hello--how are you?' I just feel like I want to meet them again and say 'hi'.

I like India but I don't think India would be the most likely place to go to if I felt threatened to leave South Africa. I would have to ask myself, although I may like certain places or certain countries more than others, where would my kids be able to adjust. I'll only do this if there's a harm of security for my children in South Africa. I would go where I know my kids could have a secure future, where they would be proud of themselves being Indians, where they could feel that at a later stage they could be an asset to that community or that country."

(Dzuma - moderate tie)

"When I went to visit my father's home in India in 1978, it looked like a stable--very primitive. I had a distant cousin who died very recently who lived there. She was half blind. My husband's brother explained to her who I was and she cried with joy. She said, 'This is your home--you must live here now.' The home was very primitive and dusty. There was a wardrobe standing in one corner and I don't think it had ever been moved since my father left the village. It was unbelievable. I said to her 'Thank you very much but no thanks.'

The street in the village was very much as my father left it--it was a wide, dusty, old road. The whole village consisted of this one street, like homes just sort of came off the streets. Our distant cousin pointed out to us homes of several families that have come to South Africa. We know all of these people but we are not especially close. There were still a few people who lived there. My father had some land, but left it for a member of the family and never bothered to re-claim it." (Azvma - weak tie)

"I went to India once in 1972. I wouldn't like to settle there because of the standard of living and what little contact we had is no longer there. We still do have cousins but they're not as important to us as our family is here now. On my father's side, the number of relatives is very small. On the other hand, if I had to go and live in India, I don't think I'd find it all that difficult. I just have no desire to."
(Azima - weak tie)

The average score for the younger generation (ages 18-30) falls between a moderate and a weak tie, but is closer to moderate, like the middle generation. This average score varies more than does the middle generation's score. Only one younger generation interviewee had schooling in India although half had been to India. No one who had been to India expressed a weak tie, but only two expressed a strong attachment. Of the seven who expressed a weak tie, four had schooling in Europe. One other younger generation interviewee also had a European education, but expressed a strong tie.

Although increasing numbers of younger generation Gujaratis have gone to Europe or elsewhere for their education, the proportion who did so is higher in my sample than it is in the general population. This is because those who assisted in arranging the interviews felt that western-educated Gujaratis near to my age would be more eager to be interviewed by me and that I would enjoy interviewing them. One of the European-educated who became "radicalized" in London explained why he does not identify himself as "Indian":

"Most of the guys that I know, that have become socially and politically aware, it is not important where we came from, but this is our country. We don't look at ourselves as being Indians. There are parts of us that may be called Indian like eating with our hands, eating certain foods, but they don't qualify us as being Indians and not South Africans." (Bzoya - weak tie)

Ten of the younger generation interviewees were Muslim and six were Hindu. Three of the Muslims had weak ties with India because of their Muslim identities. If a Muslim identity coincides with a strong attachment to Mecca, it may be construed as a sojourning mentality as well. Below are three brief quotes from these three interviewees, the third representing a distinct sojourning orientation toward Mecca:

"I am not an Indian. What's an Indian? I am a Muslim. An Indian is supposed to be from India. I'm not from India. I should be more South African than Indian, but I'm not South African. Who had the right to call it African? You are governed by your religion. I am Muslim." (Ezyra - weak tie)

"I tell you honestly, I never feel terrific about telling people I'm from India. My mom was in India for about 10 months during the second world war and came back and told people 'I'm not going back there, nor am I sending my kids there.' I don't think I'll ever go there. So, if someone asks me where am I from, I tell him I am a Muslim. People tell me the Muslims came about in India through the bania Hindus. I don't feel good about that." (Mztya - weak tie)

"I would take my home as being Mecca. The lifestyle there is 90 percent the right way, so it's the best place for us to stay, Mecca or Medina. I would like to live there." (Rzjya - weak tie to India, but strong tie to Mecca)

The interviewees with moderate attachments to India were more proud of their Indian roots, yet felt no overwhelming desire to live in India or travel very frequently to India. They tended to like the urban areas far better than the villages where their ancestors lived. Below are two excerpts selected from conversations with the seven younger generation interviewees who expressed a moderate tie with India. Following that are excerpts from two interviews of Gujaratis who expressed stronger ties and are closer to a sojourning mentality. Each excerpt refers to their visits to India:

"When I visited India I didn't visit my grandparents' village. I went to a smaller village near their village because my auntie lives there. I only spent four days visiting people in this particular village, so I didn't see much of the villages, but they are rather small. In my aunt's village, there are just a few mud-roads--just alleys, really. She had a nice small home. It's not really a cottage, but a few houses that are next to each other. It seems though like a separate home without a garden around it. There is a single room with a bed and a kitchen and toilet. It is very small actually--it's only my aunt and uncle, there is no one else staying with them, so it's enough for them. The village must be a farm village since almost all the tiny villages had farms around them.

I was impressed about the beauty of India. There are a lot of places to see and a lot to do over there. The people themselves are not really worried about other people. There are too many people to worry about. The conditions itself would probably not appeal to you after living in the conditions you are used to here. It's a bit dirty there. The Madressa was disgusting. There aren't any toilet facilities and the people there don't worry about it. The road is for them. Also, there are animals actually in the streets of Bombay following you in a big city. You think to yourself, this is crazy--how can they have animals on the streets with the cars which can't pass through the roads?" (Vzsyva - moderate tie)

"My impressions of India were very different and exciting from what I had thought. There is a lot of poverty, it's dirty, but very interesting to visit. Every place you go to the lifestyle is completely different, like the way people live, dress, behave; everything is different and everyday there is something exciting happening, different people to meet. If you go to Europe, you might go all day without seeing anything unusual. In India, there is always somebody hustling you for money or something weird, especially in the city. However, it is boring in the villages. We stayed in the villages for three nights--you could not stay there any longer, it's so boring. There is absolutely nothing to do. You sit in the evening and the talk is very unexciting and uneventful." (Mzyyya - moderate tie)

"It's like getting back home, that's the type of feeling I had and why I enjoyed it so much. Everything over there is so much a part of you, it's like being home. You feel very comfortable no matter what you do. Everyone gives the impression that Bombay is very fast, it is very crowded and everything. Bombay has a lot of night life and all of that. That is not why I liked India. I just liked India, I just liked being there more than anything. That's the only reason. The Indians in India have about the same

outlook as we have in South Africa. The only difference is the Indians in India feel a bit backward because of the material things we have that they don't have." (Dzsy - strong tie)

"Europe didn't move me but India did--it was very exciting. I got there and had a camera and took pictures. The first day I took about 12 photographs in Bombay and then I traveled all around. It was a very moving experience--a very powerful experience for me. In many ways it was a deja-vu because my mother had talked about places, my granny had talked about places, my uncles had talked about places, so being there didn't feel different or strange--I was quite at home there. I melted quite easily into a crowd. As soon as I threw off my western garb and put on my Kuta and shirt, I was one of the people. The only thing that gave me away was my hair, the fact that I had long hair and I also wore John Lennon type glasses. I speak Hindi quite well, I speak Gujarati very well, so I was able to move around quite comfortably. In many respects, I was a bit of a novelty there. There's a foreigner who spoke fluent English and fluent Hindi and fluent Gujarati. I had many funny experiences like being on the plane from Madras to Calcutta--of course I'm still vegetarian so I booked a vegetarian meal, and the stewardess brings it to me and she tells the other stewardess in Hindi, 'Look at this fancy tourist--they come to India for spiritual enlightenment and they become vegetarian for six weeks.' I let out in the foulest Indian I knew that she mustn't come to conclusions like that." (Izkya - strong tie)

It is not simply the sojourning history, but the subjective memories of it which are central to Bonacich's situational perspective. This memory must affect subsequent generations of migrant middleman minorities. The Gujaratis do have a sojourning history.

The present older generation typically has maintained strong to moderate ties with India, often not feeling "at home" in South Africa (largely due to apartheid). According to this perspective, if the same desire to be mobile is maintained by subsequent generations of Gujaratis, and a concomitant lack of symbolic attachment to South Africa is felt, it will contribute to negative perceptions by other race and ethnic groups. A Gujarati preference for occupations that allow for geographical mobility (whether or not migration actually occurs) will result. My data shows some evidence of a sojourning orientation in subsequent generations, but on the whole, not that strong.

In applying the situational perspective, an understanding is gained into how the Gujaratis' sense of historical identity could add fuel to negative stereotypes. Outbursts of hostility against the Gujarati traders were discussed in Chapter 1 and will be further discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. Perhaps the frequent ethnic displays of moderate ties to India, and occasionally strong ties to India, Pakistan, Mecca, Europe, and elsewhere, increase hostile perceptions by other South Africans. Clearly, it is in the interest of dominant whites to have other whites and as many blacks as possible shift the source of blame for their economic and social frustrations to a scapegoat minority. But that minority also has to act in certain ways which allow for stereotypes to become believable. By maintaining a strong kinship or ethnic tie through a symbolic

identification with India or elsewhere, and concomitantly displaying little tie with South Africa, other South Africans can more easily view Gujaratis negatively (clannish, alien, parasitic, and over-ambitious). These stereotypes have been commonly attributed to the Gujaratis, particularly in their earlier South African history (Moodley, 1976). Even the positive qualities of hard work and business acumen that the Gujarati display are rechannelled into negative perceptions. The group is perceived as only striving after money and as draining the country of resources, rather than contributing to them. In this way the political interests of the dominant class are served by having an outside minority group be economically successful yet be unrooted in the host society.

Gujaratis have been the victims of harsh laws which have hindered their economic development, their sense of residential permanence, their freedom to bring wives and relatives from India, and their rights to have genuine political representation. They are obviously not the cause of this treatment. The implication of the situational perspective is that the Gujarati sense of ethnic history can perpetuate a weaker attachment to South Africa and thereby make it easier for non-Gujaratis to justify their treatment and not perceive the Gujarati as being oppressed.

6). Conclusion

The middleman minority theory addresses the question, "Why do middleman minorities emerge and persist in various societies?" The Gujarati South African immigrants match the ideal-typical middleman minority features (concentration in small business roles, ethnic solidarity, and tense and hostile relations with the surrounding society). Subsequent generations also depict these characteristics (Moodley, 1976). In applying the three perspectives identified by Bonacich within the middleman minority theory, several plausible explanations emerge as to why the Gujaratis have occupied this niche. These explanations can assist in understanding social tensions which hinder Gujarati-Black solidarity.

From the cultural perspective, the Gujaratis' background in India is emphasized. Factors such as their geographical origins near the ports of Surat and Porbandar and the existence of a trading ethos may have encouraged a business orientation in Gujarati culture. The common experience of religious conversion from Hinduism to Islam in the sixteenth century could have provided impetus to certain Muslim groups to establish strong ethnic bonds. Caste consciousness and the consciousness of color, which correlates with caste, may have been an important factor enabling Hindu Gujaratis in particular to occupy a higher status than other nonwhites in South Africa and accept a lower position than whites in the racial-caste system. Each of these arguments require research to be substantiated or refuted.

Several hypotheses arose from applying the contextual perspective to the economic position of the Gujaratis. Concentration centered on the role of the dominant white economic class in South Africa. Detailed, historical analyses are required to test the broad hypotheses deduced from this perspective, which deal with class interests and racial hegemony. One hypothesis states that the capitalists' strong need to suppress their workers wages encouraged the existence of traders willing to sell goods at low-profit margins. Another hypothesis is that the capitalist class encouraged competition and antagonism among petit-bourgeois sectors in order to prevent petit-bourgeois elements from becoming full-fledged bourgeoisie. A third hypothesis is that the ideology of white racial superiority necessitates other groups besides whites as primary servicers of black's basic needs. A migrant minority can serve these needs and in doing so, perpetuate the ideology that whites are a superior race.

One particular contextual-based hypothesis was proposed on the role of migrant middleman minorities in deterring the formation of black hegemony. By having a hard working, thrifty, and austere migrant minority group in middle-ranked roles, the aspirations of the subordinate sectors could be dampened. With dominants kept removed from subordinates in their work activities, and a small minority group with business skills remaining highly visible, a belief is spread that the unequal reward system is just. With such a belief

implanted, little resistance to stratification systems with large status gaps, such as apartheid, would be anticipated. Obviously, in South Africa strong resistance has erupted, however, it can still be asked whether an ideology of inferiority has been internalized by many blacks which in turn has weakened that resistance.

The third perspective, the situational, focuses on the sojourning orientation of migrant minorities which encourages concentration in small business roles and intra-ethnic solidarity. This perspective, in particular, attempts to theoretically link middleman minority economic and ethnic activity with hostility from the surrounding society. Although I did not provide historical detail on these variable linkages in the situational perspective section, I did provide some evidence that Gujaratis in the different age-cohorts vary in their degree of attachment to India. The situational perspective suggests that historical memories of their early migration influence Gujarati ethnic bonds. These bonds are especially intense when a special attachment to the ancestral homeland is felt. This promotes accusations of both clannishness and lack of patriotism to South African soil by other groups. The hostility in turn reinforces ethnic solidarity and a feeling of unrootedness, as well as restricting economic opportunities to the ethnic economy.

Each of the three theoretical perspectives illuminate factors that are responsible for a group to emerge as a middleman minority and perpetuate middleman minority characteristics. The cultural perspective is particularly helpful in aiding understanding of why the Gujaratis, more than other minority groups, became successful occupants of middleman minority roles in South Africa. The contextual perspective directs us to the class and racial structure of South Africa where dominant white interests are served by the presence of a middleman minority group. The situational perspective leads us to consider the influence of the sojourning migration experience on the consciousness of Gujarati South African immigrants and the later generations.

In applying each of the three perspectives, one is not being theoretically eclectic, but thorough, according to Turner and Bonacich (1980). They claim each perspective is equally valid in generating sociological insights on the middleman minority experience. They advocate empirical examination of the emergence of and interactions among the three ideal-typical middleman minority features for given societies.

In the next chapter, I will work with a quantitative data base appropriate for examining some variable interactions pertaining to Gujarati South Africans at two historical periods. My concentration will center on predictors of ethnic solidarity. I will show how quantitative methodology can be fruitfully applied to address empirical questions inspired by the middleman minority theory.

I will also, however, contend that the middleman minority theory is severely inadequate in handling important theoretical questions. Briefly, this is because it fails to adequately address questions dealing with the subjective nature of ethnicity and the formation of social and political relationships with out-groups. The theory contains static, deterministic, inbuilt assumptions. It does not recognize sociological dynamics which result in the decisions made by middle groups (such as the Gujaratis in South Africa) to express their ethnic and political identities, and take concrete actions, toward certain ends which either support dominant or subordinate groups. It requires a different theoretical framework, one which considers ideology and consciousness as central to sociological explanation, to remedy the weaknesses of the middleman minority theory. Before elaborating this critique, I will show how the theory can be applied in a fruitful manner.

Endnotes

¹This was in spite of being prohibited from trading in the Orange Free State, where an 1891 Immigration Restriction Act barred Indian entry.

²One could offer additional reasons as to why Gujaratis, more than any other nonwhite sector, became established in middle-ranked entrepreneurial pursuits. Tayal (1980) states that many Gujaratis arrived with capital, which gave them a needed advantage. Pachai (1971) argues that the Indian presence in overseas British colonies was a test of Britain's imperialist rule, so there was pressure from Britain to protect middle class Indian rights in her colonies. Joshi (1942) acknowledges the influential role that the Indian bourgeoisie in western India had in protecting the rights of the Indian bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie overseas. In sum, the passenger Indians had an initial advantage in entering trade, after which their rights were protected more than Indian laborers. Although these factors should not be dismissed, the needs of dominant whites for a small passenger Indian class should be given due emphasis as well.

Chapter 3: An Application of the Middleman Minority Theory to Gujarati Ethnic Solidarity

1). Introduction

The middleman minority theory directs attention to research on the causes and effects of the three core characteristics which depict a middleman minority: ethnic solidarity, concentration in small business, and hostility from the surrounding society (Turner and Bonacich, 1980). In this chapter I will construct a measurement of ethnic solidarity based on the theory's conceptualization of the term, and test the effects on it of selected independent variables. I will explain how the findings could be interpreted by the theory to add insight into the Gujaratis' role as a middleman minority in South Africa.

A data base created from the 1939 and 1971 Indian South African Who's Who volumes will be used to measure ethnic solidarity and the independent variables. A total of 1610 Who's Who entrants were coded on variables created from their biographical portraits. The total number of associational memberships and the ethnic boundaries of these memberships serve as the most important indices of ethnic solidarity. The selection of these indices accord with the middleman minority theory's conceptualization of ethnicity.

Bonacich (1973), Bonacich and Modell (1980), and Turner and Bonacich (1980) do not view ethnicity as a natural, primordial bond that individuals who share ethnic origins automatically feel (Greeley, 1974), nor as an outmoded, purposeless form of adaptation to advanced, industrial societies (Parsons, 1949). They view ethnicity as an emergent phenomenon which serves certain material functions for a group, such as offering social assistance and political strength to attain economic goals (Yancey, et. al., 1976). The theory's architects emphasize the social organizational forms that provide a context to express ethnicity--therefore they use the term ethnic solidarity. They view ethnic solidarity as the migrant minority's necessary form of adaptation to, and maintenance of, a small business niche in advanced industrial-capitalist societies. It serves small business needs by efficiently dispensing cheap labor power, loans, skills, and information throughout the ethnic group. Ethnic solidarity may be functionally important to other ethnic groups, but Bonacich and her colleagues view it as essential for middleman minorities, who find themselves in powerless and vulnerable circumstances in the hostile, competitive environs of advanced industrial-capitalist societies.

Of the various dimensions of ethnic solidarity, the one Bonacich most emphasizes is the existence of voluntary and semi-voluntary associations which conduct and control internal affairs (Bonacich and Modell, 1980:15-17,196-216; Turner and Bonacich, 1980). The

formation of, and involvement in, intraethnic organizations indicate that ethnic feelings are alive and that the ethnic community is organized to pursue its goals.

The contextual perspective orients foci on the internal class structure of the Gujaratis and the broader South African social structure (see Chapter 2). The Who's Who information allows for measurement of occupational location and level of education. The frequency distributions reveal variation within these variables and ethnic solidarity. This suggests that the entrants were not located in the exact same position in the South African social structure or were equally motivated to formally display ethnic bonds. Although contextual hypotheses will be generated concerning logical interconnections between the independent variables and ethnic solidarity, the statistical analysis will be largely exploratory. The results will be explained from within the logic of the contextual perspective.

The situational perspective directs theoretical attention to the immigration experience as sojourners. The Who's Who volumes contain entrants who are either of passenger origin (having a sojourning legacy) or of indentured origin (not having a sojourning legacy). By controlling for other variables, such as occupational location and level of education, it can be ascertained whether immigrant origins has effects on ethnic solidarity. If the Gujaratis display higher levels than non-passenger Indians, it could be concluded that their

unique immigration experience has had a bearing on their ethnic bonds.

2). The Who's Who Data Base

There have been several publications commemorating the accomplishments of South Africans of Indian descent. None of the publications has as much breadth (in terms of numbers of biographical portraits) as do two Indian South African Who's Who volumes, one published in 1939 and the other published in 1971. Most Who's Who volumes contain an infinitesimal proportion of the population from which the entrants were selected; these two volumes do not. An advantage of the small size of the Indian South African population is that records such as the Who's Who provide individual-level data on a higher proportion of the total population than do most population surveys. Gujarati males were especially well represented in terms of proportions. Approximately four percent of all adult Gujarati males appeared in the 1939 volume and two percent appeared in the 1971 volume.

The typical Who's Who biography is a quarter of a page long and includes a picture of the entrant; occasionally a whole page is devoted to a family. Apparently, gaining entrance into the Who's Who was not very difficult. I met with the wife and son of D. Bramdaw, the deceased editor of the 1939 volume, and with M.E. Manjoo, the

editor of the 1971 volume. I found the entrance criteria to be similar for the two volumes.

The editors travelled to different Indian areas to interview prominent community members and to promote their books. Although some prominent community members were conspicuously absent from the volumes, most appeared; often a whole page was devoted to a prominent family. Most entrants filled out standard survey forms and submitted their photographs.

A special effort was made to attract interest in the Who's Who among the wealthier and higher status members of each region. Virtually anyone who was middle to upper-middle class could gain admittance, however. The books were business ventures and each entrant was expected to purchase at least one book. The cost of purchasing the book alone barred poorer individuals from gaining admittance. From my discussions with several middle- to older-aged community members, I found that the Gujarati community generally knew of the Who's Who volumes while they were being compiled. I did not find out what percentage approached the editors and were either accepted or turned down. Apparently anyone who was either self-employed or active in community affairs could gain admittance if they were willing to pay the fee. The ethnicity of the two editors did not seem to be a factor in the admittance process, as their occupations afforded them ties throughout the Indian community. In short, there is no reason to believe that particular sectors of

middle to upper-middle class Indian South African males were favored over others. The low number of females (less than three percent of all entrants in 1939 and less than ten percent in 1971) reveals that norms existed concerning the limited scope in which women could attain public acknowledgement of their accomplishments. Furthermore, most women who appear in "family portraits" appear below or to the right of their husbands.

The biographical portraits include information such as date of birth, place of birth, residential settlements, name of schools attended, level of education, occupational history, nature of ownership (if a business), type of trade, associational memberships, and positions held. Also, many entrants forwarded information on their families, such as their father's name and occupation, and on their own specific prestigious accomplishments, such as awards received, donations given, and prominent persons met (see Appendix A).

With assistance, I coded and computerized variables extracted from biographical information for each of the 1137 Indian South African entrants in the 1939 volume and a stratified random sample of 473 entrants in the 1971 volume. The 1971 sample is stratified by ethnic origins and 50 percent of the Indian South African entrants whose ages could be determined and who were between 26 and 59 years of age were selected. The age-cutoff is set at 59 for the 1971 Who's Who sample to create a continuity of ages from the 1939 to the 1971 volume. For instance, a 27 year old in the 1939 volume would be 59

in the 1971 volume (the oldest age included for data analysis in that year). This allows for the two volumes to be combined in a data set and divided into a continuous set of age-cohorts. Thus the youngest entrants in my data-set were born in 1945 and the oldest in the nineteenth century. I excluded entrants whose age could not be determined from statistical analysis. Assistance was provided by an older Indian gentleman and by the editor of the 1971 volume in identifying the ethnic origins of each entrant. They and others also assisted in identifying the few associations which neither my supervisor nor I could identify.¹

3). Measurement of Ethnic Solidarity

Due to the racist policies that have been an intrinsic feature of South Africa since the Indian arrival, virtually all Indian South Africans have needed internal communal assistance to rise up to and maintain a middle or upper middle class economic status. The need for assistance has been greatest for those involved in the quintessential middleman minority activity--small business operation. Ethnic assistance in the forms of loans, cheap labor, market information, and clientele support, has been especially important in the early stages of a small commercial business and the establishment of businesses for children. Through such support Indian businesses have withstood competition and laws which favor

white concerns (Calpin, 1949; Arkin, 1981). The middleman minority theory emphasizes the fit between ethnic solidarity and the establishment and maintenance of a small business niche.

In the biographical portraits, a section is devoted to community activities. Some of the entrants do not have any involvement listed or only a general statement is provided, such as "takes an interest in community affairs." There are 966 males entered in the 1939 volume who were 27 years of age or older. A total of 83.5 percent of them have at least one associational membership listed. A little less, 72.2 percent, of the sample of 473 males in the 1971 volume who were between the ages of 26 and 59 likewise have at least one associational membership listed.

Associations fell into one of six categories: sports, welfare, cultural, educational, political, and occupational. Political associations were differentiated as either involving party politics on a provincial or national level, or as involving local affairs. Occupational associations were distinguished as labor, owner, or professional. The other four types of associations could be distinguished according to their communal boundaries in membership criteria. Sports, welfare, cultural, and educational associations were either open to all races, open to some races, open solely to Indians, or open to Indians of a particular religion, linguistic group, region, village, or caste. These distinctions indicate the narrowness or broadness of displayed ethnic sentiments in

organizational activities. Some entrants were only in very narrow (exclusive) associations, some were only in associations with a broad ethnic component (inclusive), but most who were members of more than one association were in associations which varied in their degree of closure. This suggests that there was a desire to maintain special ethnic ties and a desire to be connected to the wider community. With assistance from members of the Indian community, I was able to code each of the associations with regard to organizational purpose and membership criteria.

For descriptive purposes, I demarcated three categories for the variable origins. This will enable a quick examination of the relationship between origins and associational memberships, before additional measurements and controls are implemented. Indians entered South Africa in two different manners: either as contracted indentured laborers or as free British subjects who paid their own passageway. A very high percentage of the passenger Indians, approximately 95 percent, came from Gujarat on the west coast of India, and are generally referred to as the Gujaratis. The remaining passenger Indians came from diverse regions. Some of them were formerly indentured laborers, who upon completion of their contracts traveled to India and then back to South Africa (Kuper, 1960). Virtually all indentured laborers were recruited from southern or north-central India and spoke Tamil, Hindustani, Urdu, or Telegu (in that order of frequency). Only non-Gujarati passenger Indians (N =

70; 4.9 percent) are excluded from the forthcoming table, but they will be included in the following ones as non-Gujarati passenger Indians scored similarly to the Gujaratis on the key variables. Indians with passenger origins are over-represented in terms of their overall population proportions in these Who's Who tables because they were substantially more likely to be members of the middle and upper-middle class in 1939 and 1971.

Table 3-1 displays percentages of entrants with particular associational memberships for four age-cohorts, two age-cohorts from the 1939 volume and two from the 1971 volume. Associations are categorized as inclusive (open to all Indians or multi-racial), religious (open to all Indian Muslims, Hindus, or Christians), or ethnically exclusive (open to Indians with a specific linguistic, regional, or caste background). Entrants with Gujarati passenger (G.P.) origins are compared to entrants with indentured (I.) origins. Column percentages do not add up to one hundred because entrants could be members of more than one association and therefore added more than once into percentage totals. For example, 50.4 percent of Gujaratis over 42 in 1939 were members of educational associations with an inclusive membership basis, but many of them were also members of other associations and therefore included in those percentages as well.

Table 3-1

Membership of Who's Who Entrants with Gujarati Passenger or Indentured Origins in Voluntary Associations

	Cohort:	<u>Over 42 (1939)</u>		<u>27-42 (1939)</u>		<u>43-59 (1971)</u>		<u>26-42 (1971)</u>		
Associational Membership Criteria	Origins:	<u>G.P.</u>	<u>I.</u>	<u>G.P.</u>	<u>I.</u>	<u>G.P.</u>	<u>I.</u>	<u>G.P.</u>	<u>I.</u>	
<u>Inclusive</u>										
Sports-----		7.5%	46.3%	22.1%	51.0%	28.6%	45.5%	21.3%	41.4%	
Welfare-----		3.5	13.1	2.2	11.7	14.3	25.9	4.9	20.7	
Cultural-----		4.8	7.5	1.8	11.7	6.8	14.0	8.2	19.0	
Educational-----		14.5	31.5	8.3	20.4	17.3	32.9	8.8	20.7	
Party Politics-----		50.4	46.3	33.0	37.8	5.3	5.6	1.6	1.7	
Local Affairs-----		7.9	12.1	6.2	15.8	10.5	30.1	6.6	24.1	
Labor-----		5.3	1.9	5.8	3.1	0.0	3.5	0.0	1.7	
Owner-----		10.5	17.8	5.1	14.8	6.0	22.4	4.9	8.6	
Professional-----		0.0	8.4	0.7	17.7	0.8	7.0	0.8	5.2	
At Least (1) Inclusive*--		68.4	80.8	52.5	76.5	54.1	81.1	38.5	63.8	
<u>Religious</u>										
Welfare-----		5.3	3.7	4.3	3.6	9.0	0.0	4.1	5.2	
Cultural-----		46.9	40.7	38.4	31.6	46.6	40.6	27.0	20.7	
Educational-----		15.8	4.2	9.8	4.1	16.5	4.2	4.1	5.2	
At Least (1) Religious*--		54.8	44.4	43.8	34.2	53.7	41.3	29.5	25.9	
<u>Ethnically Exclusive</u>										
Welfare-----		13.2	6.1	12.0	6.4	4.5	2.1	1.6	0.0	
Cultural-----		21.1	22.0	20.7	20.9	22.6	23.8	9.0	3.4	
Educational-----		7.5	10.7	6.9	5.6	7.5	8.1	4.1	3.4	
Sports-----		0.0	2.3	9.4	2.6	9.0	1.4	2.5	0.0	
At Least (1) Eth. Excl.*-		32.9	32.2	38.8	28.6	32.3	29.4	14.8	6.9	
N		228	214	276	196	133	142	122	58	1369
%*		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*The percentages of each row add up to more than 100.0% because many entrants were members of more than one type of association. The same applies within each set of criteria. For example, 54.8% of Gujaratis over 42 were members of at least one religious association, but some were members of cultural and educational religious associations and figure in both calculations.

Many interesting patterns show up in Table 3-1, such as the decline in involvement in party politics in 1971, the high rate of involvement by Indians with indentured origins in sporting associations, and the lack of overall involvement in occupational associations. One of the most interesting patterns in terms of its implications to the middleman minority theory is the difference between Gujarati and indentured origin Indian membership in welfare, cultural, and educational associations. Indentured origin Indians were more likely to be members of "inclusive" associations, while the Gujaratis (passenger origins) were more likely to be members of "religious" or "ethnically exclusive" associations. This pattern is consistent for each age-cohort. For the oldest cohort, 80.8 percent of the Who's Who entrants with indentured origins were members of at least one inclusive association, compared to 68.4 percent of Gujaratis. For each subsequent cohort, the disparity is in excess of 20 percent. On the other hand, Gujaratis in each age-cohort were more likely to be members of at least one religious or ethnically-exclusive based association, despite their being members of fewer total associations. This finding suggests that Gujaratis were more likely to honor narrow ethnic sentiments, and the middleman minority theory supplies plausible reasons why, such as their "passenger" immigration experience which reinforces ties to the homeland.

The most recent cohort of Who's Who entrants with Gujarati and indentured origins declined in their associational involvement. Apparently, there were associations for them to join, given the higher rate of participation for the 43-59 age-cohort in the same year. It is not strictly an age effect, since the same-aged younger cohort in 1939 possessed more associational memberships. To determine the actual statistical effects of origins and age, a multivariate statistical procedure is necessary.

In preparation for the multiple regression procedure, I created three variables to depict different indicators of ethnic solidarity: total associational involvement, degree of ethnic exclusivity, and ties with India. The first variable, "total associational involvement" was created by adding each Who's Who entrant's number of memberships in religious, cultural, welfare, educational, political, sporting, and occupational organizations. Although not a direct measurement of ethnic solidarity, participation in these types of associations provide a structural setting for the affirmation and re-affirmation of communal bonds. One can approximate the extent of involvement in associations by tallying memberships and incorporating some adjustments.

To measure "total associational involvement", each associational membership received a tally of +1 unless an entrant listed two or more positions held in a particular association (such as secretary and president). In this case the entrant would receive double credit

or +2 tallies for the extra involvement. Also, some entrants were members of several teams, clubs, or administrative bodies within a particular seasonal sport (especially among entrants with indentured origins) which would inflate the tally score if no adjustments are made. Therefore, each entrant was limited to a maximum of two tallies within a particular sport.

The second variable, "degree of ethnic exclusivity", was created with a weighted index, to depict the degree of narrowness or openness in associational membership criteria. In studies of Japanese-Americans (Bonacich and Modell, 1980; O'Brien and Fugita, 1981), non-ethnic and ethnic associations were distinguished, with ethnic connoting exclusive Japanese membership. Although some Indian South Africans were able to participate in non-Indian based associations in 1939 and 1971, this was infrequent owing to the racial segregationist system. Rather than collapsing all Indian-based associations into one ethnic category, we can be more precise by demarcating the degree of inclusiveness and exclusiveness in communal boundaries.

Many associations were open to all Indians and some were multiracial. These are coded as "inclusive" associations since ethnicity is not narrowly honored in the organizational make-up. Other associations employed various levels of "exclusive" criteria in membership criteria, such as religion, language, caste, and geographical origins. Association memberships with higher degrees of

ethnic exclusivity received higher scores on ethnic solidarity. Although religious associations are not ethnic per se, Muslim-based, Hindu-based, and Christian-based associations limit to an extent the range of ethnic subgroups which adhere to that religion. Inclusive associations were coded -1, religious-based associations were coded +1, linguistic-based associations were coded +2 (Gujarati, Hindi, Urdu, Tamil, and Telegu), and caste or village/regional-based associations (the most exclusive) were coded +3. The scores for each sample member were added and divided by N to attain an average score (entrants not members of any associations were treated as missing data). The higher the mean score, the greater the "degree of ethnic exclusivity".

The third variable, "ties with India", was measured by adding codes to four items of information in the Who's Who biographies. Each item received a code of 0 or 1; a 0 if the entrant did not have that particular connection with India and a 1 if the entrant did. The items are: "birth in India", "education in India", "travel to India", and "involvement with India-based associations" (membership or donation). Neither the extent of education, the number of trips to India, nor the number of India-based associations were taken into account (i.e. one trip to India counted the same as two). The five discrete scores range from 0 (weak tie) to 4 (strong tie). Some entrants may have had one of these connections with India, but chose not to divulge this information in their biographies (such as

travel to India) which suggests that their tie is not as strong as those who divulged it.

The third variable, like the first two, does not really measure the Who's Who entrant's subjective state. Each variable is a proxy for ethnic solidarity, based on visible criteria that could be measured from the biographical portraits. For instance, an entrant could be involved with many communal associations, have been born in India, and travel there frequently without necessarily feeling a sense of ethnic commonality. In addition, the third variable is biased to first generation Indians in that they were born in India and were more likely to receive education in India. In short, these variables depict structural characteristics which promote the likelihood of affirming and reaffirming ethnic ties without being direct measurements of ethnicity.

Table 3-2 is a frequency display of the three ethnic solidarity variables, controlling for age-cohort. The total N is 70 higher than Table 3-1 because all passenger Indians (not just Gujaratis) are included. Each variable was converted into three categories--low, medium, and high. For "total associational involvement", an entrant who did not have any membership listed or received a tally of +1 was coded as low, a tally of 2-4 was coded as medium, and 5 or greater as high. For "degree of ethnic exclusivity", the lowest possible mean score was -1 (all associations having an inclusive basis for membership). This was coded as low, greater than -1 but less than +2

was coded as medium, and greater than +2 was coded as high. To receive a score of high, approximately one half of an entrant's associational memberships had to have exclusive ethnic criteria for membership. For "ties with India", a score of 0 was coded as low, 1-2 as medium, and 3-4 as high.

Table 3-2

Three Indices of Ethnic Solidarity for Who's Who Entrants

Ethnic Solidarity		Cohort: <u>Over 42 (1939)</u>		<u>27-42 (1939)</u>		<u>43-59 (1971)</u>		<u>26-42 (1971)</u>		Total	
<u>Total Assoc. Involvement</u>		<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Low		139	(28.8)	185	(38.2)	93	(32.0)	97	(53.3)	514	(35.7)
Medium		208	(43.2)	183	(37.8)	99	(34.0)	55	(30.2)	545	(37.9)
High		135	(28.0)	116	(24.0)	99	(34.0)	30	(16.5)	380	(26.4)
Total		482	(100.0)	484	(100.0)	291	(100.0)	182	(100.0)	1439	(100.0)
			33.5		33.6		20.2		12.6		99.9
<u>Degree of Eth. Excl.</u>											
Low		104	(25.1)	104	(26.5)	58	(24.7)	42	(38.5)	308	(26.8)
Medium		301	(72.5)	250	(63.8)	161	(68.5)	62	(56.9)	774	(67.2)
High		10	(2.4)	38	(9.7)	16	(6.8)	5	(4.6)	69	(6.0)
Total		415	(100.0)	392	(100.0)	235	(100.0)	109	(100.0)	1151	(100.0)
			36.1		34.1		20.4		9.5		100.1
<u>Ties with India</u>											
Low		128	(26.6)	217	(44.8)	181	(62.2)	130	(71.4)	656	(45.6)
Medium		295	(61.2)	238	(49.2)	90	(30.9)	51	(28.0)	674	(46.8)
High		59	(12.2)	29	(6.0)	20	(6.9)	1	(0.5)	109	(7.6)
Total		482	(100.0)	484	(100.0)	291	(100.0)	182	(99.9)	1439	(100.0)
			33.5		33.6		20.2		12.6		99.9

For each of the three variables in Table 3-2, the fourth age-cohort (26-42 in 1971) displays lower average scores. They were less likely than 43-59 year olds in 1971, their age counterparts in 1939, and the older generation in 1939 to be deeply involved in communal associations, to be members of ethnically exclusive associations, or to have any measurable tie with India. Whether they caught up with the next generation a decade later cannot be determined without new data collection or analysis of a more contemporary Who's Who.

The data do not support the existence of a generational trend toward assimilation because the first three age-cohorts exhibit parity on these indices (except for ties with India). Also, in none of the cohorts does a substantial percentage exhibit a high degree of ethnic exclusivity or strong ties with India. This could mean one of two things: a). the entrants' degree of ethnic solidarity was not very strong or b). given that substantial percentages fell in the medium category (especially for degree of ethnic exclusivity) ethnic solidarity and narrow ethnic sentiments were pronounced but primarily displayed in an informal manner.

Table 3-3 extends Table 3-2 by breaking down each age cohort into three components: Gujarati, other passenger, and indentured. In each cohort a consistent trend appears, suggesting the important independent effects of the variable origins. The Gujaratis, and other passengers' scores are close to one another, while the

indentured have higher average scores on total associational involvement but lower average scores on ethnic exclusivity and ties with India for each cohort.²

Table 3-3

Three Indices of Ethnic Solidarity for Who's Who Entrants, Controlling for Origins

Ethnic Solidarity

<u>Total Assoc.</u> <u>Involvement</u>	Cohort: <u>Over 42 (1939)</u>			<u>27-42 (1939)</u>			
	Origins:	<u>Gujarati</u>	<u>Other Pass.</u>	<u>Indentured</u>	<u>Gujarati</u>	<u>Other Pass.</u>	<u>Indentured</u>
Low		77 (33.8%)	13 (32.5%)	49 (22.9%)	124 (44.9%)	5 (41.7%)	56 (28.6%)
Medium		110 (48.2%)	22 (55.0%)	76 (35.5%)	106 (38.4%)	5 (41.9%)	72 (36.7%)
High		41 (18.0%)	5 (12.5%)	89 (41.6%)	46 (16.7%)	2 (16.7%)	68 (34.7%)
Total		228(100.0%)	40(100.0%)	214(100.0%)	276(100.0%)	12(100.1%)	196(100.0%)
		15.8	2.8	14.9	19.2	0.8	13.6

<u>Degree of Eth.</u> <u>Exclusivity</u>	Origins:					
	<u>Gujarati</u>	<u>Other Pass.</u>	<u>Indentured</u>	<u>Gujarati</u>	<u>Other Pass.</u>	<u>Indentured</u>
Low	33 (17.1%)	9 (25.7%)	62 (33.2%)	38 (17.7%)	1 (11.1%)	65 (38.7%)
Medium	152 (78.8%)	25 (71.4%)	124 (66.3%)	146 (67.9%)	8 (88.9%)	96 (57.1%)
High	8 (4.1%)	1 (2.9%)	1 (0.5%)	31 (14.4%)	0 (0.0%)	7 (4.2%)
Total	193(100.0%)	35(100.0%)	187(100.0%)	215(100.0%)	9(100.1%)	168(100.0%)
	16.8	3.0	16.2	18.7	0.8	14.6

<u>Ties with</u> <u>India</u>	Origins:					
	<u>Gujarati</u>	<u>Other Pass.</u>	<u>Indentured</u>	<u>Gujarati</u>	<u>Other Pass.</u>	<u>Indentured</u>
Low	3 (1.3%)	2 (5.0%)	123 (57.5%)	57 (20.7%)	3 (25.0%)	157 (80.1%)
Medium	180 (78.9%)	30 (75.0%)	85 (39.7%)	196 (71.0%)	7 (58.3%)	35 (17.9%)
High	45 (19.7%)	8 (20.0%)	6 (2.8%)	23 (8.3%)	2 (16.7%)	4 (2.0%)
Total	228 (99.9%)	40(100.0%)	214(100.0%)	276(100.0%)	12(100.0%)	196(100.0%)
	15.8	2.8	14.9	19.2	0.8	13.6

Table 3-3 (continued)

Ethnic Solidarity

Cohort: 43-59 (1971)26-42 (1971)Total Assoc.
Involvement

Origins:	<u>Gujarati</u>	<u>Other Pass.</u>	<u>Indentured</u>	<u>Gujarati</u>	<u>Other Pass.</u>	<u>Indentured</u>
Low	51 (38.3%)	5 (33.3%)	37 (25.9%)	71 (58.2%)	0 (0.0%)	26 (44.8%)
Medium	48 (36.1%)	5 (33.3%)	46 (32.2%)	40 (32.8%)	2 (100.0%)	13 (22.4%)
High	34 (25.6%)	5 (33.3%)	60 (42.0%)	11 (9.0%)	0 (0.0%)	19 (32.8%)
Total	133 (100.0%)	15 (99.9%)	143 (100.0%)	122 (100.0%)	2 (100.0%)	58 (100.0%)
	9.2	1.0	9.9	8.5	0.1	4.0

Degree of Eth.
Exclusivity

Origins:	<u>Gujarati</u>	<u>Other Pass.</u>	<u>Indentured</u>	<u>Gujarati</u>	<u>Other Pass.</u>	<u>Indentured</u>
Low	15 (15.0%)	0 (0.0%)	43 (35.0%)	19 (28.8%)	0 (0.0%)	23 (56.1%)
Medium	72 (72.0%)	11 (91.7%)	78 (63.4%)	43 (65.2%)	2 (100.0%)	17 (41.5%)
High	13 (13.0%)	1 (8.3%)	2 (1.6%)	4 (6.1%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (2.4%)
Total	100 (100.0%)	12 (100.0%)	123 (100.0%)	66 (100.1%)	2 (100.0%)	41 (100.0%)
	8.7	1.0	9.9	5.7	0.2	3.6

Ties with
India

Origins:	<u>Gujarati</u>	<u>Other Pass.</u>	<u>Indentured</u>	<u>Gujarati</u>	<u>Other Pass.</u>	<u>Indentured</u>
Low	54 (40.6%)	1 (6.7%)	126 (88.1%)	74 (60.7%)	1 (50.0%)	55 (94.8%)
Medium	63 (47.4%)	10 (66.7%)	17 (11.9%)	47 (38.5%)	1 (50.0%)	3 (5.2%)
High	16 (12.0%)	4 (26.7%)	0 (1.6%)	1 (0.8%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Total	133 (100.0%)	15 (100.0%)	143 (100.0%)	122 (100.0%)	2 (100.0%)	58 (100.0%)
	9.2	1.0	9.9	8.5	0.1	4.0

Table 3-3 (continued)

Ethnic Solidarity

TotalTotal Assoc.
Involvement

Origins:	<u>Gujarati</u>	<u>Other Pass.</u>	<u>Indentured</u>	<u>Total</u>
Low	323 (42.6%)	23 (33.3%)	168 (27.5%)	514 (35.7%)
Medium	304 (40.1%)	34 (49.3%)	207 (33.9%)	545 (37.9%)
High	132 (17.4%)	12 (17.4%)	236 (38.7%)	380 (26.4%)
Total	759 (100.1%) 52.7	69 (100.0%) 4.8	611 (100.1%) 42.5	1439 (100.0%) 100.0

Degree of Eth.
Exclusivity

Origins:	<u>Gujarati</u>	<u>Other Pass.</u>	<u>Indentured</u>	<u>Total</u>
Low	105 (18.3%)	10 (17.2%)	193 (37.2%)	308 (26.8%)
Medium	413 (72.0%)	46 (79.3%)	315 (60.7%)	774 (67.2%)
High	56 (19.7%)	2 (3.4%)	11 (2.1%)	69 (6.0%)
Total	574 (100.0%) 49.9	58 (99.9%) 5.0	519 (100.0%) 45.1	1151 (100.0%) 100.0

Ties with
India

Origins:	<u>Gujarati</u>	<u>Other Pass.</u>	<u>Indentured</u>	<u>Total</u>
Low	188 (24.8%)	7 (10.1%)	461 (75.5%)	656 (45.6%)
Medium	486 (64.0%)	48 (69.6%)	140 (22.9%)	674 (46.8%)
High	85 (11.2%)	14 (20.3%)	10 (1.6%)	109 (7.6%)
Total	759 (100.0%) 52.7	69 (100.0%) 4.8	611 (100.0%) 42.5	1439 (100.0%) 100.0

Other variables could be broken down into categories and cross-tabulated with the dependent variables, but a further breakdown of Table 3-3 would be too burdensome. Instead, bivariate relationships between origins and all variables created from the Who's Who volumes will appear in Appendix A without discussion. In the following section, I will discuss selected independent variables that I measured from the Who's Who data base that have theoretical applicability to ethnic solidarity. I will propose five hypotheses which derive from middleman minority theoretical logic.

4). Measurement of Selected Independent Variables and Proposed Hypotheses

The first variable is occupational location. While small commercial businesses are the quintessential middleman minority activity, not all Who's Who entrants were owners or partners of small businesses. Some businesses expanded into larger wholesale trade with import and export activity. A larger number of the 1971 Who's Who entrants were either owners or partners of medium to large companies, professionals, or employees of medium to large companies. These occupational locations deviate from the ideal-type middleman minority activity, and hypotheses will be proposed concerning their measurements on ethnic solidarity.

With the occupational information in the Who's Who biographical portraits, businesses could be generally classified according to size. Larger retail businesses relied heavily on imported goods, and import activity as well as wholesale concerns were mentioned in the biographies. Limited liability companies were usually larger than standard retail businesses. When wholesale or import activity was mentioned or the company was limited liability, and the entrant was an owner or partner, he was coded as large business owner. Other owners or partners were coded as small business owner. Over 90 percent of all owners or partners in the 1939 and 1971 Who's Whos were engaged in retail or wholesale business (trade and services) rather than manufacturing. Of all owners (excluding professionals), 18.2 percent in 1939 and 49.6 percent in 1971 were engaged in large business activity.

Most employees entered in the Who's Whos were employed by family businesses. For employees who were not (or for whom it could not be ascertained whether they were employed by a relative), virtually all were connected to the ethnic economy. Still, less than 11 percent of Who's Who entrants both in 1939 and 1971 were employed (not including professions--medicine, law, and teaching). I decided to include employees in the statistical analyses but not to keep them in a separate category. This is due to their small total, especially for 1971, which becomes problematic when interaction terms are introduced. Since virtually all employees were in ethnic firms, and

since their ethnic solidarity scores were closely similar to small business owners, I decided to collapse these categories. Employees comprise 15.8 percent, and small business owners, 84.2 percent, of this collapsed category. They can be theoretically considered to have strong needs for ethnic solidarity owing to their material interests. I will propose hypotheses concerning the comparative manifestation of ethnic solidarity by the other categories and explain the theoretical rationale for these hypotheses.

The first hypothesis concerns the display of ethnic solidarity for large business owners (including partners). It states that ethnic solidarity would be weaker for them than for owners of small businesses and employees of small and large businesses who possessed enough status to appear in the Who's Who. Although owners of large businesses were usually tied to the ethnic economy, it can be argued that the formal display of ethnic solidarity would be less necessary for them because of their higher economic status. The contextual perspective of the middleman minority theory posits that ethnic solidarity is primarily tied to material interests, necessitating mutual support and the maintenance of trustworthy reputations among entrepreneurs and those desiring to become entrepreneurs. According to this hypothesis, such solidarity would wane for the more economically successful. For this group ethnic solidarity would entail economic burden, namely the responsibility of giving to ethnic kin without receiving an equal gift in return.

With this first hypothesis we are not only examining Gujaratis, because not all business owners in the Who's Who were Gujarati. The Gujaratis, making up less than 15 percent of the South African population, but over 55 percent of the Who's Who entrants, constitute 58.9 percent of business owners in the Who's Who for 1939 and 60.8 percent of business owners in 1971 (for the age cohorts under consideration). Of business owners, 35.4 percent had indentured origins and 5.8 percent had other passenger origins in 1939, whereas 35.1 percent of business owners had indentured origins and 3.9 percent had other passenger origins in 1971.

The second hypothesis concerns professionals, who make up 7.7 percent of the sample in 1939 and 13.9 percent in 1971. According to Bonacich, professionals who conduct their own practices are basically similar to small business owners and should be conceptualized as such. This hypothesis proposes that professionals would display levels of ethnic solidarity equal to small business owners and employees except for their degree of ethnic exclusivity. In this, they would display lower scores. The greater modernization and secularization of professional occupations led to the decision to treat ethnic exclusivity differently. Professionals frequently need to interact and mix more closely with a diverse clientele than do retail and wholesale business owners, whose services tend to be provided in a more impersonal manner.

The Who's Who biographies often did not disclose whether professional doctors, lawyers, or social workers had their own practices or were employed. In addition to doctors, lawyers, and social workers, employed teachers were added to the professional category partly because of the small totals without them. While teachers usually had lower status and pay than other professionals, they can still be included in this group. Even with this diverse composition, all professionals have been very dependent on the ethnic community for either clientele, information, sorely needed donations, and other forms of support (Ginwala, 1974; Kuppusami and Pillay, 1978).

In addition to the variable occupational location dealt with in the second hypothesis, the variable origins seemed to be a strong predictor of ethnic solidarity. The passengers have a middleman minority legacy which necessitated strong ethnic bonds for economic adaptation. Such bonds were not necessary for the indentured laborers, who were contracted on individual terms and uprooted from traditional kinship ties (Tayal, 1978). And what of the descendants of the indentured laborers who gravitated into small business activity and then needed ethnic solidarity? The middleman minority theory includes historical factors in addition to immediate contextual factors in explaining why middleman minority characteristics emerge and persist. According to the theory, the cultural legacy and historical situation of being sojourners should

have an impact on ethnic solidarity, in addition to immediate economic opportunities. Thus my third hypothesis will be that passengers displayed higher levels of ethnic solidarity than other Indian South Africans who moved into middle-ranked small business pursuits from indentured origins. (Some support for this hypothesis has already been generated in the cross-tabulation tables.)

The variable age captures the time period in which the Who's Who entrant was growing up, as the year of each Who's Who volume is taken into account. The middleman minority theory posits that both concentration in small business roles and hostility from the surrounding society reinforce the maintenance of ethnic solidarity. Although age cannot be a direct proxy for victimization by hostile neighbors, it does relate to this core middleman minority characteristic. In certain historical periods the passengers were more victimized as a scapegoat minority than at other time periods. The age cohorts exposed to greater victimization should have formed stronger intra-ethnic ties, according to the theory. If hostility from the surrounding society had decreased over time, and the economy was basically a small business one, one theoretical prediction would be that ethnic solidarity would decrease for the younger age-cohorts. My fourth hypothesis is that ethnic solidarity would not wane over time for members of the ethnic economy, as scapegoating of Indian traders did not appear to have lessened for any long stretches from the latter nineteenth century to 1971.³ One could

argue that hostility was more intense for the older age-cohort in 1939, but I will maintain that subsequent discriminatory legislation, such as the Group Areas Act of 1950, which was still being implemented in 1971, and Indian-Black African clashes, such as the riots in 1949, indicate that hostility from whites or blacks had not significantly decreased from the time of arrival of most immigrants.

The only dependent variable which will be hypothesized to be inversely affected by age in 1939 and 1971 is "ties with India". Given that birth in India and education in India are indices of this variable, the older passengers would be expected to score higher on these indices and there is no reason they should score lower on the others.

The final independent variable is level of education. Bonacich and Modell (1980) found for the first native-born generation of Japanese Americans, that although the highly educated were less likely to be working in the ethnic economy and more likely to be involved in nonethnic associations, the highly educated who were in the ethnic economy were as involved in Japanese-American associations as were the lesser educated. Bonacich and Modell did not have measurements of the degree of ethnic exclusivity of Japanese-American association boundaries. I will agree with Bonacich and Modell that the overall level of associational activity would not be affected by educational level for those in the ethnic economy. My data allows for me to take their analysis a step further by analyzing degree of ethnic exclusivity in associational memberships.

My fifth hypothesis is that the more highly educated entrants, with their better communication skills and literacy, would be less parochial or ethnically exclusive than the less educated entrants. (Occupational level would have to be controlled for and the correlation with professions checked for multicollinearity.)

Two other independent variables that could have been measured but were deleted from consideration are occupational status and year of arrival. If an occupational status coding system were used, only non-owners would receive variable scores (less than 30 percent of each cohort). Year of arrival would only be useful for the older cohorts, as the percentages of the four cohorts that were not born in South Africa from youngest to oldest are 70.7 percent, 45.3 percent, 22.7 percent, and 9.9 percent, respectively. Most of these had fathers already domiciled in South Africa.

5). Hypothesis Testing

The five specific hypotheses proposed in the previous section were empirically tested using the multiple regression procedure. Each hypothesis is a prediction that a certain sector of the Who's Who data base will differ from other sectors in its display of ethnic solidarity scores. Some hypotheses incorporate each measured dimension of ethnic solidarity and others incorporate one dimension. Sectors predicted to have lower scores are: (1) owners of large

businesses (on all three dimensions of ethnic solidarity); (2) professionals (one dimension--degree of ethnic exclusivity); (3) the later generations (one dimension--ties with India); (4) indentured origins (all three dimensions); and (5) the higher educated (one dimension--degree of ethnic exclusivity). In addition, it is assumed that no other significant relationships exist.⁵

Two independent variables are nominal variables and two are interval variables. Occupational location and origins are nominal. The three occupational locations are large business owner, professional, and small business owner or business employee. The two origins are passenger and indentured. (Gujaratis make up 91.6 percent of the passengers--759/829.) The two interval independent variables are age and education. Age at time of publication (1939 or 1971) was calculated. Level of education was broken down into three categories treated as interval scores. The low category was less than standard 7 (equivalent to the 9th grade in the U.S.). Entrants whose biographies were silent on education were also placed in this low category. The middle category was 7 through 10, and the high category was matriculation or greater. Matriculation is a little more difficult than high school graduation in America in that it entails passing a national exam in addition to completing high school courses. The entrant received a score of 1 to 3 (1 depicting less than standard 7 and 3 depicting matriculation or college education).⁴

Year was not entered as an independent variable, but separate multiple regression models were created for 1939 and 1971, so the effects could be compared. No correlations among independent variables measured greater than .5, so multicollinearity was not a problem. Finally, I included four interactive terms to see whether origins had interactions with other independent variables in its effects on ethnic solidarity. Since the primary focus is on Gujaratis and their passenger origins, a question which can be addressed with interactive terms is "Did the passenger Indians score differently on the ethnic solidarity variables to non-passenger Indians with indentured origins when they were basically similar in occupational location, age, and education?"⁶

The summary statistics for the two regression models for each dependent variable appear in Tables 3-4 through 3-6. Table 3-4 refers to predictors of total associational involvement, Table 3-5 to predictors of degree of ethnic exclusivity, and Table 3-6 to predictors of ties with India. Except for one dependent variable (ties with India in 1939), the proportion of the variance accounted for is not exceptionally high, as indicated by the R^2 statistic. However, neither is it very low except for total associational involvement in 1939 (.07).

Table 3-4

Multiple Regression Results for Total
Associational Involvement

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>1939</u>			<u>1971</u>		
	<u>beta</u>	<u>R²change</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>beta</u>	<u>R²change</u>	<u>r</u>
Occ.-Lge. Bus. Owner	.03	.001	.02	-.12*	.014	-.22
Occ.-Professional	.08*	.005	.14	.03	.001	.08
Age	.04	.001	.04	.27**	.067	.30
Origins-Passenger	-.20**	.048	-.22	-.13**	.056	-.24
Education	.06	.000	.10	-.00	.003	-.05
Passenger*Lge.Bus.	.04	.000	.03	-.22	.003	-.25
Passenger*Prof.	-.04	.001	-.00	-.08	.001	-.06
Passenger*Age	.03	.000	-.19	-.13	.001	-.16
Passenger*Education	.02	.000	-.15	-.07	.000	-.25
R ²	.07			.15		
N	966			473		

*p<.05. **p<.01.

Table 3-5

Multiple Regression Results for Degree
of Ethnic Exclusivity

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>1939</u>			<u>1971</u>		
	<u>beta</u>	<u>R²change</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>beta</u>	<u>R²change</u>	<u>r</u>
Occ.-Ige. Bus. Owner	.03	.001	.10	.04	.001	.19
Occ.-Professional	-.12**	.011	-.20	-.03	.001	-.14
Age	.07	.003	-.06	.16**	.021	.09
Origins-Passenger	.31**	.119	.35	.37**	.134	.37
Education	-.08*	.014	-.14	-.01	.005	-.07
Passenger*Ige.Bus.	-.04	.000	.12	.16	.004	.26
Passenger*Prof.	-.02	.001	-.06	.15*	.012	.11
Passenger*Age	-.17	.000	.29	.22	.002	.39
Passenger*Education	-.16	.003	.23	.06	.000	.30
R ²	.15			.18		
N	807			344		

*p<.05. **p<.01.

Table 3-6

Multiple Regression Results for Ties with India

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>1939</u>			<u>1971</u>		
	<u>beta</u>	<u>R²change</u>	<u>r</u>	<u>beta</u>	<u>R²change</u>	<u>r</u>
Occ.-Ige. Bus. Owner	.04	.002	.16	.05	.002	.22
Occ.-Professional	-.03	.001	-.16	.02	.000	-.10
Age	.24**	.058	.22	.20**	.060	.16
Origins-Passenger	.61**	.377	.61	.48**	.206	.45
Education	.01	.000	-.08	.02	.002	.04
Passenger*Ige.Bus.	-.24**	.011	.17	-.06	.002	.28
Passenger*Prof.	-.05	.001	.00	.08	.000	.08
Passenger*Age	-.24*	.004	.62	.55*	.010	.51
Passenger*Education	-.04	.000	.48	-.23	.008	.33
R ²	.45			.29		
N	966			473		

*p<.05. **p<.01.

The first hypothesis, that owners of large businesses would score lower on the ethnic solidarity variables, receives mild support. Owners of large businesses were neither more nor less ethnically exclusive in their associational memberships than those with less business assets. However, they were less involved in 1971, with a .05 significant standardized beta coefficient of $-.12$ on total associational involvement. Furthermore, the interaction with origins was $-.22$, indicating that Gujaratis with large businesses were especially less likely to be involved in community associations in 1971. The fact that statistically significant findings did not emerge for 1939 indicates that larger business owners withdrew from formal associational involvement after 1939. The growth of their businesses and their lessening dependence on communal support by 1971 could explain this drop.

Among large business owners in 1939, being Gujarati or having indentured origins did not strongly affect the tie with India. This is shown by the interactive beta effect of large business owner and origins of $-.24$ (significant at the .001 level). Thus, regardless of immigration origins, the large business owners (bourgeois class) valued maintaining ties with India.

The second hypothesis, that professionals would score lower only on degree of ethnic exclusivity, receives support for 1939. In 1939, professionals were more likely to be involved in associations with broader ethnic boundaries than other occupational sectors.

However, by 1971, other occupational sectors caught up to the professionals in the degree of their associations' inclusiveness. In fact, professionals with passenger origins were significantly more exclusive in 1971 ($\beta = .15$; significant at .05 level). This suggests that Gujaratis with professional occupations took a more active part in reviving ethnic culture along particularistic ethnic lines than professionals with indentured origins.

Turning back to 1939, professionals were significantly more involved in associations than were the other occupational sectors. Thus, professionals played an especially important role in associations encompassing all Indians, and occasionally other race groups in 1939. However, they did not significantly differ from other occupational sectors in 1971 in their total associational involvement. Finally, professionals did not have a weaker tie with India, partly because many had to go to India to receive necessary education for their professional practices (Ginwala, 1974).

The third hypothesis is that age would only inversely affect ties with India; it did, as the older Who's Who entrants had stronger ties as expected. But age had unanticipated, significant effects on the other two dependent variables, total associational involvement and degree of ethnic exclusivity. In Table 3-4, we see that in 1971 the older entrants (up to 59 years old) were significantly more likely than the younger (down to 26 years), to be involved in associations. The absence of an age effect in 1939 suggests that involvement

dropped only for those Indian South Africans of the middle class who were born after approximately 1930. Perhaps this age-cohort maintained just as intense communal ties, but informally, or perhaps ethnic solidarity was less important for them. One interpretation, a logical deduction from the middleman minority theory, is that the younger entrants were less victimized by societal hostility than were the older. Far more empirical support would be needed to be generated to build a case for this societal hostility-ethnic solidarity interconnection.

Age has a weak, but statistically significant negative effect on degree of ethnic exclusivity in 1939 and a little stronger positive effect in 1971. The younger cohort's somewhat stronger ethnic exclusivity in 1939 suggests that they were responsible for forming new religious and linguistic-based associations. Once these associations were established, the younger generation in 1971 tended to reject involvement or membership in the more narrowly based associations, such as linguistic. Finally, age had no direct effects on ties with India, but it did have significant interactive effects with the variable origins. The beta weight was $-.24$ in 1939 and $.55$ in 1971. This means that the older South Africans of passenger Indian descent had much stronger ties with India compared to younger South Africans of passenger Indian descent and indentured Indian descent in 1971, but in 1939 the differences were not as large. Thus, perhaps by 1971, older Gujaratis were the least assimilated and strongest in maintaining a sojourning mentality.

The fourth hypothesis receives strong support--middle class Indian South Africans with indentured origins scored lower than the passenger Indians on ethnic solidarity for two of the three measured dimensions. South African Indians of indentured descent were significantly less ethnically exclusive in their associational involvement, as indicated in Table 3-5, and had weaker ties with India, as indicated in Table 3-6. Most of the R^2 in these two dependent variables was accounted for by the variable origins in both 1939 and 1971.

Bonacich (1973) asserts that the classic or ideal-type middleman minority is one that migrates freely, develops a sojourning orientation, and engages in trade. Sojourners see themselves as temporary migrants who nurture a desire to return to their homeland. They remain in the host society for economic, political, or social reasons. The initial Gujarati migrants frequently traveled back to India and had families there, yet established their citizenship in South Africa in spite of discrimination and lack of general acceptance. Bonacich's situational theoretical perspective stresses the importance of this initial relationship with the homeland and host society.

Many migrant minorities do not fit this sojourner mold and have neither the resources nor the desire to maintain a strong concrete or symbolic attachment with their ancestral homeland. Many indentured Indians chose to migrate because of problems they had in India, such

as low caste, breaking of caste prescriptions, and family squabbles, but were for the most part induced by recruiting agents with promises of economic prosperity (Kuper, 1960). Even if they desired to they were prohibited from maintaining a meaningful tie with India because of the constraining nature of their contracts of indenture.

Subsequent generations had an opportunity to revive ties with India, but as the situational perspective implies, the nature of the initial immigration of the indentured Indians did not encourage the maintenance of as strong ethnic ties as for the passenger Indians. The impact of the variable origins on these two dimensions of ethnic solidarity, with controls instituted for potential confounding influences, supports this interpretation.

The passengers scored significantly lower on the other dimension of ethnic solidarity, total associational involvement, than was hypothesized. The smaller, non-passenger middle class population appearing in the Who's Who was apparently more actively involved in associations. (The breakdown of associations is specified in Table 3-1.) Although the entrants of indentured origin showed less of a propensity to organize around narrower ethnic distinctions, they were still somewhat involved in associations that were not open to all Indian members. Yet only a few were solely or mainly involved with associations celebrating narrower loyalties. A strong degree of involvement, stronger than the Gujaratis, was evident in associations that were theoretically open to Indians without regard to religion,

linguistic origins, or caste. Occasionally, associations were interracial, but these were rare owing to prohibitions and various obstacles in a racially segregated society. Perhaps in the broader based (more inclusive) associations, involvement had less to do with affirming ethnic bonds than with expressing middle class social status. Participant observation and interviews would be needed to uncover the extent to which ethnic bonds were affirmed in secular and communally inclusive associations.

The fifth and final hypothesis, that level of education (low, medium, or high) would only affect the dimension degree of ethnic exclusivity inversely, received only minimal support. Variation in amount of education did not significantly affect variation in total associational involvement or ties with India, as was predicted. In 1939, the more highly educated were as hypothesized significantly less likely to be ethnically exclusive (.05 level), but the beta coefficient was just $-.08$. In 1971, there was no effect. The correlation between the occupational location of professional and level of education was $.39$ in 1939 and $.49$ in 1971. This may have suppressed the independent effects of education. Nevertheless, the more educated in 1939, regardless of age, origins, or occupation, were broadening the scope of their communal ties. In 1971 they were apparently just as likely to express religious, linguistic, and more narrow communal distinctions as the lesser educated. It seems that as the Indian community grew more westernized, some of the highly

educated (who were likely to be in the professions) took an active role in maintaining the rich variety of Indian cultural traditions through associations honoring particular ethnic sentiments (Nowbath, et.al., 1960; Kuper, 1960; Meer, 1969).

6). Conclusion

Three results from the hypothesis testing have the most meaningful implications. The statistical results obtained concerning large business owners, age, and origins suggest interesting possibilities and beg further research.

Large business owners tend to be bourgeois rather than petit-bourgeois (Wright, 1976) and therefore deviate from the ideal-type middleman minority business, which is small and family operated (Bonacich, 1980). According to my hypothesis, larger business owners would be less involved than small business owners in voluntary and semi-voluntary associations which conduct and control community affairs. This is because of their presumed greater economic independence from the ethnic community. I found that large business owners were less involved in associations that served the community in 1971, but not in 1939. This was especially true for the passenger Indians (91.6 percent being Gujarati).

This leads to the general question, Why were large business owners more active in associations in 1939 than in 1971? It appears that the Indian businesses conceptualized as large were much larger in 1971 than in 1939. Although I have not conducted a statistical analysis, I have a copy of the Durban Valuation Roll for both of these periods. These rolls list the owners of properties in Durban (the major Indian commercial district) and the valuation of land and buildings. In brief, the rolls reveal that the larger Indian businesses are valued much less than the larger white businesses (but their value increases substantially by 1971) and the valuation gap between smaller and larger Indian businesses appears greater in 1971 than in 1939 (this will require analysis to substantiate). One could then surmise that larger Indian business owners in 1939 (wholesale, import, and export trade) were more dependent on ethnic support, as they were not as large in scale in general or in comparison to smaller business owners. Their ethnic reputations were more important to achieve economic success in the greater competitive environment for markets in 1939. This would necessitate more associational memberships in 1939 than in 1971 according to the logic of the middleman minority theory. The theory emphasizes the structural basis of ethnic bonds. Active associational participation is most likely to occur when ethnic support serves an economic need. Further study is needed, especially on the ability of large business owners to be economically successful without ethnic community support compared to small business owners.

Theoretical and practical implications stem from the testing the hypothesis concerning the effects of age on total associational involvement and degree of ethnic exclusivity. According to this hypothesis, the age cohorts would display equally strong levels of ethnic solidarity due to the constraints on their economic activity and victimization as scapegoats. Yet, the younger generation (26-42 years old in 1971) was less involved in associations in general and ethnically exclusive associations in particular.

The middleman minority theory posits two core variables, concentration in small business roles and societal hostility, as being mutually reinforcing with the third core variable, ethnic solidarity. Since the variable occupational location was controlled, the drop in ethnic solidarity scores for the younger generation in 1971 could not be due to the somewhat reduced numbers of self employed small businessmen in this cohort. The middleman minority theory leads us to question whether the younger generation in the 1971 sample could have been raised in a historical period characterized by less hostile treatment of them as a scapegoat minority. Bonacich (1973) and Bonacich and Modell (1980) pose a theoretical outlook that ethnic solidarity is a structural and social-psychological response to hostile treatment from the surrounding society.

Did younger generation Gujarati businessmen become more accepted by whites? By blacks? Or did recurrent legal discrimination such as the Group Areas Act of 1950 and skirmishes with blacks such as the African-Indian Riots of 1949 more accurately reflect the nature of interracial relations? We are also led to ask whether the drop in associational involvement and ethnic exclusivity was a temporary trend or a continual one, and whether this cohort became more involved in associations and had a resurgence in particularistic ethnic loyalties when they became older. These are empirical questions which could be dealt with by applying innovative methods, such as examining associational membership lists over time or focusing interviews on interracial relationships among various cohorts. More in-depth research can contribute to a comprehension of the societal-hostility--ethnic solidarity nexus. Similar types of research could also prove fruitful with non middleman minority groups in South Africa, such as the Afrikaners. Have their expressions of ethnic solidarity fluctuated with changing economic and social conditions?

The third result with particularly interesting implications is the strong effect of the variable origins on degree of ethnic exclusivity. As far as multiple regression analysis on social phenomena usually goes, it is impressive that 12 percent of the variance in 1939 and 13 percent in 1971 was explained by this one dichotomous variable. Middle-class South Africans of passenger

Indian descent were far closer to the ethnically exclusive end of the continuum in their combined associational memberships than were middle-class South Africans of indentured Indian descent. This effect even holds for the younger cohort in 1971, although here it was not as strong as in the older cohort in 1971 or the two cohorts in 1939. This raises questions inspired by Bonacich (1973) in her advocacy of the situational theoretical perspective. These questions go beyond a search of contemporary structural conditions to explain why certain minorities are more prone to exhibit narrower ethnic loyalties than other minorities. They go beyond analyses of the cultural traits of minorities in their ancestral homeland. The questions focus in the main on the actual immigration experience and its transplantation to the memories of subsequent generations.⁷

Will minorities with a sojourning historical legacy feel stronger ethnic attachments than other minority groups? The indentured Indians arrived from two broad regions in India, spoke different languages, and were settled together without the means to travel back to India for occasional visits. Neither did they have business connections with India as did many Gujarati business owners. The Gujarati pioneers maintained far stronger ties with their families and kin in Gujarat than did the indentured arrivees from southern and north-central India (Meer, et. al., 1981; Bhana and Pachai, 1984). The Gujaratis' emigration as free passengers, their establishment of businesses with ethnic assistance, their return to India to get

married, and the gradual emigration of their families account for these ties. From the divergent immigration experiences of the passenger and indentured origins Indians, we are led to ask, How important are ethnic roots to subsequent generations? How do they interpret their similarities to or differences from the historical experiences of other minorities? What is their degree of trust in ethnic kin as compared to nonkin? Answers to these and other questions will tell us more about the meaning of ethnicity among those who share origins and its ramifications for race relations.

What is interesting, yet disappointing, is that questions such as these cannot be satisfactorily answered from within the middleman minority theory. Once questions are raised concerning the subjective consciousness of historical subjects, we are left without a theory to probe into the nature of social consciousness and its connection with political ideology and other factors responsible for developing interracial relations. The middleman minority theory has taken us this far; it has provided insights into the emergence and perpetuation of social and economic characteristics ideal-typical of a middleman minority. The Gujaratis were examined within this framework and some of their social and economic characteristics were clarified. But with regards to the meaning of ethnicity (its subjective-politico connotations), the meaning of being in middle-ranked economic roles, and the consciousness of the structural realities of South Africa, the theory contains no mechanism to

generate insights. Furthermore, it contains paradigmatic assumptions of ethnic solidarity as a mechanism to further self and petit-bourgeois interests, at the expense of others (Bonacich, 1980). In other words, ethnic solidarity cannot, for middleman minorities, be politically progressive.

Gramsci's theoretical perspective focuses on alternative modes of consciousness of historical subjects and on the role of ideology in influencing social action (Gramsci, 1971; Salamini, 1974; Boggs, 1976; Hall, 1986). In the two following chapters, I will apply the Gramscian orientation to factors which have either facilitated or constrained Gujaratis in identifying with the aims and aspirations of the oppressed, based on experiences within their immediate cultural milieux. I will argue that internal factors which are shaped by the activities of communal group members have a major bearing on ethnic self identification and political consciousness. In so doing, I will throw light on some of the unresolved questions of this chapter and the prior one, concerning how middle-ranked migrant minority groups may engage and act upon their structural surroundings in a way supportive of fundamental social change.

Endnotes

¹. Further discussion of the data-base and frequency distributions of the ethnic composition of the volume appear in Appendix A.

². Interestingly, an examination of the proportions of entrants in each age cohort who were in the three categories of origins, reveals a greater disparity in numbers of entrants in the younger cohorts (of the total of 1439, 19.2 percent Gujarati to 13.5 percent indentured in 1939, and 8.5 percent Gujarati to 4.0 percent indentured in 1971). That is, younger entrants with indentured origins were less likely to gain admittance compared to the Gujaratis, even though their population totals were about five times greater than the Gujaratis. This indicates that South Africans of indentured Indian descent took a longer time to attain the status necessary for Who's Who admittance. Possessing less wealth, the indentured descent Indians turned to another avenue to higher social status--active community involvement in formal associations. This may account for their higher scores on total associational involvement.

³. Currently Black-Indian antagonism has surfaced, based on the 1985 rioting that necessitated evacuation of several areas near Durban by Indians. In a survey of African high school students by Adam and Moodley (1986: 83-84) a high degree of latent antagonism and resentment of Indians was reported.

⁴•Frequency distributions and certain bivariate relationships among these independent variables appear in Appendix A. A basic idea of the bivariate relationships between the independent and dependent variables emerges from examining the correlation coefficients and standardized beta coefficients in the tables and discussion to come.

⁵•Before running the regression procedure, two dependent variables, total associational involvement and ties with India, were adjusted to reduce the effect of outlier cases. A small proportion of entrants had a very long list of associational memberships and 9.0 percent in 1939 and 10.1 percent in 1971 had a score of eight to 22. These were recoded to seven. The distribution was still skewed, with approximately 50 percent scoring two or less in 1939 and 1971, so the score was transformed into its square root. Ties with India was also skewed, with 55.4 percent in 1939 and 84.8 percent in 1971 scoring zero or one out of a possible four, and only 0.9 percent in 1939 and 0.2 percent in 1971 scoring four. To reduce the effect of outliers, the square root was taken. The variable, degree of ethnic exclusivity, was normally distributed and needed no transformation.

⁶•Due to the high correlations between some of the interactive terms and their component variables, I decided to enter the interactive terms into the regression equations after the variance

explained by the separate independent variables was accounted for. This two step technique is referred to as hierarchical regression analysis (Nie, et.al., 1979:344-45).

⁷.Sociology of the family research has recently become increasingly drawn to the issue of generational transmission and continuity (Stinnett and DeFrain, 1985; Baumeister, 1986). The concern over a potential decline in generational continuity in American life was eloquently expressed in Habits of the Heart (Bellah, et. al., 1985). This question also needs to be addressed within the situational perspective in research on middleman minorities. How important are memories of one's immigrant roots and in what way are they salient?

Chapter 4: An Application of the Gramscian Orientation to Gandhian
Ideology

1). Introduction

Why are the fragmented writings of Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist, relevant to this study of the Gujaratis? His unfinished writings contain a conceptual approach for analyzing the efforts of oppressed groups to overcome their oppression. Although Gramsci only writes in detail about Italy, his sharp awareness of cultural, national, ethnic, and gender divisions among the oppressed sectors, and his search for methods to create a popular collective will to overcome subjugation, merit application to other societies, such as South Africa. The Gujaratis become an especially pertinent study group because their economic position and cultural solidarity restrict the forging of ties to other oppressed groups in South Africa, particularly Africans. Gramsci provides an analytical framework to investigate attempts to overcome divisiveness between oppressed sectors. His framework leads to an investigation of the role played by moral and intellectual leaders who attempt to organize the masses for collective action. I will narrow my focus in this chapter on Gandhi's attempt to infuse moral values in the Gujarati community so that they would form a collective spirit of resistance

to dependence and inequality.

Gramsci (1971) was primarily concerned with ideology. He offered no systematic theory of the origins, rate of diffusion, and overall impact of ideology but he did provide a conceptual basis for such a theory. He believed that progressive, social-structural change had to be "preceded by a profound intellectual and cultural reform, by a radical transformation of human consciousness" (1971:387). That transformation, according to Gramsci, needed to be from a bourgeois to a socialist mentality. One does not need to share exactly Gramsci's own political sympathies, however, to benefit from his analytical orientation. Two key Gramscian concepts are hegemony and organic intellectual.

"Hegemony" is used by Gramsci in a different sense than prior users of the term such as Lenin, who meant political domination through strategic alliances and control of the ideological apparatus. Gramsci stresses that there is always an element of consent to ideologies, and hegemony is not arrived at simply by domination or coercion of individual wills but by shared moral and intellectual ideas (Boggs, 1976; Mouffe, 1979; Omi and Winant, 1983; Hoffman, 1984). Dominant groups share beliefs that mask their oppression of others in the society in order to make the social inequality palatable. Alternately, subordinate groups can form their own idea system to transcend the dominant group's ideological hegemony and corresponding cultural and political domination

(Salamini, 1974). In other words, ideologies which legitimate the power, wealth, and prestige of dominant groups serve to create a hegemonic culture for the dominants. That hegemony is further strengthened if the same ideologies are absorbed, or at least not effectively countered by subordinate groups or classes. Gramsci devoted his theories and his life to forming a counter-hegemony to dominant group attempts at legitimating their privileged positions.

Gramsci coined the term "organic intellectual" to refer to individuals who provide intellectual and moral direction to subaltern classes, enabling them to achieve cultural and political hegemony. To Gramsci, the organic intellectual provides the subordinate groups with an encompassing set of principles, enabling them to make sense of their personal experiences of oppression. The intellectual's teachings unmask the sources of oppression and direct the oppressed to confront dominant groups in a resistant, collective manner. By disseminating new outlooks and ideas to the masses, the organic intellectual moves them to become organized, cohesive, and hegemonic, and therefore better able to overcome the hegemonic efforts of dominant groups.

When one thinks of organic intellectuals, and of the Gujaratis, one cannot avoid thinking of Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma) Gandhi. A Gujarati Hindu, Gandhi came to South Africa as a passenger Indian. Unlike other passenger Indians preceding him, Gandhi came as a lawyer, and was relatively unsuccessful as a lawyer in India prior to

his coming to South Africa. He soon built up a successful law practice and became a political activist. The Gramscian orientation directs attention to Gandhi's ideological leadership. It encourages examination of both the internal coherence of his ideologies and their organic historical effectivity (Hall, 1986:20). That is, it is concerned with the moral and intellectual messages of the actual ideas being conveyed and the audience's receptivity to those ideas.

The best source of the ideas Gandhi communicated to the Indian community is his newspaper, Indian Opinion. In it he advanced key principles of his ideology. The term satyagraha, for instance, originated in the I.O. Satyagraha, or truth- or love-force, is a nonviolent resistance to all forms of oppression through self-sacrifice and moral virtuousness. This was an important concept Gandhi used to build hegemony within the Indian community. The Gujaratis had the most to lose, materially, from an adherence to Gandhian ideology, if their struggles incorporated the interests of all Indians, Coloreds, and Africans. This is because of their relatively privileged economic status. They had a greater likelihood of removing discriminatory legal statutes affecting their business activity if they proved not to be a threat to white hegemony. Gandhi sought to incorporate his Gujarati kinsmen in a broad, collective struggle, but he had to reach this audience by focusing attention on remedies to their immediate discrimination as a petit-bourgeois economic class. My content analysis of the paper will show evidence

that it did not effectively convey collective, universalist notions to its readership because of pressures to focus on specific Indian interests.

I will conduct a simple content analysis of Gandhi's main propaganda organ, the Indian Opinion newspaper. I have selected certain time periods, newspaper issues, and terms to use in my effort to reveal the basic ideological contradiction in the newspaper. The years 1906-1908 encompass the beginning of Gandhi's passive resistance campaign, which he reformulated as satyagraha. The years 1927-1935 represent a period of great confusion and divisiveness within the Indian community, as hopes of being uplifted to the status of whites were shattered. The year 1944 approximates the time when a rather strong impetus to align with non-Europeans in political struggle emerged. I have selected year-in-review editorials (a newspaper tradition) for the 1906-1908 and 1927-1935 periods and six systematically selected issues from July 1933-June 1934 and January 1944-December 1944.

The first term I will use in my content analysis is "community". Community is a term I hope will reveal the extent to which Gandhi and his chosen editors referred to only his broad ethnic group, the Indians, in attempting to infuse satyagraha notions. Secondly, I will examine articles which do mention Africans and Coloreds to illustrate the images of them the paper presented to its readership. In this way the paper's efforts at forming closer ties to the

non-European community will be portrayed. In order to avoid conceptual confusion, I will not use the term black when referring to Africans, Coloreds, and Indians jointly. Since the term was not used in this context during the time periods the newspaper is being content-analyzed, I will use the term that the paper used, non-European, and the term nonwhite, when making joint ethnic references.

I will examine the contents in the following way: for the year-in-review editorials I will note how the term community is used in each instance (that is, what groups does it encompass and what is the moral message behind it). For the complete issues I will count the articles and announcements pertaining to Africans and discuss the views projected about them. Before presenting the results of my content analysis, I will orient the reader by describing the background for the Indian Opinion. First, I will discuss Gandhi's rise as an aspiring organic intellectual. Then the Indian Opinion will be briefly covered, and finally the content analysis itself will be presented.

2). Historical Setting For Gandhi's Rise to an Organic Intellectual

Despite all of the international attention lavished on Gandhi, relatively little academic attention has been directed to his

activities in South Africa, even though he lived there for most of a 21-year span. Originally brought to South Africa as a translator in 1893 by a Muslim Gujarati merchant who knew Gandhi's family in Porbandar, Kathiawar, India, Gandhi rapidly became a political leader, primarily through representing the petit-bourgeois interests of the smaller and larger Gujarati businessmen (Tayal, 1980). Gandhi found the Gujaratis increasingly discriminated against by local and provincial white administrators who represented white traders' interests (Joshi, 1942). However, the vehemence directed against the Gujarati traders far exceeded their threats to the material interests of whites (Meer, 1969; Moodley, 1977; Arkin, 1981).

The Gujaratis and the other passenger Indians presented an anomaly to the European colonists. Europeans lived a virtually uncontested dominance over other non-Europeans: Africans, Coloreds (of mixed race), and Indians (of indentured origin). However, the passenger Indians challenged the presumed normal relationship between white and nonwhite by successfully establishing themselves in independent economic enterprises (Ginwala, 1974).

The actual degree of commercial control Indian settlers had over Europeans can be approximated from statistics on licenses and assets. For the British colony of Natal in 1895, where practically all Indian property investments and most commercial investments were located, the total number of Indian shop license owners was 393, compared with 356 white shop license owners. These numbers

correspond proportionately to population totals. However, in 1897, directly after Natal was granted responsible government by the British, the Dealer Licenses Act was put into law. While the act did not formally refer to Indians in order to ease British sensitivities toward overt racism, its obvious intent was to favor whites in the issuance of licenses. It empowered municipalities to control the issuance of licenses, with full discretion given to the licensing officer to renew or grant a license. There was no avenue of appeal open to contest a decision in a court of law until 1906, when India threatened to discontinue the supply of indentured laborers unless an avenue of appeal opened (Meer, 1969:47). By 1908, the number of licenses issued to whites was double those issued to Indians--2,034 to 1,008 (Arkin, 1981:72-4). Although the above data do not distinguish Indians by passenger/indentured origin, the Wragg Commission Report of 1887 showed that from 1880 to 1885, practically all retail stores owned by ex-indentured Indians in Durban, the major city in Natal, were taken over by passenger Indians (Tayal, 1980:6).

No comparative race figures on financial assets or trade turnover for Natal are available. Such statistics would be very helpful in comparing the economic command of petit-bourgeois and bourgeois sectors. However, given that the 1904 Natal Census counted 283 whites as merchants and assistants whereas only eight Indians were counted as such (the bulk being classified as shopkeepers and hawkers), large scale commerce was evidently primarily in white

hands. Figures were available for gross monthly turnover in the Afrikaner republic of the Transvaal in 1904. Fewer Indians settled here because there was no indentured population, but about one-third of Indian commerce was located in the Transvaal. The Indians were responsible for 5.91 percent of the gross trade turnover and the turnover averaged £4,325 per white license and £1,791 per Indian license (Arkin, 1981:77-8). Therefore, Indians were not a significant economic threat in the Transvaal and their businesses tended to be smaller than whites'. Nevertheless, some of the most vehement hostility directed towards Indians occurred in the Transvaal, particularly from 1903-1909 (Pillay, 1976; Joshi, 1942).

Even though the Gujaratis and other Indians posed no actual large scale threat to white economic interests, they sparked a great deal of hostility from whites whenever they engaged in economic activities above the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder. The first large-scale European-Indian conflict took place in Durban in January 1897. A thorough structural analysis of this and subsequent conflicts is well beyond the confines of this thesis; a description of this conflict, however, exposes some of the deep-seated white fears and insecurities which have recurrently promoted racial clashes in South Africa. Gandhi used these fears and insecurities as the foundation for his moral-political struggles centering around the satyagraha (truth- and love-force) philosophy (Kuper, 1956). Surprisingly, remarkably little has been written on this conflict by

historians or sociologists, and the best sources I could locate was a Bachelor of Arts thesis at the University of Natal (Stange, 1967) and a short biography of Gandhi written by Fatima Meer (1970). Also, a daily newspaper that the author of the B.A. thesis relied on was very revealing. I will discuss this conflict because it sets the stage for Gandhi's subsequent political-ideological strategies.

What has been coined "The Gandhi Incident of January 1897" would either not have occurred, or not have been so intense, had Gandhi not emerged as such a clever representative of the Indian population. He used the print media to present Indians as faithful subjects of the British Empire who happily and voluntarily gave allegiance to the British flag. As a political leader, Gandhi only requested for Indians those British rights promised to them by the Queen and high-level British administrators. His name was known in Natal largely through "Letters to the Editor" addressed to the Natal Mercury newspaper, a local European daily. The letters contrasted the unfair and unequal policies of South Africa with the colonists' British ideological heritage of fairness and equality.

In three years time, Gandhi had emerged as a leading Indian spokesperson. In 1896, Gandhi returned briefly to India to gather support for the Indian cause, in particular, the denial of the franchise. He wrote and distributed the Green Pamphlet. The pamphlet countered several of the racist arguments voiced by white South Africans for denying Indians the vote. As word spread in Natal

that Gandhi's pamphlet portrayed the white colonists in a negative light, fears and insecurities swelled into racial hostility. Whites formed a demonstration committee to initiate a campaign against the further immigration of Indians, both indentured and free passengers, and to request the repatriation of Indians living in South Africa. The committee organized a major public meeting at the Durban Town Hall in November 1896, one month prior to Gandhi's scheduled landing with approximately 300 Indians. These passenger Indians were rumored to be traders and skilled laborers, who would compete with whites for jobs and capital. In fact, over two-thirds of the passengers were bound for other destinations, and many of those scheduled to land were families of old settlers (Meer, 1970:40).

On the platform of the town hall were the mayor, town clerk, and prominent businessmen, none of whom were immediately affected by Indian competition. Nevertheless, they exploited this cause to show their solidarity with the general white populace. The principal speaker proposed a resolution calling for the government to terminate Indian immigration and repatriate those who had already arrived. He blamed the owners of the sugar and tea estates for starting the unnecessary turmoil by bringing the indentured laborers to Natal. Their presence led to the arrival of traders and skilled laborers. The speaker's resolution, destined to become a petition and presented to the government, urged an immigration restriction law to totally ban Asiatic immigration, along the lines of extant Australian and New

Zealand legislation. The resolution was overtly racist—one point claimed, "the low moral tone and insanitary habits of Asiatics are a constant source of danger to the progress and health of the European population" (Stange, 1967:13).

The demonstration committee proceeded to organize several rallies and meetings for November and December 1896. Thus, when Gandhi's ship arrived at the Port of Natal on December 18 along with another steamer carrying approximately 400 Indian passengers, anti-Asiatics were further committed to prevent the landing of any passengers. The Natal government was in a difficult bind because it could neither send the passengers back without Imperial repercussions nor let them land without bloodshed. Fortunately for the government, a bubonic plague in India provided a pretext to order the passengers to stay on board for a 21-day quarantine period (despite no reported cases on deck).

This delay created additional time for the demonstrators to show how important, ideologically, the immigration issue was to them. Verbal attacks on the Indians took a more vulgar form than Dr. Campbell's petition, and more mass rallies were organized (Stange, 1967). During this heated period, an editor of the Natal Mercury wrote a rather lengthy and forceful editorial explaining the European opinion. Showing a fear of having to compete with the Indians, the editorial concludes:

At present the law requires as many Asiatics as choose to swarm into this country can do so, without let or hindrance. The people of the Colony almost unanimously object to this wholesale invasion, and surely this is a subject the people have a perfect right to deal with. The men do not come with swords in their hands and occupy the country *vi et armis*, but in the end it would come to much the same thing. The present method is only a shorter process, and even supposing that they never participated directly in the government of the Colony, that would make very little difference; socially and commercially, it would cease to be suitable land for Europeans, and no loyal Natalian can look forward to that with equanimity....The class of people who propose to make this country their home at the present time, however, are men who will at once enter competition with the European residents, and the struggle would then commence between the 2 races as to which race was to predominate. Whatever the result of such a contest may be, we do not choose to enter upon it, nor put it to the test. The land is ours by inheritance. (Natal Mercury, January 12, 1897)

Within four months, the Natal Parliament passed the Immigration Restriction Act. The act did not refer in writing to Indians, but it served the explicit purpose of restricting free (passenger) Indian immigration without hampering the continuing supply of Indian indentured labor. The act was consistent with a stretched and ethnocentric version of the pure British ideology of "equal rights for all". It was stretched to "equal rights for civilized men", with civilization connoting European education. To gain domicile rights, a prospective immigrant had to be able to write a few paragraphs in any European language, of which approval was at the discretion of the immigration officer.

Gandhi fought for individual clients victimized by this immigration law and the Dealer's Licensing Act enacted in 1897 in Natal to give local municipal authorities the authority to grant or withhold trading licenses. He also represented individual clients in the Transvaal who were confronted with discriminatory legal statutes concerning trade, residence, and immigration. Occasionally, he represented indentured Indian clients, reputedly for no fee, who were cheated and abused by their masters. Although he was frequently able to win minor concessions for his clients, he was unable to turn the growing tide of white resentment and exploitation of Indians.

A strong fear of Indians took root in the white community because the Indians demonstrated economic endurance and success when given opportunities. Indians, especially Gujaratis who occupied middle-ranked positions, challenged the presumed normal relationship between white and nonwhite. The whites used the British ideology of equal rights for all as a facade to appear even-handed and fair. In fact, they denigrated Indian culture and elevated European culture. Indians were portrayed as falling short on the moral and intellectual components of culture—except for the few with European educations and cultural tastes. Although Gandhi had a European education and exposure to European culture from his legal education in England, he rejected it. Instead he formulated an alternative moral and intellectual direction for Indian British subjects, constantly seeking to generate pride and dignity among his Indian compatriots.

His ultimate goal was to remove cultural and economic prejudices held by all classes and races in South Africa. First he had to be successful with his own kindred.

3). Gandhi's Ideological Program

Gandhi, through numerous attempts to challenge the system of racial hierarchy, developed and refined an ideological framework to unify Indians and nonwhites in their resistance to racial oppression and British superiority. It has been argued that Gandhi only used his universal-sounding ideological prescriptions to secure greater privileges for the Gujarati elite (Tayal, 1980). Conversely, it has been argued that he achieved Indian unity and paved the way for black unity with his ideological framework (Meer, 1969; 1975). This disagreement among social-historians over Gandhi's impact on Indian politics and black hegemony invites a closer examination of his ideological program.

Gandhi's ideology centers on two moral directives: (1) power should be shared with others and used to serve rather than control others, and (2) service to others should consist of efforts to free them from whatever demeans or oppresses them (Swomley, 1984; Kuper, 1956). Gandhi's moral-political vision for the newspaper was that it would discourage the dichotomous perception of others as superiors or inferiors, and replace it with a nonstratified perception conferring

equality and dignity on all human beings. Such a consciousness would serve as a basis for a collective strength that would overcome all forms of societal repressions. Such a vision is also contained in contemporary ideologies geared to the oppressed, such as Liberation Theology, which advocates suffering to challenge social injustices until the poor "inherit the earth" (Gutierrez, 1973).

Gandhi's key philosophical concept is satyagraha. The word means "truth and love force" in the Gujarati language. It was coined from a 1906 Indian Opinion newspaper contest to improve on the implied lifelessness of the term "passive resistance" in describing nonviolent Indian struggles against unjust laws. Gandhi was skillful in reaching his readership with this concept by personalizing it. In the passage below, we find one of his many concrete illustrations of the practice of satyagraha, in this instance referring to Gandhi's relationship with his wife. Gandhi believed that the English-speaking and Afrikaner whites could be changed by satyagraha just as he was:

I tried to bend her to my will. Her determined resistance to my will on the one hand, and her quiet submission to the suffering my stupidity involved on the other, ultimately made me ashamed of myself and cured me of my stupidity in thinking that I was born to rule over her; and in the end she became my teacher in non-violence. And what I did in South Africa was but an extension of the rule of Satyagraha she practiced in her own person. (Gandhi, 1928; reprinted in Indian Opinion, Jan. 29, 1960)

Within the satyagraha philosophy, ahimsa is a central concept. Imperative to successful sayagraha struggle is the ability not to lower one's ethical standards to that of the oppressor. This can be accomplished by ahimsa--overcoming feelings of hatred, fear, anger, jealousy, lust, and greed with nonviolence and love. Gandhi was influenced by the Christian doctrine of "love thy enemy". Below is one of Gandhi's many personalized prescriptions of ahimsa, in this instance addressed to a reader of a Gandhian newspaper in India who had confessed hatred for the British imperialists in a letter to the editor:

To err is human. All have their good as well as bad points. It is in human nature, even if we are in the wrong, to resent bitter, often unjust criticism. But if we were lovingly shown our faults, we would perhaps be willing to listen. We must behave thus towards the British...Such an attitude is indispensable in satyagraha which demands that, while we may neither speak of evil of wrongdoers nor wish them ill, we must at the same time show them the error of their ways and non-cooperate with them in their wrong doing. (Harijan, Oct. 13, 1940; reprinted in Indian Opinion, Dec. 27, 1940)

Gandhi's abstract notions could be applied in many ways. Love for oppressors could symbolize gentle, constitutional protests rather than forceful, mass action. The suffering entailed in satyagraha could serve the sole purpose of changing the hearts of oppressors. Or, Gandhian ideology could stir a sense of resistance which incorporates all forms of extralegal protest until oppression is obliterated.

Gandhi challenged European misperceptions of Indians and sought to build Indian self-dignity and pride by morally and intellectually challenging European attempts at inferiorization. Gandhi dealt only peripherally with the African's situation. Some suggest that he believed that once the Manichean order between Europeans and Indians was overcome, Africans would become elevated because the basis for white superiority would be destroyed (Meer, 1975). Others see Gandhi's efforts to gain equal rights for Indians, particularly higher status Indians, as simply a move to shift the dividing line between oppressors and oppressed, leaving working-class non-Europeans to continued subjugation (Tayal, 1980; Ginwala, 1974). Was Gandhi merely shifting the dividing line by fighting for more rights for the small Indian minority, especially the petit-bourgeois class, or was he providing a moral and intellectual basis to denounce all forms of oppressive treatment?

The Indian Opinion newspaper was Gandhi's main propaganda vehicle. Therefore, it is an excellent source for studying Gandhi's ideological program. With all the messages on resisting oppression and trusting people as equals, did Gandhi use the Indian Opinion to encourage Indian cooperation with the majority oppressed African community? Some interesting findings emerge from analyzing Gandhi's newspaper. At first, I used the newspaper to collect historical information on Indian protests and Indian associations. After photocopying pertinent articles from the first issue in 1903 up to

1920, I noticed that little was being written on the African population. The purpose of the paper, as made clear by Gandhi (Gandhi, 1928), was to deal specifically with Indian issues, as the Indians had grievances that solely affected them; there were African newspapers to deal with African concerns (see Odendall, 1984, Chapter 3). This statement of purpose raises the empirical question, to what extent did the Indian Opinion refer to Africans and Coloreds (mixed-race) and in what context? The theoretical question arises, to what extent did Gandhi use the newspaper to set a moral-intellectual basis for future black hegemony? Both of these questions will be dealt with through an examination of the newspaper's contents in select time periods prior to the Nationalist Party takeover in 1948. First, I will briefly introduce the paper.

4). The Indian Opinion

"Two enterprises will always be associated with Mr. Gandhi's name and work in South Africa. One is the propaganda, commenced in 1903, among his own people, by means of a weekly journal called Indian Opinion; the other, that little Tolstoyian Colony in Phoenix, where Indian Opinion is now published. Both of them have exerted a great influence on the Indian community" (Doke, 1909:6; reprinted in Pachai, 1958:26).

In 1893, Gandhi, a practicing barrister in Kathiawar, India,

entered South Africa to serve as an interpreter in a court case between two rival Indian merchants. He soon became involved in political struggles, initially in 1893, when the newly-elected government of the British colony of Natal introduced a measure to disenfranchise the Indians. Gandhi founded a political body in Natal in 1894, which led to the organization of similar bodies in the Transvaal and Cape Colony. To further pursue his aims of safeguarding Indian rights and promoting Indian self-respect and dignity, he, together with a printing press owner and a journalist launched an Indian weekly newspaper. The paper was initially published in English, Gujarati, Tamil and Hindi, but from 1905 on, only in English and Gujarati. By 1907, Indian Opinion had roughly 3,500 subscribers and the total Indian South African population was approximately 120,000. Issues were circulated for others to read. It is unknown what proportion of the readership was Gujarati and to what extent the section of the paper written in Gujarati was read compared to the English section. I will only be analyzing the English section. Just how closely the populace read the paper or discussed the articles cannot be determined; however, readers were exposed to many articles and editorials elucidating the application of Gandhi's philosophy and they were informed of oppressive legislation and the struggles to overturn it. Surely, readers communicated information gathered from the paper to nonreaders. Although Gandhi contributed articles and editorials regularly, he

elected not to be formally associated with the editorship, wishing to avoid the improper appearance of advertising his own law practice (1958:28-29).

After Gandhi's son, Manilal, died in 1956, Indian Opinion experienced financial difficulties and finally folded in 1961. Manilal had served as editor for almost 30 years, maintaining close ties with his father until Gandhi's death in 1948. In the paper's final issue, the ideological purpose of the newspaper was explicated:

It was not only the mouthpiece of the struggle of the Indian people in Natal and the Transvaal but it was also the instrument which conveyed to the world at large the deep stirrings in the mind of Gandhiji. Gandhi evolved the philosophy and technique of Satyagraha. The Indian Opinion was the vehicle which conveyed that philosophy and technique to the people. The Indian Opinion was not an ordinary newspaper seeking merely to transmit information and to advertise wares for manufacturers and merchants. It moulded opinion and led the people. (Aug. 4, 1961)

Gandhi envisioned the Indian Opinion as the inculcator of liberationist principles in the various Indian class and ethnic sectors and among others (particularly Europeans). I will conduct a simple content analysis of the term "community" and of articles and announcements referring to Africans. The following section will be an analysis of the term community in year-in-review editorials from 1906-1908 and 1927-1935. I will argue that the philosophy of satyagraha, in being directed to the Indian community (and occasionally Europeans), contributed to a utilitarian and isolationist ethos among many inspired by Gandhi.

5). Content Analysis of the Term Community

The years 1906 and 1927 were turning points for the Indian South African community: 1906 was a year of heightened discrimination against them, particularly in the Transvaal, and 1927 was to some a year of apparent upliftment. These historical turning points defined the time periods I chose to analyze the Indian Opinion. The Indian Opinion responded to the events of 1906 and shortly thereafter by articulating the universalist philosophy of satyagraha. In 1927, 13 years after the departure of Gandhi, the Indians appeared finally to be uplifted much closer to the level of the European South African population. In response to this apparent upliftment, the newspaper in several instances acknowledged the right of Europeans to permanently rule the country. I will briefly review historical events of the 1906 and 1927 periods, and follow each review with a content analysis of the term community in Indian Opinion year-end editorials in those years. These editorials provide us with a basic idea of the moral thrust behind the newspaper.

Historical Background 1906-1908

The Transvaal Republic became a British dominion in 1902, after the Afrikaners lost the Anglo-Boer War. The Indians expected British

protection from discriminatory legislation. In fact, one of Britain's proclaimed motives for entering the war was to protect her Indian subjects from Afrikaner (Boer) hostility (Pillay, 1976). Remnants of faith in British protection rapidly diminished with the drafting of a registration ordinance by the Transvaal government in 1906, and were destroyed when the ordinance was passed by the Transvaal Parliament in 1907 and received imperial sanction. The 1907 Asiatic Law Amendment Act required all Asiatics to register anew (most of them had voluntarily registered in 1903 as an act of good faith), providing authorities with ten finger impressions. Once registered, each Asiatic was required to carry a pass and produce it upon request to any police officer demanding it. The only previous use of the ten fingerprint system was by the British for criminal identification (Indian Opinion, Jan. 18, 1908). By implication, all Indians were regarded as criminals simply because some Indians had illegally entered the Transvaal.

Descriptions of the first passive resistance struggle by Indians in the Transvaal, which Gandhi led in defiance of the Asiatic Law Amendment Act, appear elsewhere (Joshi, 1942; Meer, 1969; Tayal, 1980; Indian Opinion articles, 1907). Here, I will simply acknowledge the role of the Indian Opinion as an ideological organ cementing ties among Indians by infusing satyagraha principles.

1906-1908 Year-in-Review Editorials

Beginning in 1904, it became an annual Indian Opinion tradition to write a year-in-review editorial. During certain periods this tradition was not followed, but from 1904 to 1961, a total of 35 review editorials were published. They received titles such as "A Retrospect", "Yearly Balance Sheet", "The Old and the New Year", "The New Year", and "A Review". Since the satyagraha philosophy in its ultimate universal form centers around the construction of a broad sense of community among the oppressed, I will examine the use of the term community in the newspaper that originated the term satyagraha in 1906.

In the editorial review for the year 1906, the word community appears twice, in 1907 it appears once, and in 1908 it appears six times. In each year the term is used solely in reference to the Indian community. The focus of each review is the discriminatory laws enacted or in the process of being enacted against the Indians. The articles attempt to contribute to the formation of a unified spirit of communal concern among the Indian population. Excerpts from these editorials are printed below to illustrate this (emphasis added):

The inward activity of the Indian community in South Africa shows unmistakable signs of progress. We notice various societies springing up on all sides. And while they may not all be of service to the community, they are an index to the awakening of Indians to a sense of the importance of reform within. (Dec. 29, 1906)

The only consolation, therefore, that Indians can have from this gloomy summary is that the events in the Transvaal have brought them closer together, and that they have now entered upon a line of conduct which makes them rely more and more on self-help rather than on servile dependence. (Dec. 28, 1907)

Another item on the credit side is the magnificent self-sacrifice of the community as a whole, and of the Natal leaders especially. There is, again, the fact that at last the Colony is beginning to realise something of the true inwardness of passive resistance, and to appreciate the principles for which Indians have all along been striving...There is the growing sense of self-respect and self-dependence on the part of the community...The past year, then, has had its sorrows not unmingled with happy moments. The community, generally speaking, has found itself. It has realised something of its inmost being. It has learnt what it is striving for, and has set up a lofty ideal. (Dec. 26, 1908)

These editorials form only a miniscule part of the writings throughout the year in the weekly Indian Opinion. Nevertheless, the year-in-review editorials are purposefully moralistic and indicate the general thrust of editorial policy. On the one hand, personal sacrifice for the good of the whole community is strongly emphasized. The concept of community here is incompatible with a bourgeois-liberal, Lockean notion of community as simply an arena in which to protect individual interests in a free competitive system. It advocates community as a meaningful end in itself, a unified whole that shares a sense of common responsibility and mutual concern and awareness. This is a radical notion of community, especially considering that the group being organized for passive resistance was a trading community. While this concept of community runs counter to

a laissez-faire, utilitarian, petit-bourgeois ethos, it can also be interpreted as a narrow one in the South African context. By placing Indian boundaries around itself, material self interests took primacy over a sense of genuine mutual concern. Ginwala makes this claim in asserting that Gandhi used the Indian Opinion to advance the ideology that Indians deserved special privileges relative to other non-Europeans, owing to their civilised culture and existence of a solid middle class (1974:366-369). Thus in gaining respect for Indians and Indian culture, Africans were implicitly presented as lacking the culture and class necessary for equal treatment.

Even though the sense of community encouraged in these editorials was one among Indians and not among all who were oppressed, one must remember the situation facing the Indians at the time. The 1907 Registration and Immigration Law was "deliberately intended to humiliate, oppress and exclude the Indians...In fact, the Law took for granted an Indian to be a barbarian devoid of moral instincts in him" (Aiyar, no date:115). The Indians responded by showing that they, from "a highly cultural, philosophical and spiritual land could put up with the indignities hurled against its nationals" (Joshi, 1942:103) and maintain self-honor and dignity.

The humiliation and degradation the Indians suffered produced a need to counter stereotypes of cultural inferiority. Gandhi led this movement to develop a sense of confidence in one's own abilities through establishing a self-sufficient, morally virtuous community.

This sense of community negated the formation of a wider sense of community encompassing Africans and Coloreds, but it also negated a utilitarian, petit-bourgeois ethos. In this way a step was being taken in the direction of a mutualist ethos where community conveys collectivist sentiments.

Odendaal (1984), in his focus on black political protest in South Africa through 1912, notes that the Indian Opinion was congenial towards the black struggle but stood aloof from it. Odendaal cites as an instance of congeniality the paper's declaration in 1908, "Our sympathies go out to our oppressed fellow subjects who are made to suffer for the same cause that we suffer, viz., our slight pigment of skin" (quoted in Odendaal, 1984:213). During the 1906-08 period Africans faced the possibility of colonial federation with increased self-government, a development which would jeopardize the little protection Africans had from the Imperial government. Odendaal maintains that Indians supported this cause but felt it was in their best interests to struggle for their specific civil rights, such as trading rights, immigration rights, and residential rights. He states:

<The Indian> struggle throughout the period under review continued mainly to be focused on the past and present treatment of Indians, rather than on the wider issue of the future effects of union on the black population. This approach was based on the argument that while the indigenous coloured and African groups had a full right to demand political equality, the Indian settlers should not strive for political rights at this stage but should

concentrate on their civil rights which were constantly in jeopardy. (1984:214)

One could contend that Gandhi's tactics of separating the Indian cause from oppressed blacks in general was counterproductive to his intention of building a universal, liberatory self-consciousness among his followers and listeners. After all, the Indian Opinion newspaper was designed to morally validate and motivate Indians to struggle for equal rights with the Europeans (Gandhi, 1928; Pachai, 1958). The strength of the Gandhian ideological program lies in its focus on self-sacrifice to the benefit of the whole community; its danger lies in its concentration on the Indian community, which could result in a lack of commitment to the needs of other oppressed groups. This danger apparently became real 13 years after Gandhi's departure from South Africa. The Indian Opinion not only did not advocate moving to a higher stage of collective struggle, but honored the right of whites to permanently rule the country. Although the newspaper continued to represent Gandhian philosophy, its underlying moral direction was a utilitarian version of Gandhian ideas, well-suited to a striving, upwardly mobile petite bourgeoisie.

Historical Background 1927-1935

By 1927 the Indian situation in South Africa was an international issue (Pachai, 1971). In particular, the question of Indian rights

was hotly debated among elite sectors in India, England, and South Africa. Members of the white community in South Africa who perceived themselves as threatened by the Indian presence, submitted discriminatory bills to the South African Parliament. The bills incorporated, among other things, compulsory segregation of residences, trading areas, and land ownership, the elimination of the municipal franchise (the only franchise remaining), and the barring of skilled Indian labourers from handling machinery. One of the government's major objectives was to make conditions so miserable for the Indians that greater numbers would elect to repatriate. Many Indian South Africans responded to these conditions in a moderate manner, creating a larger gulf between Indian socio-economic and ethnic sectors (Pahad, 1972; Ginwala, 1974; Moodley, 1976).

Previously, in 1914, the Union government offered Indians minor inducements to repatriate; from 1914 to 1926, 21,780 took advantage of the scheme (Ginwala, 1974:277). The rate of repatriation was considered unsatisfactory by many whites, so they pressured the government to increase it. Conditions were made worse for resident Indians and political organizations with Gujarati trader-backing responded to these threats.

The umbrella Indian political association, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), attempted to garner international support for the Indian cause and prevent passage of these discriminatory bills. For two years they ardently worked to persuade South Africa's Union

government to have a Round Table Conference with a delegation from India. The Union government repeatedly stalled because it did not want India to meddle in its internal affairs. Eventually it agreed to a conference providing that the issue of Indian repatriation was its major objective.

The conference was held in December 1926, and January 1927, in Cape Town. The agreement, published in February, scrapped plans to further proceed with the Areas Reservation Bill which would segregate Indians. It made a so-called gentlemen's agreement (that is, provided abstract promises) that Indians would be "uplifted" to the full extent of their capacity. In return, the Indian delegation consented to support a concrete repatriation scheme that awarded a higher cash bonus to emigrants than the 1914 scheme. The delegation also gave consent to a clause that Indians would lose rights of domicile in South Africa after a three year continual absence (Joshi, 1942).

Many Indians were unimpressed with the outcome of the conference, questioning the government's sincerity regarding upliftment. Several anti-Indian laws were untouched, and the agreement acknowledged a superiority of the "western standard of living", by setting this as the goal for Indian upliftment. This was an especially touchy point with the Gujaratis, who had been able to maintain closer ties with India and develop pride in their Eastern heritage. However, none of the upliftment clauses were binding, and the agreement did not rule

out future discrimination along the lines of the Area Reservation Bill. So, cultural matters aside, the concrete benefits of the agreement were dubious.

Gandhi (who was in India) and several other Indian Nationalist leaders expressed satisfaction with the agreement, believing it was the best that could be attained in the present circumstances (Joshi, 1942:136). According to Gandhi, an expression of good faith by Europeans was at least as important as concrete legal changes because it indicated a movement away from a sense of racial superiority. Thus, the agreement would be largely helpful to the Indian community in the long run. In contrast, P.S. Joshi, an ardent Nationalist supporter and an esteemed school teacher in South Africa, was one of several less moderate Indians who was not satisfied with the agreement. In his opinion, "It gulped down a good many obnoxious clauses in return for an abstract assurance for the upliftment of Indians" (1942:140-1). In its ensuing editorials the Indian Opinion represented the more moderate line, fostering a sense of goodwill in the hope Indians would be recognized as equals by European leaders. This can be sufficiently illustrated simply by reference to the year-in-review editorials, although it would be a worthy research effort to content-analyze the newspaper in more detail.

1927-1935 Year-in-Review Editorials

The Indian Opinion in its December 30, 1927, issue consents to the agreement, even though it acknowledges that the agreement wounded Indian dignity. The year-in-review editorial portrays Indians as willing partners in a white-ruled society, providing that they are left in peace to develop their own institutions and advance economically. No espousal of the Gandhian liberationist ideal of a collective willingness to endure self-sacrifices for the elimination of all oppression appears. Only the Gandhian prescription of acting morally to gain positive recognition from Europeans is advanced. The year-in-review editorials take a conciliatory tone and conveys more of a utilitarian ethos than a mutualist, collective one, which inhibits subordinate group hegemony. The following excerpt from the 1927 issue is illustrative:

To the European community we say that we have agreed to the stoppage of further Indian immigration, though it is a humiliation to a citizen of the British Commonwealth to be shut out from any part of His Majesty's Dominions while its doors are open to foreigners. We have agreed not to question the political supremacy of the European community in this country. We have agreed, if the chance is given, to come up to western standards of economic and social life in order to make ourselves more acceptable to the Europeans. We have gone further and agreed to the scheme of assisted emigration, though the implication of it wounds the national self-respect of India...In return we ask for just the right to live and work and rise to the height to which we can. We ask to be given the same facilities in the educational and economic spheres that are now open to Europeans only...

To the Indian community we plead that they accept the Capetown Agreement as a stage on the right road, along which one day we hope to reach our destination. We ask them to be loyal to its implications. Let no individual connive at or countenance the admission of illegal entrants from India. It is immoral in the first place. We have agreed to stop further immigration from India. If we did not and do not mean it, we should ask for its revision. But to go behind our promise and defeat the law in a crooked manner is immoral. We can fight this Government only by moral weapons, by putting them in the wrong and putting ourselves in the right; we cannot fight them with soiled hands. (Dec. 27, 1927)

The next year-in-review editorial again does not advocate political challenge to the racial hierarchy. The review urges Indians to make self-sacrifices in order to elevate the Indian position, implying that unity need not extend to other nonwhites. This is most noticeably illustrated in the review's last paragraph, where the two communities referred to are the Indians and Europeans:

Our wish for the new year is that the spirit in which the Capetown Agreement was arrived at would prevail in both the communities and that both would honestly work for its fulfilment: that colour prejudice would be a thing of the past and that a spirit of tolerance would prevail among the ruling race: that both the communities would be inspired by a spirit of friendliness and brotherhood and that they would stand by each other in times of peace as they have stood in times of distress. What we would wish for our own brethren in this country is this: Let us not merely clamour for existence, let us not lose our manhood for the sake of mere existence: our self-respect and honour of our country should be more precious to us than our existence; we should be prepared to sacrifice our existence to maintain them. Then alone will we have deserved to live. With this wish and prayer we wish one and all "A Happy and Prosperous New Year." (Dec. 28, 1928)

The review of 1929 focuses on two concrete concerns: Indian educational facilities and the safeguarding of vested business interests. It was written in the wake of revived anti-Indian activities resulting in the re-instatement of discriminatory ordinances and bills. The government was disappointed with the outcome of the 1927 repatriation scheme (euphemistically called "assisted emigration"), as traders and skilled labourers in direct competition with whites were not taking advantage of the scheme (Joshi, 1942; Girwala, 1974).

The Indian Opinion, in ensuing year-end editorials, reflects a sense of frustration in not being uplifted to the European population's level, as was hoped for. Although the reviews sound less moderate, they still do not advocate merging with Africans or Coloreds. Rather they stress that a commitment to satyagraha would strengthen the Indian community. While there was no 1930 review, the editorial review for the year 1931 demands the removal of discriminatory legislation and is worthy of being quoted at some length:

It is now five years since the Capetown Agreement was arrived at and it is felt that the time has arrived when the Agreement might be reviewed. The Agreement was hailed as a "Gentlemen's Agreement." It gave us the impression, at the time, that the lot of the Indian community in the Union would improve as a result of that Agreement and that in the provision of educational and other facilities, Indians who were to remain part of the permanent population, would not be allowed to lag behind any other sections of the population. Our hopes in this respect have been shattered...The issue before the Government of India delegation is, there

fore, quite clear. We do not think there is any room for bargaining with the Union Government as they have done in the past. We do not wish that the rights of a section of our brethren should be bartered away in order that we may live comfortably in this country. There is nothing that we can give. All that has been taken away from us has to be returned to us. The Transvaal Licensing Control Ordinance of 1931 must not receive the assent of the Governor-General-in-Council...The Immigration Amendment Act of 1931 must be repealed. The condonees must be allowed to bring their wives and children into the Union. In short, the position, as it was after the 1914 settlement, should be reinstated and improved upon by amending the Transvaal Township Act, the Gold Law of 1908 and Law 3 of 1885 to the extent that Indians in that Province may have the right of ownership of property. The Licensing Laws should be amended in the manner suggested by the last delegation. These are the minimum demands of Indians in this country which should be acceded to and for which Indians should be prepared to sacrifice their all, if they have any vestige of self-respect in them. (Jan. 1, 1932)

Despite sounding more militant, the goal here is still attaining more rights for Indians. The distance between the Indian and African communities has not lessened.

In the 1930s, dissension within the Indian ranks was strong, especially in the provincial Indian political associations. Moderate leaders, representing Indian traders, were pursuing a conciliatory approach, and the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) went so far as to offer assistance to a Colonisation Enquiry Committee which sought new locations (other than India) for Indians to migrate (Meer, 1969:34). The moderates deviated from the liberationist ideals of Gandhian philosophy; their central goal was to safeguard the immediate economic interests of petit-bourgeois Indians, who were in the main,

Gujarati (Pahad, 1972). Less moderate Indians, usually of indentured origins, rejected the mainstream Indian political associations. Although the Indian Opinion's 1933, 1934, and 1935 year-in-review editorials attempt to reinforce a spirit of sharing, caring, and helping one another regardless of economic and social standing or political alignment, no sense of broad-based unity or hegemony existed among the Indian population:

Coming to ourselves things have not been very bright. In fact there is a distinct cleavage caused in the community over which no sane person could feel happy. Whether the disturbed state of affairs will lead to the betterment or otherwise of the community remains to be seen. (Dec. 29, 1933)

While making a retrospect of events of the passing year, it saddens our heart to have to take note of the hopeless dissensions that have existed in our community during the year. As in all things, we see in this, too, the hand of Nature whose ways are inscrutable. But were it not for our own shortcomings we would certainly not be suffering the wrath of Nature. Our future and that of all humanity depends on fellowship, sympathy, and mutual understanding based on truth, love and the spirit of self-sacrifice as against untruth, hatred, jealousy and aggrandizement. This is true both individually and collectively and unless humanity turns its attention to these basic principles where is the possibility of harmony, peace and happiness for all? (Dec. 28, 1934)

So far we have dealt with the general conditions prevailing throughout the world. We will now glance over our own past. How have we progressed socially, morally or politically? We cannot think of a single act that we can put to our credit...For our political disabilities we are definitely of the opinion that we are ourselves to blame. The mere talk of self-respect and honour has no meaning at all if there is not the readiness to sacrifice all to uphold them. We cannot claim to have made any progress socially or morally.

The differences in the community as between the Colonial born and the Home born, the capitalist and the labourer is taking deep root and signs of communalism too are not absent. All this augurs ill for the future of the Indian community in South Africa. (Dec. 27, 1935)

Why was there such deep dissension between Indian class and ethnic sectors? As noted by Moodley (1976), Ginwala (1974), and Pahad (1972), opposing material interests were at stake. The Indian Opinion, as illustrated in its year-in-review editorials, wanted to generate a sense of cohesiveness despite these competing material interests because the Indian community was so small in numbers. To appeal to common sentiments, the common experience of being Indian was emphasized.

The racial narrowness of the paper's basic moral approach has been illustrated by this content-analysis of the term community. As previously mentioned, the term appeared a total of nine times in the three year-in-review editorials from 1906 to 1908, each time referring solely to Indians. It also appeared a total of 24 times in the seven year-in-review editorials that were published between 1927 and 1935. During this latter period, the term likewise never encompassed Coloreds or Africans, but in three instances, it referred to Indians and Europeans jointly, and in two, solely to Europeans. In only one instance were Coloreds and Africans alluded to at all in a year-in-review editorial. The December 27, 1935 editorial simply acknowledged that "non-Europeans" were the greatest sufferers of the

then current drought.

To more completely assess references to Africans and Coloreds in weekly articles and editorials, I will content-analyze 12 systematically selected newspapers, covering two one-year periods (July 1933-June 1934 and January 1944-December 1944).

6). Indian Opinion References to Africans: 1933-1934 and 1944.

The Indian Opinion, although primarily focused on the Indian-European relationship, did not totally ignore other non-Europeans in its weekly articles. As internal dissension grew in the Indian community in the early 1930s, and a sharp moderate-radical split in Indian politics matured by the 1940s (Pahad, 1972), the Indian Opinion attempted to infuse Gandhian ideology in its reporting of events. Most issues had at least one article which referred to Africans and a few contained articles referring to Coloreds. The Africans were often referred to as natives, and I will use that term when the article I am referring to also uses it. By examining the moral messages contained in these articles, it is apparent that a general basis for racial equality was being articulated, but no overt attempt was being made to identify with Africans or Coloreds.

I selected a sequential sample of six issues (every eighth issue), beginning with July 28, 1933 to May 4, 1934 and beginning with January 12, 1944 to November 10, 1944 (one issue in each

sequential sample was a seventh issue owing to a missing eighth). The average length of the 1933-1934 issues was nine pages in English (excluding advertisements); the 1944 issues were shorter, averaging seven pages in English. I will refer briefly to each issue's treatment of Africans and Coloreds, focusing first on the six 1933-1934 issues.

The July 28, 1933 issue refers to Zulus on page 7 and natives on page 8 in brief announcements, the first in reference to a historical exhibition on display and the second to a new soccer field for native and Indian railway laborers. On the whole, however, this issue like others focuses on Indian political concerns. Four of the next five selected issues focus to a larger extent on Africans, placing them in a basically favorable light. The September 22 issue contains some short news items and a rather long article condemning the High Commissioner of South Africa for deposing a chief of a native reserve. The chief had sentenced a European to be flogged for living with a native woman. While the High Commissioner did not approve of the racial mixing, he objected strongly to a native punishing a European. This article illustrated the limitations placed on natives with authority. The November 10 issue includes an article by Reverend Andrews, a close supporter of Gandhi, who wrote about the mixed reception American Negro Quartette members received on a trip to England. Reverend Andrew's point was that no one should be treated as an inferior.

The January 12, 1934, issue refers more extensively than the other issues to Africans, containing six news items involving Africans and one full page article on the relegation of Indians to the non-European counter at the post office. The news items include a list of population figures, numbers of each race sentenced to prison under the liquor laws, announcement of a non-European Conference meeting (multi-racial liberal association), an excerpt from another newspaper comparing the relationship between Britain and India to African nations and their colonizers, an announcement of a required license to serve natives in refreshment rooms, and a dropped criminal charge against an African leader. The post office article explains that having to share the same counter with natives was not causing feelings of humiliation, but rather the outrage stemmed from the grouping of Asiatics with the lowest ranked race. The staff writer asserts that a separate counter was invalid for natives but "We are, however, not now concerned with the native..." This could be seen as an extension of the Gandhian strategy of keeping Indian issues separate from other non-Europeans without denigrating them, or as an indication of a lack of concern for them. Clearly, the staff writer is claiming affinity with the Gandhian outlook, but that outlook does not push for closer bonds with Africans or Coloreds.

The March 9 issue contains no references to Africans or Coloreds while the May 4 issue is the second most extensive of the six in reference to Africans. Besides three short announcements, there is a

small current events piece and a major article entitled "Black and White Justice" (reprinted from a European daily). The shorter piece reports on an elderly native Zulu woman who was mothering a European child in a native compound. The real mother had intended to strangle the child and this woman persuaded the mother to let her take care of it. The child was well-cared for and clothed, yet the woman was very distressed because the child might be taken away by authorities. The larger article covers the small penalties being placed on Europeans who killed natives, in contrast to the stiff penalties levied on natives offending whites. A European who killed a native child was fined £12, £2 more than the price of a fowl. Thus, the article places Africans in a favorable light as victims of unjust treatment by whites.

No radical calls for unity between Indians and Africans (or Coloreds), or conservative pleas for divisiveness appear in the selected 1933-1934 Indian Opinion issues. While no firm basis for future black hegemony was established on an ideological plane, Africans are depicted in the occasional articles dealing with them, with pride, honor, and moral fortitude, in contrast to depictions of many whites.

In total, 19 articles or announcements refer in some way to Africans or Coloreds in the six 1933-1934 issues; for the six 1944 issues, just 15 such references appear, although the issues are shorter in length. In 1944, the activities of some integrated

political associations, such as the Anti-Cod (against the new United Party's Colored Affairs Department) and the Anti-Segregationist Council (against the ascending Nationalist Party), receive coverage.

The newspaper in 1944 also elucidates moral principles which encourage closer Indian-African relationships and support black equality. An announcement, a letter to the editor, and two articles serve as examples. A March 3 article announces the formation of an African Youth League whose aim was to socially emancipate Bantu youth by fighting land restrictions and to develop a mass movement opposed to the color bar, segregation, and oppression. A plea for needed donations is made. A poignant letter to the editor is published in the April 21 issue entitled "A Native's Complaint". It points out that the seating in all but two Indian-run, non-European cinemas in Natal and the Transvaal was segregated, with Africans seated on the sides in narrow rows and Indians and Coloreds in the middle, more comfortable rows. A plea is made for equal treatment and integrated seating.

One major article describes a speech made at Wits University by an Afrikaner, the former Judge-President of the Free State. The speech focused on injustices imposed on the natives, such as the pass system, which destroyed black racial pride. Dr. Krause advocated reforms, such as a registration certificate, the right of educated natives to represent their people, free compulsory education, and decent housing. However, Dr. Krause did not advocate integration or

political equality, but self-reliance and pride. The article appears without editorial comment. A more radical article was written by a staff correspondent on September 1 concerning a recent Teachers' Conference. He approves of their formal denouncement of the segregationist policies of both the presumably more liberal United Party (which had recently established a separate department to cater to Coloreds) and the Nationalist Party (which later won elections in 1948). The writer supports the growing contingent in the Teachers' League who had vowed to fight for full liberation of all people, not drawing boundaries between themselves and manual workers or peasants.

7). Conclusion

The Indian Opinion, in its final edition, claims "it was...the instrument which conveyed to the world at large the deep stirrings in the mind of Gandhiji...It moulded opinion and led the people" (Aug. 4, 1961). The potency of Gandhi's newspaper as an ideological tool can be debated, but an examination of its contents reveals that while Gandhi's abstract notions of universal love and liberation were communicated to the newspaper's readership, they were not apparently presented in a consistent manner. Although Gandhi's intention was to build a unified Indian community that would embody a politically progressive will, his newspaper did not strongly advocate unity with

other non-Europeans in the time periods reviewed.

By using satyagraha principles to motivate the struggle for Indian interests, ideological prescriptions often sounded more parochial than universal. The Indian Opinion's recurrent pleas for unity appear to have been more an effort to mold a united stand to protect Indians from discriminatory treatment than an effort to build a united front with all oppressed people. The paper was not providing a strong counter-ideology to white rule and an important component of the ethos of the oppressors was being projected.

Once racial boundaries are mentally erected to define the community, attempts to transcend class and ethnic barriers with liberationist notions of universal love and commitment become ideologically inconsistent. A framework has been set for concentrating on self-group interests and political advancement tactics within the given stratification order. Visions of collective peace, long lasting solidarity, and equality become secondary goals. Such an overshadowing of collectivist goals is a fundamental impediment to subordinate group hegemony.

Key to the Gramscian orientation is ideology's intersection with immediate, day-to-day sources of oppression. Gujaratis, as an economically successful, yet oppressed minority, had to connect their opposition to the rules and regulations immediately affecting them to the more removed oppression of others--less successful Indians (working class Indians, the impoverished Indians), Africans, and

Coloreds. The Gujaratis had more ideological barriers to overcome than most other Indian South Africans because of their economically privileged position as a petit-bourgeois class. Pahad (1972) shows that some Gujaratis were able to identify with and actively support the struggles of other oppressed groups in the early 1940s. This was when a new Gujarati organic intellectual, Dr. Yusuf Dadoo, articulated a non-racialist, socialist ideology. However, most Gujaratis were not swayed by Dr. Dadoo and remained moderate, focusing exclusively on their petit-bourgeois interests and opposing Dadoo's political association.

This raises the question of whether Gandhi and Gandhian ideologists were as progressive as they could have been without totally alienating the Indian community, particularly the Gujaratis. An argument can be made that Gandhi took the necessary first step toward broader unity, focusing his energies on those who were most narrow and parochial in outlook. Before broad-based coalitions can be formed and sustained, it is essential that individual participants have a sense of pride and dignity based on an altruistic morality. Gandhi responded to European efforts at inferiorization by attempting to create a proud Indian community, demonstrating superior ethical standards by practicing satyagraha against immediate repression. By not denigrating the cultural heritage or political claims of Coloreds and Africans, self-pride was not formed at their expense. Gandhian ideology could then be considered progressive in its time and place

by serving as a precursor to the political outlook necessary for the fight to uplift all oppressed persons.

The relationship between Gandhi, his supporters, and the Indian community is a complex one, as are all relationships between aspiring organic intellectuals and those whose consciousness they seek to radicalize. As in this chapter, research often centers on intellectual and moral leaders and the ideas they articulate. The Gramscian orientation leads us also to examine historically-developed popular thought (common sense knowledge of the masses). This awareness allows us to consider the receptivity of the group to different types of aspiring leaders. To understand the ability of certain intellectuals to effectively reach certain populations, motivating them to either support traditional societal structures and limiting energies to attaining parochial interests or rejecting the ideologies espoused by traditional intellectuals for a progressive goal, it is necessary to study common sense knowledge.

I will pursue this topic in the following chapter by examining links between common sense ideas pertaining to cultural identity and political ideology. Is there an affinity between a certain cultural awareness and the receptivity to particular political ideas (namely, those which incorporate the aims and aspirations of subservient blacks)? By addressing this question, with empirical analysis of actual Gujarati opinions and outlooks collected via case study interviews, I will offer a direction for further theoretical and methodological development on the complex issues of ideology and hegemony.

Chapter 5: An Application of the Gramscian Orientation to Gujarati
Communal Consciousness and Political Ideology

1). Introduction

Guided by the Gramscian orientation, the foregoing content analysis of the Indian Opinion has examined one aspect of the link between community and political ideology, namely the efforts of an organic intellectual (Gandhi) in creating subordinate group hegemony. Gramsci also encourages an examination of the inner cultural life of subordinate group members, to discern whether they are capable of being moved towards political activism and alliance with other oppressed groups in the society. Chapter 4 focused on the messages transmitted to the Gujaratis by Gandhi and his newspaper editors. Chapter 5 looks at the contemporary ethnic and political beliefs held by Gujaratis, and examines the relationship between these two belief systems. My research question for this chapter is "What is the connection between communal consciousness and political ideology?" The answer will clarify some aspects of the relationship among different realms of subjective awareness that contribute to subordinate group hegemony.

In this chapter, I will conduct a basically simple empirical exercise illuminating the process of ideology formation. I will concentrate on the link between ethnic ideology and political beliefs. The word ethnic usually refers to specific linguistic and geographical origins yet it is used for a wide range of characteristics (Royce, 1982). I will refer to the broad notion of shared cultural sentiments as communal consciousness, although it could also be called ethnic consciousness. Communal consciousness includes a sense of attachment to others who share a similar historical legacy, such as regional or linguistic origins, religion, or race, as self-defined.

The data for my analysis of contemporary Gujarati communal consciousness and political ideology was collected in interviews conducted with 50 Gujarati South African subjects between fall 1981 and spring 1983. I created crosstabulation tables for this interview data, using a typology of communal consciousness advanced by W. Montgomery Watt (1963). I used this typology to code the communal bond that the interviewee emphasized most, although Watt used it strictly for religious group attachment. I used a standard typology of political ideology (conservative, moderate, liberal, radical, contradictory, and apathetic-fatalistic) to code interview data for political consciousness. Finally I examined bivariate relationships between demographic variables (ethnic background, age-cohort, and occupational location) and the two core variables (communal consciousness and political ideology).

With my small sample, I found certain interconnections, the most important being that a certain type of communal consciousness correlated with political ideologies which transcend immediate, parochial interests. A converse type of communal consciousness correlated with political ideologies solely encompassing ingroup political interests. I also found a rather interesting relationship between occupational location and political ideology, suggesting an important distinction between smaller and larger Gujarati businessmen in their ability to internalize progressive political ideology.

2). The Case Study Interview Data Base

Between fall 1981 and spring 1983 I conducted 50 interviews, each of which averaged slightly less than two hours in tape recording time. Most interviews were conducted with males (43); I also interviewed five females and two interviews were conducted with husband and wife simultaneously. The sampling procedure was a cross between the "availability" method and the "quota" method (Selltitz, et.al., 1976). That is, not every Gujarati available to me was interviewed; I interviewed an approximate, but not exact quota from four ethnic divisions within the Gujarati community. I sought interviewees with a range of other background characteristics as well, such as age, sex, and occupation. My geographical base was Durban, but I traveled to Johannesburg and Pretoria on two occasions to conduct 14 interviews. I first sought out elderly Gujaratis with

lively memories, and then I proceeded to the middle and younger generations.

I received assistance in arranging interviews from six contact persons with different social backgrounds, all but one of whom was in turn contacted originally by my on-site supervisor, Professor Fatima Meer. My supervisor also arranged some interviews and I arranged a few directly. Also, five interviews "snowballed" from interviewee to interviewee. The contact persons knew of my desire to interview community members with diverse occupational histories and views on South Africa. Interviews were conducted whenever and wherever convenient, usually at the interviewee's office or home. Some interviews, most frequently those with the older generation, necessitated multiple visits.

Naturally, each contact person had his or her own idea of who would make a good interview subject, and this influenced the selection procedure. Usually interviewees had high status in the community, although a few did not. While certainly not close to a random sample's representativeness, this sample was not overly homogenous in terms of wealth, ethnic background, religiosity, community involvement, and especially important for this chapter's purposes, communal consciousness or political ideology. Although the sample does not proportionately represent the broader Gujarati population, it encompasses a sought-after range of ideologies and life experiences in that population.

My goal was to encourage interviewees "to talk about what is on their minds and what is of concern to them without forcing them to respond to the observer's interests, concerns, or preconceptions" (Bogdon and Taylor, 1975:57). This was accomplished to an extent with a loose interview format. Each interview began with my asking what the interviewee recalled about the family's first passenger Indian (why he chose to emigrate to South Africa, family arrival, occupational history, etc.). Next we discussed relatives who were particularly important to the interviewee, such as parents. I asked interviewees to talk briefly about these individuals, and provided minimal direction while listening intently.

Most of the interviews centered on the next section of the interview, concerning the interviewee's personal life experiences. I followed a chronological outline of topics, beginning with childhood and proceeding through life stages. I encouraged the interviewee to expatiate on any issue of interest. Usually, toward the last quarter of the interview, the topics of ethnic and political ideology arose. When discussing personal activities and interests outside of employment, I would ask the interviewee how he or she felt about the different race groups, how important religion and other aspects of culture were, his or her views on politics, and other topics. I encouraged each interviewee to spend as much time as desired on each subject and to go back to a subject whenever desired as I wanted to gain as complete an understanding as possible of the Gujaratis. In

several instances, the interviewee raised pertinent topics without any initial question on my part.

I transcribed each interview virtually verbatim, with some very small adjustments made to improve readability. I received assistance from Fatima Meer and two Indian South African students in transcribing some of the more difficult interviews. This process focused my theoretical interests further and led me to examine the links between the concepts "communal consciousness" and "political ideology". I read each interview thoroughly through and as objectively as possible, and extracted all statements relating to these two concepts.

Before discussing the conceptualization and measurement of these two concepts I would like to bring up some methodological issues raised by my case studies. First, were the interviewees open and honest? Apparently, they were. I sensed a deep feeling of comfort during most interviews and we had open exchanges of ideas and general topics of concern. My outline of topics was not rigidly adhered to, and most interviews were more conversational in nature than a strict interview per se. This encouraged more relaxed interactions. My on-site supervisor, a Gujarati herself, made such an atmosphere possible. Prof. Meer, who is outspoken politically, induced those with like sentiments to express them. Her presence did not seem to inhibit those of opposing sentiments in expressing their views. Perhaps this is because of her reputation as an academician who has

written on Indian culture and history, and her being a proponent of Indian culture made me acceptable to more conservative Gujaratis who do identify with her cultural activism, if not her politics.

In working with an open interview format, there is a potential to bias results with leading questions and the conversation flow. I do not feel this was a problem as I collected my data first, and then my theoretical questions became focused. I knew I was interested in the interviewees' subjective perceptions of their life in South Africa, but I did not have specific hypotheses that I sought to substantiate. Therefore I did not consciously encourage certain responses from the interviewees.

My interviews were conducted in a variety of locations, from homes to work settings to the university. Did differences in environment affect the results? Yes, but this was unavoidable. The most thorough interviews were conducted in private, either in home or the office, after an initial meeting. Both of us felt freer to converse and discuss sensitive issues, such as politics. Due to lesser inhibition, I was more successful in obtaining detailed responses to questions regarding personal viewpoints when in private, and at a location of the interviewee's choice.

The foregoing discussion of methodological problems establishes my perception of the reliability of the interview data I collected. The next issue I faced was selecting segments of the data that I could systematically analyze that dealt with my theoretical

concerns. I will next show how I conceptualized and operationalized the two concepts I became especially interested in--communal consciousness and political ideology.

3). Operationalization of Communal Consciousness

W. Montgomery Watt (1963) constructed a typology to characterize some of the major perceptions which promote hostile relationships among religious denominations. This typology can be applied equally well to nonreligious communal groups. Watt refers to each type of perception as an idea-type. The typology consists of three idea-types: isolationist, inflationary, and fixational. Each type resembles a form of neurosis that an individual can exhibit but are useful concepts on the group level as well. At the group level, these idea-types represent various responses to structural conditions; group leaders and members subscribe to these idea-types and can articulate them. Watt contends all three idea-types damage relationships with outgroups. Similarly, I will contend that such perceptions can potentially impede the growth of a heightened social commitment to aid the oppressed.

The first idea-type, isolationist, is a perceptual shutting off of the ingroup from outgroups, so that caring relationships are formed solely within the ingroup. Watt draws an analogy to the schizophrenic who is "unable to deal satisfactorily with the conflicts involved in free mixing with other people, and who tries to

avoid these conflicts by withdrawing from the real world of other people into a private world of his own" (1963:51-2). The isolationist group does virtually the same thing in response to its tensions and experienced hostilities, socializing one another to fear, distrust, and ignore outsiders.

The second idea-type is an inflationary response to societal conditions. It is an ideological technique of building self-confidence by upgrading the ingroup at the expense of outgroups. "It consists in making an assertion about a state of affairs or a set of ideas so that, if the assertion is believed, it follows that the importance of one's group is unduly enhanced or its interests unduly promoted" (1963:52). Unlike isolationist ideas, which advocate withdrawal from the outer society, inflationary ideas serve to elevate ingroup social status and esteem by claiming that the ingroup is special and its views outright superior to outgroups. Whereas individuals and groups commonly build confidence through asserting pride in cultural practices, Watt suggests that group leaders and members can create a neurotic environment of ego inflation, sustained by denigrating and disparaging the cultural characteristics and practices of other groups.

The third idea-type, the fixational set of beliefs, derives from the "retention of ideas after the circumstances to which they were relevant have altered" (1963:54). This type clings to traditions and customs, with the view that this is the only proper way to express

group loyalty and pride. Believers in fixational ideas advocate rigid adherence to traditional folkways and mores in response to modernization, for example.

These three idea-types, each of which incorporates a variety of ideological prescriptions and proscriptions for proper group behavior, can be considered as primarily independent or dependent variables depending on one's analytical focus. These ideas can be the foundation of the group's intellectual and moral atmosphere and shape the members' concomitant sense of attachment to the group. A group's political attitudes, by extension, can also be affected by its communal consciousness.

The Gramscian orientation views consciousness as a complex phenomenon with internal dynamics, yet one conditioned by structural constraints and pressures. The internal dynamics Gramsci refers to can be examined with the application of these three idea-types.

For heuristic purposes, I have created three additional idea-types that are polar opposites of the three already discussed. I will call the opposite of isolationist, integrationist (mixing with outgroups is highly encouraged); the opposite of inflationary, egalitarian (emphasis on cultural equality); and the opposite of fixational, reflective-adaptive (encouragement of novel cultural practices to adjust to changing societal conditions).

The data collected does not allow for precise measurement of the degree to which interviewees possess these idea-types; however,

statements could be extracted from the interviews which approximate the six idea-types.

The coding of interviewee assertions into one or more of the six categories entailed a judgemental procedure. In order to arrive at this decision, I first examined the interview transcript and identified the cultural group attachment which each interviewee most strongly expressed. The responses ranged from the inclusive category of identification by race (especially inclusive when the interviewee defined her or his race as black rather than Indian), to the ethnically exclusive realm of defining herself or himself by caste or specific home area in India. Interviewees may not have explicitly pointed out the most meaningful communal source of their identity. Nevertheless, when a realm of culture was emphasized more than any other, I concluded that it had significant meaning for the interviewee and was therefore worthy of empirical analysis.

The second step in the coding of interview data was matching one or more of the six ideological categories with the communal attachment emphasized by the interviewees. Unfortunately, when I was at this stage of analysis, I did not have the luxury of contacting interviewees to further clarify their statements. Nevertheless, a majority of the interviewees, 35 out of 50 (70 percent) could be coded without too much ambiguity into one or more of the six categories.

Some interviewees did not really express their views regarding

ingroup/outgroup relationships or the meaningfulness of cultural traditions, information which was necessary for coding. Furthermore, some statements were just too ambiguous for the coding scheme, which may signal a weakness in the coding scheme.

Statements concerning religious bonds were usually the most difficult to code. Many eloquent and obviously meaningful articulations could not be coded. The following is a case in point of two statements expressed by an interviewee that would need further probing to determine whether they should receive a code of egalitarian or fixational:

I used to look forward to religious events but I feel there are certain new innovations that are made by people today which are contradictory to the beliefs of my religion. Our religion teaches us to be very down to earth and simple, humble people. I feel people are not like this and too extravagant. I admired Gandhi very much. He was a very honest man. He used to believe in "Allah". He was a great person and his religion doesn't alter this. Also, he never slandered Islam.

I feel that right now things are not moving in the right direction. People don't attach much importance to religion anymore and this upsets me. People are no longer very trustworthy. The older generation had a very strong faith--now no such thing. The older generation was very honest--today everything is different. People have got a lot of money and they are very proud. They are heading for disaster. Even the whites of the older generation were a better lot. In spite of all the laws and regulations that were enforced, they used to look at us with respect.
(Czcoa)

The above was one of the 15 interviewees who was not coded for

this variable, although she, like some of the others counted as missing data, openly expressed ideological viewpoints concerning cultural life. Her assertions could certainly fit another conceptual schema revolving around ideology, especially if it dealt with intergenerational relationships. In this schema, however, her point about Gandhi as a Hindu only leans toward an egalitarian viewpoint, and her statements about the younger generation indicate a fixational point of view. Her views would need further probing for substantiation of any coding decision.

In order to further illustrate the coding procedure, I will present a number of examples of interview data that were codable. The full set of coded assertions appear in Appendix B. Below are brief definitions of the six idea-types and selected narrative excerpts from the interviews exemplifying each one of them. The final illustration, of reflective-adaptive, also contains elements of integrationist ideas and was coded jointly. The definitions and illustrations are ordered in pairs, the first followed by its opposite. It is important to note that the type of communal bond varies in the illustrations, the first referring to ethnic origins, the second to race, the next three to religion, and the final quote to ethnic origins. When two discrete segments of an interview are cojoined, I have indicated this with two slash marks (//). When I skipped a few words, which was occasionally unavoidable due to inability to transcribe, or I asked a question to keep the conversation flowing, I make no indication in these excerpts.

To indicate the age-cohort of the interviewee, I've given an o for older, m for middle, and y for younger as the second to last letter of each code-name:

3A). Isolationist

"shutting off of the ingroup from outgroups so that caring relationships are formed solely within the ingroup"

I now live with my son in Overport. I only have a few friends. They're Gujarati Hindu.// If you've got a family and are surrounded by African people, you can't mix, so you develop the habit of staying alone. We are surrounded by Gujarati Muslim people in Overport. We don't mix with them. I don't get into town too often because my daughter-in-law usually stays at home. In England, the royal family only goes out a few times in a year. The same occurs with us. (Nzicoa; emphasized ethnic origins)

(This interviewee received a code of isolationist because he portrays an unwillingness to mix socially with non-Gujarati Hindus.)

3B). Integrationist

"a relaxation of ingroup/outgroup boundaries so that mixing with outgroups is encouraged regardless of cultural background"

I went to standard six at Orient, then I went to High School in Swaziland. It was a private school. They taught the British system and my parents thought it would be a better education. I wasn't hesitant to go there. Even friends I have made there have come and stayed at my house, and I've gone to stay at their house. We still keep in touch even now. I met a lot of different people there, people from all over the world, virtually from every country, including England, America, and Australia, but mainly from the surrounding African countries. It was an exclusive school, where diplomat's children went, even Chinese from the Republic of China. It was co-ed, which Orient was not, and a boarding school as well. So the life was

completely different, but I didn't have any problems adjusting to this new environment. (Mzyya; emphasized race)

(This interviewee received a code of integrationist because he asserts a desire to make friends across the racial borders.)

3C). Inflationary

"claiming that the ingroup is superior to outgroups on account of cultural criteria"

The way of dressing, the way of living, the way of education, everything should be perfectly based on the Koran. It is a perfect book. It gives you solutions to all problems. It tells you why you should and why you shouldn't. In other words, it's based on logic.// It's very difficult for me to try and explain the Hindu religion. It's very illogical to me. It's very primitive and different than the Muslim religion. It's difficult to understand the logic because there is no logic. Also, in Christianity, you say that Jesus was the son of God. Why would God want to kill his son for mankind? You know it's no logic. You decide what it is. (Ezrya; emphasized religion)

(This interviewee received a code of inflationary because he expresses the view that his religious culture is superior to other religious cultures.)

3D). Egalitarian

"respecting the cultural practices of outgroups and not expressing superiority to them on account of cultural criteria"

Why I like India is because it is an old, 4,000 year old country, and India has got its own art and traditions. I don't mind if the religion is different. Your religion is good enough for you and my Islam is good enough for me. We all have the same God.// The Koran is a wonderful book. I'll give you the meaning of just one verse alone and that will put

you on the right track. The verse says, "Before your lifespan is over in this world, whatever you do good, you send it towards the Almighty. Whatever you achieved and left behind after you depart from this earth will also be noted, and on the day of judgement, you will be rewarded accordingly." (Mzhoa; emphasized religion)

(This interviewee received a code of egalitarian because he asserts the view that his religious culture is not superior to other religious cultures.)

3E.) Fixational

"rigid adherence to traditional cultural mores and folkways"

Most of the things today are very westernized. You can look at it yourself--the world is becoming too modern and time is going too fast because of the modern things in life.// The use of television in our religion is forbidden. Music is also forbidden because music encourages you to start dancing, dancing encourages you to go to discos to show how good you can dance, and discos encourage you to start drinking--one evil leads to another. Also, you meet women at discos, which is very wrong. (Rzjya; emphasized religion)

(This interviewee received a code of fixational because he espouses beliefs prescribing living life exactly as one's ancestors.)

3F). Reflective-Adaptive

"reflective consideration of cultural beliefs and practices and willingness to adjust them to changing social circumstances"

Today people are freer to express their opinions. My parents couldn't have strong viewpoints when they were kids but had to accept the opinions of the older people. They've had to adapt to a lot, as for hundreds of generations, the mother and father had a lot of authority. To marry outside of the Khatri group, even

a Meman who speaks almost the exact same language, was unheard of. Although the people were religious, I don't think they followed their religion properly. They only had to read the Koran in Arabic. They didn't know its meaning so much. So, their religion was more ritual than a sort of thinking, living, and understanding religion. These days the youngsters don't accept that. They want to follow their religion in its true form. To not marry someone just because they're not from the same language group is stupid and un-Islamic.// Our parents accepted a lot of things and we would question them and maybe feel a bit selfish. You will think, "No, this is definitely wrong," but at the same time you might feel you're being selfish for thinking or saying that. Our parents might have felt it but they would not question it. (Jzgya; emphasized ethnic origins)

(This interviewee received a code of reflective-adaptive because she stresses the importance of independent thinking to arrive at the meaning and appropriate expression of one's culture.)

These examples of the six categories of communal consciousness indicate the range of opinions expressed in the interview data base. Even though different communal groups are being referred to, the type of group is less important than the nature of attachment to it. This is the aspect of communal consciousness that will receive attention. It should be noted that although there are six types of attachment, certain types share common characteristics. Isolationist, inflationary, and fixational ideas are boundary-maintenance mechanisms that reduce the likelihood of forming attachments to those who do not share communal attributes. Integrationist, egalitarian,

and reflective-adaptive ideas enable the individual to simultaneously hold affective ties with the ingroup and engage in harmonious relationships with outgroups.

The coding of communal consciousness entailed somewhat arbitrary decisions. While many statements were clearly in either the isolationist-inflationary-fixational camp (inward-turning) or the integrationist-egalitarian-reflective-adaptive camp (outward-turning), it could often be debated which category fit best. When I felt two idea-types were expressed equally, I issued two codes. However, although I will analyze these categories and offer some tentative conclusions, my most important points will revolve around the dichotomy of inward-turning and outward-turning ideas. After I discuss the operationalization of political ideology, I will examine whether these idea-types correlate with political ideology and discuss theoretical implications.

4). Operationalization of Political Ideology

After reviewing all of the interview transcripts again, I sorted out those with political content. In each interview, I had brought up politics with a very general question, when necessary, similar in wording to the following: "What are your views on the Indian situation in South Africa?" If the interviewee appeared comfortable in speaking on political issues, I probed with more specific

questions on the political topic being discussed. Sometimes the interviewee concentrated on the Indian-White relationship, other times on Indian politics, the African situation, or politics in general. I was able to code political ideologies for 34 out of 50 (68 percent) of the interviews. Although my method was not systematic, it allowed politics, as well as other sensitive areas, to be discussed in as natural and conversational a setting as possible, as advocated by Lane (1960) and Bulmer (1975). If interviewees did not want to discuss politics, or put forth their views, I did not press them.

Many factors might have contributed to the lack of codes for 32 percent of the sample. My interviews tended to be shorter with this uncodable subgroup, averaging about seventy-five minutes of tape recording time. Only 6 percent (one out of sixteen) of the younger generation (18-30) did not reveal political beliefs, whereas 58 percent (seven out of twelve) of the middle generation (35-60) did not and 36 percent (eight out of twenty two) of the older generation (over 65) did not express their political views. The two main inhibiting factors in gathering rich, subjective information were the presence of other people in the room during the interview and the various reactions interviewees had to my research interests. Both of these factors were usually overcome but not in all cases. For 10 of the interviews with the older generation, there were family members present in the room, and in only four of the other 12 interviews,

were we alone in the household. Five of the 10 interviews conducted with others present did not produce political perceptions and three of the four privately conducted interviews did. Perhaps the interviewees in the latter group were on the whole, more comfortable with being interviewed in the first place. Their interviews averaged approximately three hours of tape time compared with approximately one and one-half hours when others were present. Also, six interviews with the older generation were conducted at work settings (four with others present in the room), and half of these interviewees did not express their political ideology when I tried to lead into this area.

For the middle generation, being interviewed at work was a greater deterrent to political openness than was the presence of others. All six who were interviewed in their offices did not express their political views despite my asking how they felt about the Indian situation. Some discussed certain political events, such as resistance efforts and government actions, but did not convey their own point of view. This stands in contrast to the younger generation, eight of whom I interviewed at their workplaces, and only one not expressing his or her views. Also, five interviews with middle generation members were conducted in the presence of others, and three of them did not articulate a political ideology (two of the three were interviewed at work). Only two interviews were very private, and both of those interviewees were open with their

political views.

Thus, although my being a white American and my using a tape recorder made it somewhat difficult for political issues to be discussed, over two-thirds of all interviewees did express political views. The nearly one-third who did not were mainly older than I was, and their interviews were conducted in an environment which was not as conducive to relaxed, open, conversation.

Some interviewees who did express political points of view vacillated on the issues. Either these interviewees were overly conscious of the interview situation and attempted to counter previous statements, or they had inconsistent political loyalties. Rather than dismiss these cases, they were coded as contradictory. The types of political ideologies articulated by the more consistent interviewees clustered in a narrow range along a continuum stretching from conservative to radical. Between the extremes, but closer to the conservative side, were moderate ideological articulations, and between moderate and radical pronouncements were liberal viewpoints.

I will define each of the categories of political ideology that I identified and then display interview excerpts. Some statements were not specific enough to distinguish between two categories. This most often occurred with statements that could be either liberal or radical. I will include illustrative excerpts of such statements.

First, for my purposes, conservative political ideology is defined as the desire to maintain the post-1948 political status quo

in South Africa, particularly support of the Nationalist Party's apartheid programs. Although there are political parties to the right of the Nationalist Party, including the Conservative Party, they express ideas beyond the limits of the most conservative South Africans with Indian descent that I have heard. Moderate political ideology will be defined as the desire to upgrade the privileges which Indian South Africans, or particular Indian South African sectors enjoy, believing that the government has treated them unjustly. No simultaneous commitment to the political aims of other oppressed groups is expressed. In other words, moderates seek greater acceptance of the Indian community, or sections thereof, by dominant whites, without seeking to alter the white-African master-servant relationship. Both conservatives and moderates do not profess concern with upgrading the status of blacks, whereas proponents of the next two levels of ideology, liberal and radical, do. This fundamental distinction will become important when comparisons are made to communal consciousness.

Both liberal and radical ideological pronouncements reject apartheid and seek its dismantlement, structurally and ideologically. Liberals and radicals vary on a number of specific issues, but the fundamental dividing line between them in the South African context is the issue of violence (Van den Berghe, 1979; Adam and Giliomee, 1979; Kuper, 1975). Liberal ideology, in brief, views dialogue, economic sanctions, boycotts, and marches, everything short

of violence, as effective means to end apartheid and white dominance. On the other hand, the common denominator of radical ideologies is the commitment to the view that sharp, violent-laden struggles with dominant whites are necessary to bring about liberation of the oppressed. Liberals hesitate to endorse violence, believing that it perpetuates hate and persecution; radicals view the exclusive use of nonviolent forms of protest as ineffective in the South African context, since it only perpetuates the status quo.

Some interviewees who discussed their political beliefs did not fit into one or more of the conservative, moderate, liberal, or radical categories. Their view was one of apathy, either because of an expressed distrust of all politicians and political movements, or because of a sense of powerlessness to accomplish anything. These interviewees were coded as apathetic-fatalistic.

There were nine interviewees whom I could not distinguish whether they fit into one category or the one next to it along the conservative-moderate-liberal-radical continuum. Three interviewees were coded as moderate or liberal and six as liberal or radical. The three interviewees who were coded as moderate or liberal expressed strong views against discrimination of Indians, but apparently were not overly concerned with discrimination against Africans and Coloreds, since they did not suggest a link between them (but neither did they rule it out). Pure moderates, however, drew firmer boundaries between Indian interests and black interests, clearly

indicating a lack of explicit concern over black rights, at least until Indian rights were achieved. The six coded as liberal to radical did not discuss methods of social change, but did link Indian and black interests or articulated strong concern for the dispossessed Africans. Below are selected narrative excerpts typifying each ideological category (the full set of coded statements appears in Appendix B):

4A). Conservative

If this country is given to the Africans, what would happen to the six million whites, the three million Coloreds and the one million Indians? We will be put in a boat and dumped in the middle of the sea. This government is doing the right thing. They talk about the bad Afrikaners, but this government is doing the right thing. The Indian and the Colored must understand what we must do. Combined, we have the power; separate, we lose the power. The African community gives very little love. (Nzioa)

(This interviewee received a code of conservative because he expresses satisfaction with Nationalist Party policy toward the race groups.)

4B). Moderate

Dadoo was a little bit of a Communist and he was trying to bring everybody together; the black man must have the same rights as an Indian. Nana said, "No, we must look after our own business because if we look after them, we can't win because it would go against the government's policy and that would never help." So, he said, "We should look after ourselves first, and then after that we can help them." I liked Nana he was a good friend of mine. He was a hard worker who all the time looked after Indian interests. (Mztoa)

(This interviewee received a code of moderate because

he expresses support of a previous political faction which sought to elevate the Indian situation and disassociate itself from black causes. Even though he is speaking of the past, this statement served to express his contemporary political views.)

4C). Moderate to Liberal

If we didn't have limitations, I think the Indians would be much more powerful in this country. Where people have been thrown out of their homes because the area was banned, where you couldn't open a business--you still can't open a business where you want to, where you don't have access to the right government officials because you are not electing them, while a white person has a councillor in his area and can be in contact with him and lean on him, its hard to progress. However, the Indians have still pushed forward. The enterprising nature of the community has always remained to uplift themselves to a degree. At least, the people we mix with socially all have done well for themselves, but could have done much better. The funny thing is you come across a lot of whites who would say, "Oh, my best friend is an Indian." They're trying to tell you, "I'm on the level, you don't have to worry about me--I'm a good guy." Obviously, it's up to us to make our own decisions. We don't have to listen to what they say.// Our contacts with whites are not too regular with the same people, so we don't get too involved because of the whole set-up in this country. Though they say everything is open, there are limitations where you can go, what you can do, like cinemas, restaurants, pubs, and things like that. (Pzaya)

(This interviewee received a code of moderate to liberal because he focuses on hardships imposed on the Indian community and the need for governmental changes. He neither refers to blacks in general nor disassociates Indian South Africans from blacks.)

4D). Liberal

There must be free education for all and one type of education. There must be a special boost for the fellow at the bottom. He must have a five year program to bring him up on the three Rs, a crash program so he comes up and closes the gap. In a period of say 10 years for the Indian and 15 years for the African, they'll be able to solve their difficulties if you bring them all to power. There's no use saying you're going to do this on paper and do nothing in the end. If you say you want to give them something, then it should be done. (Sznoa)

(This interviewee received a code of liberal because he advocates a peaceful transition to power sharing showing a special concern for the oppressed.)

4E). Liberal to Radical

Our squash league is a non-racial breakaway league. You find this across the board in sports, where black players decide to form their own league and not discriminate on account of race. There is a lot of antagonism between the two leagues. They play on squash courts that the nonwhites need a permit to play on.// You know, some chaps come from Europe for about six months and they think they're superior to everyone. He's been here six months; all he knows is that he's a white person--he's superior; that's what's been drummed into him. This upsets me. I usually think, "He's probably a little nobody--who the hell does he think he is?" He was probably struggling over there and the South African government probably begged him to stay. Now he feels superior again. (Dzsya)

(This interviewee received a code of liberal to radical because he expresses a commitment to nonracialism and rejects white superiority complexes, but he neither condones nor condemns violence.)

4F). Radical

A lot of radical people are cynical about the Black Consciousness Movement, but I don't reject it outright. I think people should read books by guys

like Franz Fanon to get a better understanding of why people get into Black Consciousness and so forth. It's partly because they can't deal with their own feelings of inferiority, so you react instead of act. You react by becoming B.C. You say, "I'm going to become black. I'm going to stick to my identity. I reject the white man completely." You can't do that and destroy the system, because the system is not black and white; the system is capitalism. Basically, the capitalist system is funded by the so-called white man, but there are black capitalists too, and those guys are just as harmful. (Bzoya)

(This interviewee received a code of radical because he expresses a socialist point of view regarding necessary social change. He refers to another form of radical ideology that serves as a basis for African Nationalism.)

4G). Contradictory

South Africa is a nice country at the moment to live in. We have our problems, but everybody has their problems all over the world. All governments have to be harsh and ruthless to keep law and order. The people who agitate against a government and get into power, are harsher than the previous government. This goes on from government to government and each government that comes in becomes uprooted because it is too ruthless. This is the situation in southern Africa. South Africa is a stable country as a whole. It's a country of honey and milk. The people who want to work, can get their daily bread, but these loafers who don't want to work will eventually starve. Those who want to work can make a nice living.// I am politically motivated in my own way of thinking and this country has a lot of restrictions on speaking your own mind, but you express yourself in one way or the other. What's in you must come out of you. But still, the law is there and holds you back. As I've said, one unjust law in this country is the Group Areas Act, which has created a tragedy for the Indian community and likewise for the established Colored community. The African has always had the same tragedy because he had no place to stay and has been a migrant. He has suffered tremendously. The laws in this country have

always been one-sided; creating rules without consulting people or understanding their problems. (Bzkoa)

(This interviewee received a code of contradictory because he asserts that South Africa is a good and just country in one instance and in another that the laws are one-sided and unjust.)

4H). Apathetic-Fatalistic (emphasis on fatalism)

All over the world there are problems, not just in South Africa. Whatever is going to happen is going to happen. You can't avoid it, so what's the use to fight? Which part of the world is peaceful, tell me? In America, there's a lot of trouble; in Canada, lots of trouble; in India, lots of trouble; in Pakistan, lots of trouble; in any African country, lots of trouble. You have to face it, you can't avoid it. What's going to happen to others is going to happen to us. (Pzma)

(This interviewee received a code of apathetic-fatalistic because of her sense of powerless and belief in the futility of trying to create a more humane society.)

4I). Apathetic-Fatalistic (emphasis on apathy)

Reading about Russia doesn't make sense to me, because I'm not going to Russia, and one thing I do hate is politics. That's a subject I hate a lot. I would never discuss the politics of any country with anyone, even on the local Indian Affairs Committee or the S.A.I.C. I don't want to know about them. I don't know whether they're good or they're bad. I don't like politics. It's a subject that just bores me to death. So what if Mr. Rajbanski, I know the name because it's printed all over, is having a meal with Buthelezi and Buthelezi decided that we Indians should be more active towards the Africans. All right, that doesn't interest me so much because I'm not politically minded. That's all politics. (Hzsya)

(This interviewee received a code of apathetic-fatalistic because of his distaste for political issues.)

These narrative excerpts illustrate the range in political ideological assertions among my 50 Gujarati interviewees. Although the total sample is small, we at least get an idea that there is variation in political viewpoints, some of which come close to and others further away from the views articulated by traditional and organic intellectuals. I will examine whether certain demographic factors, such as class location, age, and ethnic origins, correlate with these ideas, as well as those regarding communal consciousness. This will allow me to make very tentative hypotheses concerning the ideological divisions in the wider Gujarati population. Most importantly, I will examine bivariate relationships between communal consciousness and political ideology. The purpose of this is to attempt to clarify some aspects of the relationship among different realms of subjective awareness that contribute to subordinate group hegemony.

5). Data Analysis

The six types of communal consciousness were recoded into two categories to first simplify the results: inward-turning and outward-turning. Interviewees who received one or more codes

depicting Watt's three idea-types (isolationist, inflationary and fixational) were recoded as inward-turning. Interviewees with the opposite codes (integrationist, egalitarian and reflective-adaptive) were recoded as outward-turning.

The original eight codes of the political ideology variable were collapsed into four categories: ingroup interests, all subordinate group interests, contradictory, and apathetic-fatalistic.

Interviewees coded as conservative, moderate, or moderate to liberal were recoded into the category of ingroup interests. Interviewees coded as liberal, radical, or liberal to radical were recoded into the category of all subordinate group interests. Contradictory and apathetic-fatalistic codes remained the same. This recoding allowed me to fit interviewees into broader categories, based on their assertions of cultural consciousness and political ideology.

I hypothesized that an inward-turning communal consciousness would correlate with an ingroup interest political ideology, and an outward-turning communal consciousness would correlate with an all subordinate group interest political ideology. I formulated no hypothesis predicting contradictory and apathetic-fatalistic political ideologies.

The basis for my hypothesis is that the experiences and ideologies which make up cultural and political life are mutually reinforcing (Gramsci, 1971; Thompson, 1963). If isolationist, inflationary, or fixational cultural ideas are incorporated by

communal group members, they cannot simultaneously be committed to the needs and interests of other oppressed groups. Such stances would be internally contradictory and inconsistent. Conversely, if group members adopt integrationist, inflationary, or reflective-adaptive ideas, they can simultaneously be committed to the needs and interests of other oppressed groups, as is prescribed in liberal and radical belief systems.

Table 5-1 is a cross-tabulation showing the relationship between communal consciousness and political ideology. Whereas initially 35 out of 50 (70 percent) of the interviewees received a code for communal consciousness and 34 out of 50 (68 percent) received a code for political ideology, only 25 out of 50 (50 percent) received codes for both variables and are included in this table. Conducting a statistical test on such a small number of cases can be done with the Fisher's Exact Test, but it is unnecessary, as the table itself reveals a very apparent relationship--one which supports my hypothesis. Of the five whose political ideologies were coded as ingroup interests and received a code for communal consciousness, each espoused inward-turning ideas concerning their communal bonds. Of the 10 whose political ideology was coded as all subordinate group interests, nine espoused outward-turning ideas concerning their communal bonds. Thus, only one out of 15 interviewees deviated from the prediction. In addition, four out of the five interviewees coded as contradictory, and four out of the five coded as

apathetic-fatalistic, articulated inward-turning communal ideas--showing that they too were unable to express strong identification with the downtrodden.

Table 5-1

Political Ideology by Communal Consciousness

Political Ideology	Communal Consciousness			Total
	<u>Inward-Turning</u>	<u>Outward-Turning</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
<u>Ingroup Interests</u>	5	0	3	8
<u>All Sub. Group Interests</u>	1	9	4	14
<u>Contradictory</u>	4	1	1	6
<u>Apathetic-Fatalistic</u>	4	1	1	6
<u>Missing</u>	1	9	6	16
Total	15	20	15	50

In spite of the sample's imperfections, the pattern uncovered indicates a strong interconnection. Only interviewees who were liberal, radical, or somewhere between were likely to espouse outward-turning ideas concerning their communal bonds. Now that this basic pattern is revealed, it is important to investigate whether certain categories of the variable, communal consciousness, contributed differently to the overall finding. Were interviewees

who asserted isolationist ideas in any way different from interviewees asserting inflationary ideas? These types of questions can be dealt with in the following table.

Table 5-2 is a cross-tabulation display of the same two variables, with the original codes remaining for the variable, communal consciousness. A particular problem was posed by 11 interviewees. Their communal consciousness assertions were coded as fitting two idea-types. In order to avoid giving them two tallies in the table, and the remaining interviewees only one, they were given one-half a tally for each of the two codes. That is why some cells have a 0.5 frequency.

Interviewees who expressed ingroup interest ideologies (conservative, moderate, or moderate to liberal) were most likely to express isolationist communal ideas (4 out of 5). Two of these interviewees were isolationist and felt most attached to their linguistic-regional ethnic group, and two expressed closest attachment to their race-ethnic group (Indian). It is interesting that both interviewees who emphasized their linguistic-regional ethnicity were of the older generation and conservative in their political ideology, and both of the subjects who focused on race were younger generation and moderate to liberal in their political ideology. This suggests that when the older generation is isolationist with regard to ethnic origins, they are especially likely to articulate Nationalist Party apartheid ideology. Perhaps

Table 5-2

Political Ideology by Communal Consciousness*

Political Ideology	Communal Consciousness						Total
	<u>Isola- tionist</u>	<u>Infla- tionary</u>	<u>Fixa- tional</u>	<u>Integra- tionist</u>	<u>Egal- itarian</u>	<u>Reflective- Adaptive</u>	
<u>Ingroup Interests</u>	4.0	1.0	-	-	-	-	5.0
<u>Contradictory</u>	0.5	3.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	-	5.0
<u>Apathetic-Fatalistic</u>	1.5	0.5	2.0	1.0	-	-	5.0
<u>All Subordinate Group Interests</u>	1.0	-	-	4.0	1.5	3.5	10.0
Total	7.0	4.5	2.5	5.5	2.0	3.5	25.0

*Eleven interviewees were coded into two communal consciousness categories and received a tally of 0.5 for each code and 14 interviewees were coded into one category and received a tally of 1.0.

they feel more comfortable with the aspect of apartheid ideology as advanced by former Prime Minister Verwoerd, which claims that each ethnic group can preserve its identity through apartheid legislation (Villiers, 1979). On the other hand, although some younger generation Gujaratis have been racially isolated and do not seek to integrate with whites or blacks, they do not appear to accept apartheid ideology. But neither have they apparently identified with the goals and aspirations of black liberationist movements. Their pride in their Indian legacy translates into a desire for segregation, whereas others who also derive self esteem from their ethnic roots do not translate that pride into ethnic exclusivity.

Articulators of contradictory political ideologies swayed from one set of political ideological prescriptions to another. They were most likely to express inflationary communal ideas. Two out of the five who were contradictory in political ideology were coded as inflationary and another two were coded jointly as inflationary and another inward-turning idea-type. Of the four, three were younger generation Gujaratis. Although the contradictory ideologists made up only 20 percent of the subsample of 25, they made up 66 percent of those who articulated inflationary communal ideas, as can be seen in Table 5-2.

One could either conclude that this relationship between contradictory and inflationary views has theoretical implications or that it is an artifact of the interview situation--interviewees who

were less comfortable with the format shifted their political statements and felt a need to assert notions of communal superiority. In Table 5-7 it will be shown that all of the contradictory assertions came from large business owners, so either only they felt uncomfortable as such with the interview which resulted in their contradictory political views and communal boasting, or these interviewees genuinely held contradictory political ideas and inflationary cultural viewpoints.

The apathetic-fatalistic subjects were more evenly divided in their types of inward-turning communal consciousness assertions. However, they were much more likely to be fixational with regard to their communal bonds than were the other interviewees, constituting 80 percent of this category. This relationship should not be surprising, since clinging to traditional cultural dictates would not seem to encourage creative thinking or active concern with one's own oppression, much less the oppression of others. The only way of radicalizing groups with fixational ideas is perhaps by melding culture and politics by introducing the ideal of an ethnic state in the image of traditional culture. Such a goal for Muslim or Hindu Indians is beyond possibility in South Africa.

Lastly, the interviewees with political ideologies encompassing all subordinate group interests in Table 5-2 were more likely to express integrationist or reflective-adaptive outward-turning communal ideas than egalitarian outward-turning ideas. When racial

identities were discussed, integrationist ideas were usually asserted; when religious identities were discussed, reflective-adaptive ideas were usually asserted. Thus, the political progressive who emphasized his or her racial identity, encouraged interaction between the races and often discussed how they acted on this belief. The political progressive did not automatically shun religion as a central component of identity either. Five of the nine who were liberal to radical in their political ideology emphasized religion--some of them were very religiously active Hindus or Muslims. The difference between them and the religiously active articulators of other political ideologies was their understanding of religion: the political progressive discouraged rote memorization of scriptures and rigid adherence to rituals while others condoned such practices.

Now that we have some evidence that communal consciousness correlates with political ideology, it would be valuable to know whether certain sub-sectors of the Gujaratis vary in their assertions about communal life and politics. With such information, we could make informed predictions about which sectors are more likely to identify with the oppressed. The three variables that I will crosstabulate with communal consciousness and political ideology are ethnic-religious background, age-cohort, and class location. The five Gujarati ethnic-religious categories are Meman Muslims (from Saurashtra), Sunni Vohra Muslims (from Surat), other Muslims,

Kathiawadi Hindus (from Saurashtra) and Surtee Hindus (from Surat). This variable will be analyzed first.

Table 5-3, which shows the relationship between ethnic-religious background and political ideology, reveals that only Muslims articulated contradictory political ideologies. This could be due to their desire to placate my liberal to radical supervisor, who is Muslim. Perhaps their conservative or moderate views would come forth more consistently in a different interview situation. The fact that only eight of the 29 Muslims interviewed did express liberal or radical political ideologies suggests that my supervisor's reputation did not have that strong a pull on interviewees expressing similar views. In all, the ethnic-religious groups do not differ from one another very much. It is interesting that my highest response rate came from the Kathiawadi Hindus. I seemed to be most openly received by this community in Durban in general, and they, plus the Sunni Vohra Muslims I met in Johannesburg, took the greatest interest in my research. Even the Kathiawadi Hindus who were steeped in traditional culture not only enjoyed sharing their biographies with a foreign researcher, but also expressed their political views.

Table 5-4 shows the relationship between ethnic-religious background and communal consciousness. It shows a fairly consistent pattern in the expression of inward-turning or outward-turning ideas for each of the four major ethnic-religious groups. This finding suggests that each of the four ethnic-religious groups contain

Table 5-3

Ethnic and Religious Background by Political Ideology

Ethnic and Religious Background	Political Ideology					Total
	<u>Ingroup Interests</u>	<u>Apathetic-Fatalistic</u>	<u>Contra-dictory</u>	<u>All Subordinate Group Interests</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
<u>Memam Muslim</u>	-	1	3	-	3	7
<u>Sunni Vohra Muslim</u>	2	1	3	7	7	20
<u>Other Muslim</u>	1	-	-	1	-	2
<u>Kathiawadi Hindu</u>	3	3	-	5	2	13
<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	2	1	-	1	4	8
Total	8	6	6	14	16	50

Table 5-4

Ethnic and Religious Background by Communal Consciousness

Ethnic and Religious Background	Communal Consciousness			Total
	<u>Inward-Turning</u>	<u>Outward-Turning</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
<u>Memam Muslim</u>	3	4	-	7
<u>Sunni Vohra Muslim</u>	5	7	8	20
<u>Other Muslim</u>	-	1	1	2
<u>Kathiawadi Hindu</u>	3	5	5	13
<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	4	3	1	8
Total	15	20	15	50

internal variation in their communal consciousness, some possessing cultural identities which facilitate subordinate group hegemony, and others, cultural identities which impede receptivity to the ideas espoused by organic intellectuals.

Tables 5-5 and 5-6 present the effects of age on political ideology and communal consciousness, age being divided into three categories: older (over 65), middle (35 to 62), and younger (17 to 30). Surprisingly, the younger generation was only somewhat more likely to be in the all subordinate group interests political category than was the older generation. This is somewhat misleading, however, in that the younger generation was closer to the moderate rather than conservative end of the ingroup interests category and closer to the radical side of the all subordinate group interests category than were the following generations. Also, the middle and older generation interviewees were less likely to divulge their political ideologies (some plausible reasons for this were discussed in the methodological sections). Nevertheless, each age group varied in its political ideologies. Similarly, each age cohort varied in its communal consciousness scores. The smaller middle age sector varied least in communal consciousness and were the most outward-turning. The older generation was slightly more likely to be inward-turning and the younger generation slightly more likely to be outward-turning.

Tables 5-7 and 5-8 portray the effects of occupational location on the political ideology and communal consciousness variables. Some

Table 5-5
Generation by Political Ideology

Generation	Political Ideology					Total
	<u>Ingroup Interests</u>	<u>Apathetic-Fatalistic</u>	<u>Contradictory</u>	<u>All Subordinate Group Interests</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
<u>Older</u>	3	3	3	5	8	22
<u>Middle</u>	2	1	-	2	7	12
<u>Younger</u>	3	2	3	7	1	16
Total	8	6	6	14	16	50

Table 5-6
Generation by Communal Consciousness

Generation	Communal Consciousness			Total
	<u>Inward-Turning</u>	<u>Outward-Turning</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
<u>Older</u>	8	7	7	22
<u>Middle</u>	1	5	6	12
<u>Younger</u>	6	8	2	16
Total	15	20	15	50

Table 5-7

Occupational Location by Political Ideology

Occupational Location	Political Ideology					Total
	<u>Ingroup Interests</u>	<u>Apathetic-Fatalistic</u>	<u>Contra-dictory</u>	<u>All Subordinate Group Interests</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
<u>Sm. Bus. Owner</u>	3	-	-	5	5	13
<u>Lge. Bus. Owner</u>	1	4	6	-	6	17
<u>Prof. sm. bus.</u>	1	-	-	4	-	5
<u>Prof. employed</u>	2	1	-	2	2	7
<u>Employed</u>	1	-	-	3	3	7
<u>Student</u>	-	1	-	-	-	1
Total	8	6	6	14	16	50

Table 5-8

Occupational Location by Communal Consciousness

Occupational Location	Communal Consciousness			Total
	<u>Inward-Turning</u>	<u>Outward-Turning</u>	<u>Missing</u>	
<u>Small Business Owner</u>	4	3	6	13
<u>Large Business Owner</u>	7	5	5	17
<u>Professional-small business</u>	1	3	1	5
<u>Professional-employed</u>	2	3	2	7
<u>Employed</u>	-	6	1	7
<u>Student</u>	1	-	-	1
Total	15	20	15	50

particularly interesting findings emerge. I divided occupational location into owner/partner of small business, owner/partner of large business, professional-small business, professional-employed, employed-white collar, and student. I based the distinction between small and large businesses based on my own perception; in practically all instances, large businesses were substantially involved in import and export, whereas small businesses were in retail with a few employees and not exceptionally high overhead. Professionals either had their own practice, like a small business, or were employed by an institution as a doctor, lawyer, or teacher.

The most striking finding in Table 5-7 is the difference in political ideology between owner/partners of large business and the remaining occupational categories. Large business owners received 100 percent of the contradictory codes and 66 percent of the apathetic-fatalistic codes, despite their making up only 34 percent of the sample population. Only one large business owner committed himself to a political stand along the conservative to radical continuum. This suggests that the merchant community does not tend to present itself to outsiders as consistently supporting any one side in political struggles. This was not simply a generational phenomenon, either, as three of the contradictory scores were younger generation. Also, three of the five small business owners coded into the all subordinate group interests category were older generation, showing that older small businessmen were perhaps more likely to

identify with oppressed blacks. The fact that none of the large business owners asserted an unambiguous commitment to liberal or radical causes represents either their fear of economic consequences in making such a claim, or a genuine lack of commitment.

Nevertheless, small business owners and professionals who offered their service in a small business establishment, who are in class terms petit-bourgeois, were more likely to identify with anti-apartheid causes beyond those exclusively pertaining to the victimization of the Indian community.

Table 5-8 shows that small and large business owners were slightly more likely to be inward-turning than outward-turning, and professionals were somewhat more likely to be outward-turning in their communal consciousness. The most extreme pattern occurred among the seven who were employed. Five of them were younger generation, three of them were certified accountants, one a bank analyst, and one a clerical worker in an insurance firm (the other two were middle generation, one a salesman in a jewelry store and one a clothing store manager). Six of these seven employed who could be coded on communal consciousness, were outward-turning. The combination of being younger generation and employed promoted outward-turning communal ideas and all subordinate interests political views.

6). Conclusion

The Gramscian orientation directs attention to the creative role of ideas in facilitating or impeding revolutionary activity (Salamini, 1974; Boggs, 1976). By examining philosophies of individuals engaged in cultural life, one becomes sensitive to how these expressions can react back on society and produce certain outcomes. I directed attention to how certain cultural beliefs can deter or facilitate political thinking in terms of all the oppressed.

An empirical and theoretical question becomes "Do changing perceptions in the cultural realm lead to changing perceptions in the political realm, or vice-versa?" Such a question requires empirical analysis of a longitudinal, case-study nature, and theoretical development on the interconnections among superstructural institutions and their ideologies, well beyond the confines of this chapter.

The simple, but important point I have added support to is that one cannot live in a cultural world that discourages mixing with outsiders, elevates the ingroup at the expense of outgroups, and is rigid in its adherence to traditional precepts, and at the same time strongly identify with the political aims and aspirations of oppressed groups. Although the sample was small, 13 out of 14 who were inward-turning in their communal consciousness expressed a political ideology that was neither liberal or radical. In contrast, 9 out of 11 who were outward-turning in their communal consciousness,

were liberal or radical. Although structural factors impinge on communal consciousness, as was illustrated with the interconnection between occupational location and communal consciousness, the Gramscian orientation grants leeway to intellectuals within the cultural realm (not simply "educated" intellectuals, but all reflective human beings) to alter the ideologies of cultural groups (Ferrarotti, 1979). Thus a movement toward "integrationist", "egalitarian" and "reflective-adaptive" ideological dissemination and acceptance within communal life can facilitate the establishment of a moral and intellectual atmosphere which promotes identification with the oppressed and downtrodden.

The question still remains whether certain classes, because of their structural circumstances, can generate and internalize a cultural and political consciousness that promotes identification with the interests of the oppressed. It appears, based on my small sample, that the greatest obstacles lie with the large business owners. Even though five were outward-turning in their communal consciousness, none of these expressed all subordinate group interests ideologies. One of them was apathetic-fatalistic in political ideology and another was contradictory, the remaining three not divulging their political views. Thus it is not clear whether an outward-turning cultural consciousness is enough to influence those with the most vested interests in the status quo. However, given the variability within the petit-bourgeois occupational sectors with

regard to political ideology, and its impressive correlation with communal consciousness in my sample, it can be suggested that communal consciousness and political ideology are closely tied together for the petite bourgeoisie. Further research could greatly enhance our comprehension of the dual effects of class and ethnic background on the apparently tight interrelationship between communal consciousness and political ideology.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

1). Discussion of Research Findings

The middleman minority theory and the Gramscian theoretical orientation are both useful in illuminating sociological undercurrents active within the Gujarati South African community. The middleman minority theory exposes values and practices of the Gujaratis which serve to constrain efforts to achieve political solidarity with black resistance causes. The Gramscian perspective orients our attention to conscious, social efforts to overcome various forms of subordinate group divisiveness. It takes the researcher from the basic social dynamics illuminated by theories such as the middleman minority theory into the shifting terrain of political and social struggle. It holds promise that a cultural, moral, ethical, and intellectual consciousness can be shared by subordinate groups with competing material interests. Such a consciousness embodies a strong will to overcome all forms of oppressive social arrangements and counters the hegemonic efforts of the ruling class, who seek to win the consent of certain subordinate groups with concessions and promises.

By incorporating both theoretical perspectives, I was able to highlight those underlying forces pushing the Gujaratis closer to and further away from black unity. I did not focus on the complex nature of actual white, black, and non-racial political alignments and associations nor the likely future course of events. While I remain very interested in the broader context of social revolution and evolution of South Africa and have speculations about what might occur, I did not conduct a detailed analysis of the South African political economy and political protest movements. The findings I did obtain, however, should serve to shed light on this broader, more significant level.

In applying the middleman minority theory, plausible explanations emerged as to why the Gujaratis have been essentially a middleman minority in South Africa. Each explanation, deduced from applying three variant approaches within the theory, identifies divisive social forces within the Gujaratis which need to be overcome in order to establish hegemonic ties with those lower in the stratification order. For instance, in applying the cultural perspective, special attributes of the Gujaratis, such as a strong trade ethos, tightly knit social networks, and a caste-rooted feeling of ethnic pride can all serve as social mechanisms distancing Gujaratis from other blacks and heightening Gujarati concern for economic and social advancement without genuine concern for the aims and aspirations of subordinates. By drawing on these cultural features and promising

protection of cultural identities, the political state is able to obstruct strategic alliances between the middleman minority group and other subordinate groups.

Although Chapter 2 highlights these social distancing cultural resources, the evidence that these factors will inevitably cause insurmountable frictions with blacks does not finally convince me. I see their existence, as well as other structural and ideological impediments to unity, as being overcome by conscious, creative efforts by Gujaratis and the other oppressed population sectors. When elite and competitive values of one's ethnic legacy become important in establishing self-esteem and pride (which they do when the types of cultural resources identified by the middleman minority theory are asserted), there are pressures to turn communally inward, to avoid meaningful relationships with other ethnic groups, and to assert self-pride. These pressures are certainly operative in the Gujaratis' case, but so are other forces compelling Gujaratis to recreate their cultural life and communal identities based on a sense of common popular beliefs shared with other ethnic groups.

The contextual perspective of the middleman minority theory highlights the role middleman minorities play as a buffer between elites and the masses, and it nicely fits into the South African context. The small sector of dominant whites needs numerous resources to pacify the blacks, and a scapegoat minority can always be of assistance. They help reinforce the status gap between whites

and blacks by serving black consumer needs in a small business capacity. Such servicing tends to evoke antagonism with many blacks whose consumer power is weak. To cope with this, the Indian businessmen could lower prices, but only so far. The Gujaratis' degree of economic success can be perceived as coming at the black consumer's expense. In directing their energies and thoughts to business, and having more face-to-face contact with blacks than white businessmen have, Gujaratis have become convenient scapegoats in times of crisis. Their ability to make money through hard work and entrepreneurial acumen can be perceived as the display of selfish, individualist motives. Frustrated working class and petit-bourgeois whites can blame middleman minority businessmen for their own economic stagnation, as can blacks who feel the economic pinch and see the relative prosperity of Indian businessmen.

By degrading the middleman minority, both blacks and whites can enhance their self-image without fear of state reprisal. This benefits the dominant whites because disadvantaged whites and blacks alike can blame the middleman minority for their own frustrations, rather than the system which benefits dominant whites. Furthermore, by increasing the level of competition in the petit-bourgeois ranks, bourgeois whites are less threatened by increasing competition from lower class whites, striving for equal class standing. In addition, Africans may feel undeserving of power and privilege based on their observations of the economic skills and hard work of Indian

businessmen, who stand only one notch above them in the stratification order. The middleman minority can serve to perpetuate stereotypes of Africans as being best suited for lower-level economic tasks. All of these possibilities strengthen the hegemony of the dominant whites, as racism permeates the popular ideas and common sense of the masses.

Although I did no concentrated analysis on each of these plausible causes of Gujarati-black (and Gujarati-working class white) divisiveness, nor did I ascertain just how divisive relations actually are, my examination has nonetheless been useful. It shows that just by occupying middleman minority roles, Gujaratis are pushed by structural forces into a scapegoat minority situation. The potential for hostile outbursts always exists when a powerless minority group is benefiting more from the given social structure than are other oppressed groups. The dominant economic class and political elites benefit from such an arrangement. Apartheid intensifies the prospects for middleman minority scapegoating, as it serves to restrict upward mobility aspirations for all oppressed sectors (including middleman minorities). As the middleman minority feels exploited, it is perceived by less fortunate as privileged. The placing of Gujaratis along with other selected Indians and Coloreds on meaningless government councils and parliamentary chambers compounds the feelings of animosity that Africans and other less privileged groups feel toward the Gujaratis. Any form of

alliance with or benefit from the hated apartheid system impedes prospects of sharing a common subjective awareness of shared oppression. It simply makes the task of Gujarati activists who seek solidarity with blacks harder to accomplish.

One would have to thoroughly analyze previous outbursts of white and African hostility toward the Gujaratis (such as the public outbursts in the 1940s by whites and Africans against Indian businessmen) to ascertain just how operative these contextual factors were. It also requires an ambitious class analysis of extant South African society to deal with contemporary displays of hostility toward Indians, such as those in certain townships (Inanda) and the newly integrated beaches. Even without such a detailed empirical analysis, the contextual perspective, like the cultural perspective, illuminates forces which serve to impede hegemony with subordinate groups. If not countered by forces capable of facilitating subordinate group hegemony, one can anticipate cultural and structural gulfs between the Gujaratis and those lower in the stratification order to either remain or become reactivated.

The situational perspective also directs attention to a feature of middleman minority groups that reduces prospects for sharing a common moral and intellectual atmosphere with other oppressed groups--their subjective awareness of their migratory history. To the extent that the minority directs its ethnic energies and thoughts to the ancestral homeland, one can anticipate the maintenance of

ethnic solidarity, concentration in easily liquidated lines of business, and intensified societal hostility. As long as the middleman minority feels unrooted in their new residence, they are less inclined to take risks to upgrade the life circumstances of the downtrodden. Rather, those possessing a "sojourning mentality" will more likely migrate to a new international destination when the status quo is in jeopardy. I found some empirical evidence that a sojourning orientation is no longer strong among Gujaratis, but certainly a more sophisticated analysis is necessary.

The above perspectives of the middleman minority theory are useful for pinpointing obstacles that need to be overcome in order for Gujaratis to coalesce with various liberation movements that seek to terminate apartheid and create an equitable society. However, have subsequent generations of Gujaratis moved out of middleman minority roles? If they have, the theory does not have as much applicability. I could not precisely determine the number of Gujaratis self employed in small business, the quintessential middleman economic activity. I was able, however, to make the empirical case that a solid Gujarati middleman minority community has existed for several generations. The 1939 and 1971 Who's Who volumes both contained sizeable numbers of Gujaratis at younger and older ages engaged in middleman economic activities (see Chapter 3). Three findings about the relevance of ethnic solidarity to them have particularly interesting implications with regard to subordinate

group hegemony.

One statistical finding is that the Gujaratis were more exclusive in their associational memberships than were other Indian South Africans in similar petit-bourgeois economic roles. That is, middle class Indian South Africans with an indentured laborer legacy were more inclined to be members of associations that did not honor regional or linguistic loyalties. Several Indians with an indentured laborer legacy did participate in such associations, but they were more active in associations without ethnic boundaries than were the Gujaratis. This suggests that the Gujaratis have even more ethnic obstacles to overcome, in order to achieve broad-based subordinate-group hegemony. Their historical origins as a migrant trading class may be responsible for their greater involvement in ethnically exclusive associations, lending evidence to support Bonacich's situational perspective. Their historical situation as sojourners may have continued to create a sense of unrootedness in South Africa, more than other Indian South Africans in similar economic roles.

Also important is the statistical finding that large Gujarati business owners have increasingly withdrawn from active associational involvement in the community between 1939 and 1971. Those coded as large business owners in 1971 tended to have larger capital assets than those coded as large business owners in 1939, and they could be considered bourgeois in class standing rather than petit-bourgeois.

Since middleman minority businesses tend to be small and family operated (*petit-bourgeois*), perhaps the large business owners in 1971 should be viewed as falling outside the middleman minority community. Their low scores on total associational involvement supports this interpretation, as ethnic associational involvement is a core characteristic of a middleman minority, since ethnic group members need ethnic support to be successful in small business. Ethnic support is apparently less essential to the needs of the larger Gujarati businessmen in 1971, and one could surmise that acceptance by the white bourgeoisie is more important to them than is ethnic solidarity and economic survival. If this is the case, the impediments of the higher economic stratum of the Gujaratis to form solidary bonds with blacks is greater than impediments of the middle-ranked Gujarati sectors who form a middleman minority community.

The third finding of special importance concerns the younger Gujaratis who were established in business in 1971. Their drop in associational involvement and ethnic exclusivity, compared to prior generations, raises the question of whether their ethnic solidarity has waned or whether simply their desire to participate in formal organizations has declined. Since statistical controls were instituted for occupational location and level of education, these variables cannot be held accountable for the lower scores on the ethnic solidarity variables that the youngest cohort exhibited.

If the significance of ethnic solidarity has waned for this and later cohorts, despite concentration in middleman minority economic roles, it signals a weakness in the middleman minority theory. Perhaps more is at stake in making decisions about commitments to the ethnic community than strict economic self-interests. An assumption of the middleman minority theory is that once ethnic solidarity emerges (due to a combination of cultural, contextual, and situational causes) it will persist on a formal level as long as there are economic needs fulfilled by ethnic associational involvement (Bonacich and Modell, 1980). Why then would the same age cohort in 1939 be more actively involved than in 1971?

The only plausible support for the theory comes from positing that the younger cohort was less victimized by hostility from the surrounding society (ethnic solidarity is viewed as reinforced by concentration in small business roles and by hostility from the surrounding society). One explanation could be as follows: The younger generation appearing in the 1971 Who's Who were the first to benefit from state policies, and therefore felt less victimized by whites than prior generations, even though apartheid did not become official state policy until 1948. Girwala (1977) points out that with capital in fewer hands, the more successful businessmen were able to take advantage of opportunities for land ownership, building ownership, commerce, and industry owing to the Group Areas Act provisions that crippled the less economically secure. Even if the

older cohort appearing in the Who's Who were economically benefiting from the Group Areas Act, they were still victimized by the Pegging Act in 1946 and the riots in 1949, and the strong waves of hostility surrounding these events. Certainly, this hypothesis is worth pursuing, as are causes for what appears to have been a resurgence in ethnic associational involvement (inclusive and exclusive) in the 1980s.

Mahatma Gandhi, Yusuf Dadoo, Fatima Meer, and other well-known Gujarati activists, sought to transform the consciousness of their kinsmen to identify with the aims and aspirations of the oppressed. Using the Gramscian theoretical approach, such "organic intellectuals" can assist their group members to transcend their contradictory experiences of benefiting from and being exploited by white rule. Moral and intellectual leaders can articulate a set of principles that acknowledge the rights of all to societal privileges and the commitment of all to the social good. A sense of equality and dignity is conferred on all oppressed persons and a spirit of resistance to oppression is nurtured. This moral-intellectual foundation overcomes desires to extol one's communal subgroup for certain superiorities or virtues that others lack, and other such responses to dominant white attempts at inferiorization. It overcomes the desire to form a protective net around the communal ingroup in response to tensions and hostilities. Instead of emphasizing self-achievements in commerce to demonstrate a sense of

superiority, energies are funneled in the direction of social obligations and ideals which transcend material self-interests.

Many Gujarati political leaders have been both praised by anti-apartheid activists for working toward subordinate group unity and denounced as tacticians who were only concerned with their narrow interests. I decided to focus on Gandhi, who has received his share of both types of evaluations. My concern was the nature of the ideological messages he attempted to transmit to his Indian audience. To what extent did they encourage a moral foundation to emerge which embodied a collective, mutualist basis for dealing with societal injustices? Was Gandhian ideology ordered by a set of moral principles which encouraged identification with all the oppressed and the sought liberation by resisting all forms of discrimination? These are important questions; my search for answers was not motivated by a desire to evaluate Gandhi, but to understand more about the capability of certain types of messages in influencing a petit-bourgeois economic class in identifying with the aims and aspirations of other oppressed sectors. I analyzed the contents of Gandhi's South African newspaper during a portion of his stay in South Africa (1906-1908) and after he left (1927-1935). My essential finding was that the general moral thrust of the paper did provide impetus to commit to the "group" and to make self-sacrifices to eliminate oppressive treatment befalling the "group". But the "group" did not transcend Indian boundaries. Africans were not

denigrated, just basically ignored.

My interpretation of the messages conveyed by Gandhi and Gandhian ideologists is that they facilitated in certain respects, and constrained in others, subordinate group hegemony. The newspaper, for example, appears to have furthered resentment against anti-Indian legislation and helped to mobilize nonviolent resistant struggles, but it did not further a sense of community with Africans or Coloreds, and did so only slightly with working class Indians (a cursory review indicated that issues affecting them received less emphasis). The satyagraha philosophy, as expressed in Gandhi's main propaganda vehicle, did not provide a firm moral-intellectual foundation for solidarity with the downtrodden. Certainly, Gandhi's intention was to struggle for broad social equality once Indian petit-bourgeois grievances were rectified. It does appear, however, based on historical events after Gandhi's departure, that only a dramatic break from Gandhian ideology could move Gujaratis to support broad-based resistance efforts.

Yusuf Dadoo was able to bring about such a change with his socialist ideology, while Gandhians maintained a moderate approach to uplift the Indian community to the status of whites. Gandhian ideology was not perfectly suited for petit-bourgeois economic interests, as it had collectivist elements, but it was not capable of shaking the individualist, utilitarian foundation of petit-bourgeois ideology. It did not provide a coherent set of principles to

transcend current ideological limitations, only to be more resistant, in a morally virtuous manner, to protect the material interests of one's own group.

The Gramscian orientation is also concerned with the community members' receptivity to ideologies espoused by organic intellectuals. My final chapter concentrated on the subjective awareness of the Gujaratis whom I interviewed, and I was assisted conceptually by Gramsci's theoretical groundwork once again. In Gramsci's writings, he occasionally discusses the dual nature of the consciousness of the masses--they are influenced by the ideas disseminated by the dominant class which serve dominant class interests, but do not accept these ideas outright because of their practical experiences contradicting those ideas. To what extent are the masses receptive to the ideas of organic intellectuals, who offer an alternative moral-intellectual foundation to counter dominant group interests (a counter-hegemony)? Gramsci's answer is that much depends on the nature of inner, cultural life, which is created and recreated anew by human actors. This groundwork set the stage for my adoption of a conceptual schema provided by Watt to measure the subjecture nature of inner, cultural life.

Watt (1963) constructed a typology to characterize perceptions held by religious group members to make sense of their group attachment. His purpose was to show that certain perceptions, which he refers to as idea-types, damage relationships with other religious

denominations. His typology can be easily extended to all types of cultural groups, not just those with a religious purpose. The three idea-types, isolationist, inflationary, and fixational, discourage the creation of a common awareness and sense of solidarity with others who do not possess the same communal identity.

My empirical analysis unfolded as follows: I used my 50 case-study interview transcripts, which averaged a little less than two hours in tape recording time and covered a wide range of topics (see Chapter 5), and extracted statements pertaining to cultural life and politics. I selected the communal group (racial, religious, ethnic) that the interviewee appeared to be most attached to, and examined whether the statements referring to that group fit any of the isolationist, inflationary, and fixational idea-types. I also defined the opposites of these idea-types (integrationist, egalitarian, and reflective-adaptive). I judged whether any interviewee statements closely matched any of the six idea-types.

I was able to code 35 of the 50 interviewees (their statements and the codes appear in Appendix B). I found variation in my small interview sample, as 15 asserted ideas matching one or more of Watt's three idea-types, and 20 asserting ideas judged to match one or more of the opposite idea-types. After this was accomplished, I coded political ideology into six categories (conservative, moderate, liberal, radical, contradictory, and apathetic-fatalistic). I was able to code 34 interviewees who expressed their political ideology.

Eight interviewees were coded as either liberal or radical (it would taken further probing to make a distinction), and three as either moderate or liberal.

A total of 25 interviewees (50 percent) received codes for both the communal consciousness variable and political ideology. Several crosstabulations were performed and analyzed, the most theoretically important being the crosstabulation of communal consciousness and political ideology. Because of the small sample size, certain initial categories were collapsed (the initial codes are important, but unnecessary for the basic analysis). The three types of ideas which Watt contends deter inter-group harmony were collapsed into the category, inward-turning ideas. The opposite types were reclassified as outward-turning ideas. Similarly, for political ideology, conservative and moderate ideas, which do not challenge white minority rule, were defined as ingroup interest ideas. Liberal and radical ideas both support the aspirations of the oppressed, although they advocate different means to the ends of an equal society. These were classified as all subordinate group interests ideas. Despite my small sample, a clear pattern emerged: of the 25 receiving codes for both variables, 14 were inward turning in their communal consciousness, of which only one professed all subordinate group interests political ideas. On the other hand, for the 11 coded as outward turning, none articulated ingroup political ideas and nine asserted either liberal or radical (all subordinate interests)

political ideas. This finding, plus one concerning the scores on both of these variables for the large business owners, have the most significant ramifications.

I have collected partial empirical support for the notion that certain ideas about one's communal or ethnic group attachment correlate with certain political beliefs. The Gujarati interviewees, who varied in their political ideology, varied in a way that correlated with their understandings of their inner cultural life. If this relationship is indeed a valid one, it raises several provocative questions. Can we generalize that exposure to certain types of ideas in one's communal life, ideas which are isolationist, inflationary, or fixational in nature, lead to the acceptance of political ideologies which focus on ingroup interests rather than on broad subordinate group interests? Does exposure to opposing ideas in communal life encourage the acceptance of political ideas articulated by organic intellectuals? Or is the causal arrow in the other direction? Does the internalization of exposure to alternative political viewpoints in turn lead to the reorganization of one's communal consciousness?

I believe that a dynamic reciprocal relationship exists between changes in communal consciousness and changes in political ideology. When reflective thinking leads to a new awareness in either realm, due to the inspiration of moral and intellectual leaders, the capability to be receptive to corresponding ideas in the other

subjective realm grows. For instance, one is more likely to be receptive to, and influenced by, traditional intellectuals who espouse conservative and moderative political views if they are inward turning in their cultural life, and more likely to be moved by organic intellectuals if they are outward turning in their cultural life. This hypothesis can be tested in any social setting through the application of creative methods. It will help us understand why people are drawn to the ideas expressed by various ideologists in making sense of their own experiences and interests.

A very interesting finding in Chapter 5 was the communal consciousness and political ideology scores for the Gujarati large business owners and partners (bourgeois in class standing rather than petit-bourgeois). For the 17 interviewees classified as large business owners, I was able to code 12 for communal consciousness. They were practically split in expressing inward-turning ideas (seven) and outward-turning ideas (five). One would presume, based on the central hypothesis, that the five expressing outward-turning ideas would assert liberal or radical political views and the seven expressing inward-turning ideas would assert conservative or moderate views. Such was not the case. In fact, the primary need for the additional political categories, contradictory and apathetic-fatalistic, was to code the political assertions of large business owners.

Of the 17 interviewees, 11 received codes for political ideology;

six of them were coded as contradictory (no other interviewee was coded as contradictory) and four of them were coded as apathetic-fatalistic (out of a total of six). None consistently articulated political views that were liberal or radical in nature (six interspersed such views with conservative and moderate ones) and only one was in the ingroup interests category (as moderate). Four of the six who expressed contradictory political views (vacillated in ideology) articulated inflationary (inward-turning) communal ideas. These ideas could serve as a barrier to accepting liberal or radical views on a consistent level. Perhaps if the large business owners could reevaluate their communal identity so that they feel equal rather than superior to others in respect to cultural attributes, they would be more receptive to anti-apartheid movements. This does not appear especially likely, as none of the five who were outward turning in communal consciousness espoused liberal or radical political views.

However, with my small sample size, I cannot conclude that the large business owners, having more of a stake in the system, are unable to wholeheartedly support liberation movements even when their communal consciousness is ripe for forming an appropriate political consciousness. It remains a very interesting empirical and theoretical question whether larger black capitalists have too many entrenched material interests to fully support black liberation efforts, whereas smaller black businessmen can be swayed by organic

intellectuals representing subordinates.

2). The Current Struggle

My dissertation has not focused on current political alignments and the relationship of all the players in the heated South African social struggle. I have focused on one small middleman minority group that is economically privileged compared to other blacks, yet equally powerless. Why is such a small group important in determining the larger fate of South Africa? Being a small, vulnerable group that has served as a scapegoat minority for both whites and blacks, the nature of the Gujarati relationship to both dominants and subordinates is a key feature of the current struggle. In the battle for legitimacy, all of the leading players in the struggle are seeking to build support for their rule as the best for South Africa. The Gujaratis are a minority and will continue to be a minority regardless of whether those supporting verkrampde apartheid, multi-racialism, black nationalism, non-racialism, capitalism, or socialism rule South Africa. One of the best yardsticks for judging the actual moral and intellectual atmosphere established by any ruling party is its relationship to powerless minorities. The basis for that relationship is established during the struggle for state power.

Under apartheid, the Gujaratis will probably benefit more

economically than they will under black majority rule (whether it be socialist or not). The Gujaratis have fought long and hard for petit-bourgeois rights, having obtained concessions and promises from the government leaders which have kept them at a material advantage to most other blacks. However, they have never, and doubtfully ever will, possess rights and privileges equal to those enjoyed by whites as long as the apartheid system is intact. Increased political rights, such as the constitutional dispensation to Indians and Coloreds, serve to create an image of power sharing but hold no real substance. Only through collaboration with the authorities can the devastating consequences of apartheid be softened, but not eliminated. As Adam and Moodley state: "When a tight network of control discriminates at every level of daily life, the victims need to seek remedies wherever they can find them. Here the collaborator offers himself to alleviate grievances on an individual basis. His real or putative influence with the dominators makes collaboration with the collaborator the only avenue for prompt redress" (1986:80-81).

Yet despite the humiliations of playing a junior partner to the hated system, the unknown can be even more terrifying. As Bertell Ollman states: "What is new and unknown is more terrifying to many than the terror which is known. They think at least they have been able to live through the trouble they have had. How do they know they will be able to deal as well with the new troubles which await

them?" (1972:180).

Organic intellectuals who are devising and revising political programs can either dismiss the Gujaratis as a reactionary ethnic group or seek to incorporate them into their struggles. The Gujaratis have the strongest cultural, structural, and ideological forces pushing them to fear black majority rule. If the relationship between Gujaratis and other blacks does not solidify during the current crisis, it is doubtful that mutual trust and a sense of solidarity can emerge after a political transformation. In order for racial and ethnic antagonism to be absent after the assumption of state power, a sense of unity along racial and ethnic lines among the revolutionary forces must occur during the ideological struggle--what Gramsci refers to as the "war of position". It will take skillful leadership to prevent the divisive and hostile feelings resulting from an apartheid society from disintegrating efforts at achieving hegemony.

In order to create hegemony among different subaltern groups and classes, elements of the dominant ideology that encourage ethnic exclusivity, expressions of ethnic superiority, and a rigid adherence to ideological doctrine, must be countered. By establishing a shared culture among the masses, based on a common spirit of resistance to all forms of oppression, the needed hegemony will exist to forcefully challenge the foundations of apartheid. The very ambivalent position of the Gujaratis in South Africa makes them key social actors in

furthering or impeding the creation of subordinate group hegemony. By rejecting the attempts by dominant whites to win their consent, the Gujaratis lend their weight to further crush the moral-intellectual foundation of apartheid.

APPENDIX A

Who's Who Data Base

The computerized data-files created from the 1939 and 1971 Indian South African Who's Who volumes contain far more information than was utilized in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. This appendix displays three types of information gathered from the volumes that did not appear in Chapter 3. First I will provide information on the Gujarat-born appearing in the 1939 Who's Who. I will include data on birthplace in Gujarat, ethnic origins, year of arrival, and first settlement. Second I will list unique contributions and accomplishments that were mentioned in the biographical portraits in the 1939 volume. Finally I will present crosstabulation tables of several variables created from both the 1939 and 1971 volumes by the ethnic origins of the entrants, controlling for age-cohort.

1). Who's Who Entrants Born in Gujarat

The first data-display derives from the 1939 Who's Who. A total of 1137 Indian South Africans had their biographical portraits appear in this volume (Chapter 3 discusses the Who's Who admittance criteria). There were 482 entrants over the age of 42 (including 73 deceased in 1939), 484 entrants between the ages of 27-42, 76 less than 27, and the ages of 95 could not be determined. Only 2.9 percent (33) of the entrants were female. More than half the entrants were born overseas--483 in Gujarat, 125 outside Gujarat but in India, and 24 not in India nor South Africa. The birthplaces of six entrants were not indicated and 499 were born in South Africa. Of the South African-born, 405 (81.2 percent) were born in Natal, 64 (12.8 percent) in the Transvaal, and 27 (5.4 percent) in the Cape (the provincial birthplace of three could not be determined). On the other hand, a greater number of the foreign-born first settled in the Transvaal rather than Natal (287 compared to 245 and 77 in the Cape--the first settlement of 21 could not be determined and two entrants never resided in South Africa). Now, turning to the Gujarat-born, frequency distributions of birthplace, ethnic origins, and first settlements appear below for those born in Surat district (a total of 259), Kathiawar (128), and Other (Baroda State--68 and Bharuch--26). I will also display the median, mode, and range for arrival date. Cutch was the birthplace for only 2 (one Meman and one Khatri)--they will not be analyzed.

SURAT

<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Kholvad	33	12.7
Kathor	19	7.3
Dabhel	11	4.2
Surat City	10	3.9
Rander	10	3.9
Varad	8	3.1
Sisodra	8	3.1
Tadkeskewar	7	2.7
Alipore	7	2.7
Matvad	6	2.3
Karadi	6	2.3
Degam	5	1.9
Vankaner	5	1.9
Bardoli	5	1.9
Alipur	5	1.9
Simlak	4	1.5
Kacholi	4	1.5
Bulsar	4	1.5
Lachpur	4	1.5
Bodali	4	1.5
(less than four entrants: includes 62 villages--46 with 1 entrant)	84	32.4
Don't Know	<u>10</u>	<u>3.9</u>
	259	99.6

<u>Ethnic Origins</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Sunni Vohra Muslim	121	46.7
Hindu	119	45.9
Urdu Muslim	14	5.4
Sindhi	2	0.8
Parsi	2	0.8
Kokney Muslim	<u>1</u>	<u>0.4</u>
	259	100.0

<u>First Settlement</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Jo-burg, Trans.	68	26.3
Pretoria, Trans.	19	7.3
Other, Trans.	61	23.6
Durban, Natal	51	19.7
Other, Natal	27	10.4
Cape	21	8.1
Don't Know	<u>12</u>	<u>4.6</u>
	259	100.0

Arrival
Range: 1876-1932
Median: 1910 (23.4% before 1900)
Mode: 1919 (12)
Don't Know: 54

KATHIWAR/SAURASHTRA

<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Ranavav	35	27.3
Porbandar	25	19.5
Bhanavad	18	14.1
Jodiya	8	6.3
Rajkot	4	3.1
Jamkhambliar	4	3.1
Aliabada	3	2.3
Anand	2	1.6
Gorana	2	1.6
Jhalia	2	1.6
Morvi	2	1.6
Gondal	2	1.6
Jamnagar	2	1.6
Chatilar	2	1.6
Latipur	2	1.6
Khilos	1	0.8
Gunda	1	0.8
Jetpur	1	0.8
Dhuvar	1	0.8
Godbagasra	1	0.8
Sukpur	1	0.8
Thoyana	1	0.8
Dhrol	1	0.8
Khambhodar	1	0.8
Tarsai	1	0.8
Vadashda	1	0.8
Don't Know	4	3.1
	128	100.0

<u>Ethnic Origins</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Memam Muslim	90	70.3
Hindu	29	22.7
Khoja Muslim	6	4.7
Parsi	2	1.6
Urdu	1	0.8
	128	100.1

<u>First Settlement</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Jo-burg, Trans.	2	1.6
Pretoria, Trans.	30	23.4
Other, Trans.	33	25.8
Durban, Natal	39	30.5
Other, Natal	13	10.2
Cape	7	5.5
Never Emigrated	2	1.6
	128	100.2

Arrival
 Range: 1872-1927
 Median: 1905 (30.9% before 1900)
 Mode: 1896,1903 (8)
 Don't Know: 16

OTHER (BARODA)

<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Navsari	40	58.8
Ghala	9	13.2
Dharmaj	5	7.4
Village with less than 4 entrants	<u>14</u>	<u>20.6</u>
	68	100.0

Arrival

Range: 1879-1927
Median: 1910
Mode: 1917 (6)
Don't Know: 6

<u>Ethnic Origins</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Hindu	55	80.9
Sunni Vohra Muslim	9	13.2
Urdu Muslim	2	2.9
Parsi	<u>2</u>	<u>2.9</u>
	68	99.9

<u>First Settlement</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Jo-burg, Trans.	22	32.4
Pretoria, Trans.	7	10.3
Other, Trans.	7	10.3
Durban, Natal	19	27.9
Other, Natal	7	10.3
Cape	4	5.9
Don't Know	<u>2</u>	<u>2.9</u>
	68	100.0

OTHER (BHARUCH)

<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Tankaria	5	19.2
Panoli	4	15.4
Village with less than 4 entrants	<u>15</u>	<u>57.5</u>
Don't Know	<u>2</u>	<u>2.9</u>
	26	100.0

Arrival

Range: 1889-1932
Median: 1903
Mode: 1902, 1904 (3)
Don't Know: 6

<u>Ethnic Origins</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Hindu	1	3.8
Sunni Vohra Muslim	22	84.6
Parsi	2	7.7
Khoja Muslim	<u>1</u>	<u>3.8</u>
	26	100.0

<u>First Settlement</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Jo-burg, Trans.	6	23.1
Pretoria, Trans.	2	7.7
Other, Trans.	3	11.5
Durban, Natal	8	30.8
Other, Natal	2	7.7
Cape	<u>5</u>	<u>19.2</u>
	26	100.0

2). Unique Contributions and Accomplishments

In addition to standard information appearing in the Who's Who biographies such as age, education, occupation, and associational involvement, several entrants reveal accomplishments of a more personalized nature. They include charitable contributions, unique possessions, self accomplishments in the social, cultural, business, and political realms, and contacts with prominent persons. I will list some of the more distinctive biographical details appearing in the biographical portraits, although I will not provide an exhaustive list or place statements in categories. The list excludes many accomplishments and contributions to the community that were more general in nature, such as contributions to popular charities, the collection of donations, receiving popular rewards/honors, contact with Gandhi or visiting dignitaries, reception committees, appointment to Commissioner of Oaths, representing community at political conferences or cultural celebrations, etc. This short list, however, provides a glimpse of the wide range of personal accomplishments that the middle class Indian South African community desired to project about itself. The desire to be unique with individual attributes corresponded with the desire to project a strong, vibrant sense of community.

Converted Hindus into Muslims (Khoja Muslims--Ismali sect)

First Indian to pass referee's exam.

In 47 months, broke all South African tennis records and won 28 championships.

First prizes for terriers in South Africa and Rhodesia.

First South African to make pilgrimage to Mecca by air.

Highest donor to Sastri College fund.

Stimulated recording of Bantu music and first to broadcast Indian music from Durban.

Supervises large European staff.

Owens private tennis court.

Winner of Irish Sweep.

One of largest employers of Indian labor.

Fought in Zulu War.

Pilgrimage to Hindu sacred cities.

Admitted to Transvaal as educated entrant with six others in 1911.

Trusted friend and advisor of the natives.

Author/Editor of Who's Who and other books.

Offered services as soldier in World War 1 but was refused.

Responsible for the provision of separate waiting rooms for Indian ladies in the Railway Administration.

Studied Negro problems in the U.S.

Only Gujarati Hindu lady to have a motor driver's license in South Africa.

Special enumerator during 1906 Census.

For public purposes, contested health board regulations, paying £800 himself.

Broadcast talk on Tagore from Durban station.

Separated from Gandhi on passive resistance issue, favoring constitutional approach.

Advocate of passive resistance against Indian grievances in 1939.

Connected with religious work of Swami Shankerand.

First person to celebrate Gandhi's birthday - got Kathiawar Mundal to arrange public celebration.

During Boer War, only Indian to buy and sell horses to the military.

As a young man was a skilful wrestler.

Prepared Congress report on Durban Navigation Colliery disaster in 1927.

When Mrs. Sarajina Naidoo inaugurated the first non-European conference in 1924, elected first vice president.

On behalf of Indians, presented loyal address to H.R.H. Prince of Wales at Colenso.

First to start business in Durban - 1872.

Largely responsible for tour of All-India soccer team to South Africa - 1934.

Took part in removing untouchability in Karadi - 1937.

Entertained Gandhi, Parsee Rustomjee and others with songs while in gaol.

First to advance exhibition of Indian movie pictures in the country.

Only Indian representative of the non-European Library Committee.

Recruited men in Surat for Imperial Army - W.W.1.

Adverse to policy of non-cooperation and acted as peacemaker in Hindu-Muslim riots in Surat in 1929, being strong advocate of Hindu-Muslim unity.

First non-European to be present at a State banquet.

Single-handedly conducted, in India, strenuous agitation against proposed segregation measure by Union Government in 1939. Was able to carry the whole country with him, from H.E. the Viceroy to the peasant.

Staunch disciple of Swami Dayanand Saraswather.

Purchases from England so large had to buy own boat for transport.

First Indian requisitioned to stand as Maritzburg City Councillor - 1938, but owing to centenary celebrations withdrew candidature.

Among early Indians to Basutoland and major Indian representative there of Indian grievances.

One of the accused to test successfully the validity of the late hours pass by-law of the Durban Corporation.

Organised first touring teams of cricket and tennis for Sastri College to the Transvaal.

Licensed lay reader of diocese of Natal, Indian Mission.

Left an estate of £120,000 in 1935.

First to acquire immovable property in the name of a company in the Transvaal.

First Indian owner of a Rolls Royce - 1921.

His bequest is the largest gift to the Indian community in South Africa.

Among first Indian women to enter commercial business.

Only Indian member of local European library.

3). Demographic and Associational Variables by Ethnic Origins,
Controlling for Age-Cohort

The primary purpose of the 1939 and 1971 Who's Who files was to measure dimensions of ethnic solidarity and plausible predictors of ethnic solidarity such as occupational location, level of education, age, and ethnic origins. Below are frequency distributions of the initial indicators that were used to construct indices of ethnic solidarity and predictor variables. Also, some other variables that are interesting in their own right are displayed.

Each variable is presented in the same format. The column variable is ethnic origins. The Gujaratis are divided into four categories: Meman Muslims (from Saurashtra), Sunni Vohra Muslims (from Surat and adjoining districts), Kathiawadi Hindus (from Saurashtra), and Surtee Hindus (from Surat and adjoining districts). A fifth category is for South Africans of other passenger origins (Parsis, Ismaili Khojas, Kokneys, Urdus, Sindhis, and a few Tamils). The sixth category is for Who's Who entrants of indentured immigration origins (Urdus, Hindustanis, Tamils, and Telegus). Most of this latter category were of the Hindu faith, with only Urdus being Muslim and about 20 percent converted Christians. Tables exist

for two age-cohorts in 1939 and two in 1971 (some tables were only constructed for 1939, such as the first variable of sex, as females were not included in the 1971 data sample). Under the column categories appear the cell size for each row category followed by the row percentage and then the column percentage for that cell.

Also note that the tables are not inclusive of all Who's Who entrants appearing in the respective volumes. Entrants under the age of 27 in 1939 (often appearing with their fathers) and entrants who did not provide a date of birth had to be excluded. Still, there is a total of 966 entrants in the 1939 volume included in tabulations. For 1971, not only are women excluded, but so are entrants over 59 years old (so that there is no cross-over and duplication of 1939 entrants) as well as entrants under 26 years of age. Furthermore, for the 1971 data sample (unlike the 1939) each of the Gujarati, other passenger, and non-passenger ethnic groups were stratified and 50 percent of males between the ages of 26 and 59 were included in the data base. Thus the sample size is smaller than it is for 1939 but the total 1971 Who's Who population is not smaller. There is also interestingly a smaller proportion of the 26-42 age group appearing in the 1971 volume than in the 1939 volume, as indicated by table totals.

Sex

(1939--over 42)

<u>Sex</u>	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Male</u>	57 12.1% 100.0%	82 17.4% 100.0%	17 3.6% 100.0%	71 15.1% 98.6%	40 8.5% 100.0%	203 43.2% 94.9%	470 97.5%
<u>Female</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 8.4% 1.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	11 91.7% 5.1%	12 2.5%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.4%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

<u>Sex</u>	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Indian</u>	
<u>Male</u>	36 7.6% 100.0%	128 26.9% 100.0%	16 3.4% 100.0%	96 20.2% 100.0%	12 2.5% 100.0%	188 39.5% 95.9%	476 98.4%
<u>Female</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	8 100.0% 4.1%	8 1.7%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.4%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Year of Arrival

(1939--over 42)

Year of Arrival	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Born in S.A.</u>	2 1.4% 3.5%	3 2.1% 3.7%	1 0.7% 5.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 2.1% 7.5%	132 93.6% 61.7%	141 29.3%
<u>1860-1910</u>	51 17.3% 89.5%	71 24.1% 86.6%	14 4.8% 82.4%	59 20.1% 81.9%	31 10.5% 77.5%	68 23.1% 31.8%	294 61.0%
<u>After 1910</u>	3 15.8% 5.3%	1 5.3% 1.2%	1 5.3% 5.9%	8 42.1% 11.1%	4 21.1% 10.0%	2 10.5% 0.9%	19 3.9%
<u>Don't Know</u>	1 3.6% 1.8%	7 25.0% 8.5%	1 3.6% 5.9%	5 17.9% 6.9%	2 7.1% 5.0%	12 42.9% 5.6%	28 5.8%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Year of Arrival	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Born in S.A.</u>	10 3.8% 27.8%	62 23.4% 48.4%	7 2.6% 43.8%	5 1.9% 5.2%	5 1.9% 41.7%	176 66.4% 89.8%	265 54.8%
<u>1860-1910</u>	4 10.3% 11.1%	12 30.8% 9.4%	3 7.7% 18.8%	10 25.6% 10.4%	2 5.1% 16.7%	8 20.5% 4.1%	39 8.1%
<u>After 1910</u>	19 12.9% 52.8%	39 26.5% 30.5%	5 3.4% 31.3%	76 51.7% 79.2%	2 1.4% 16.7%	6 4.1% 3.1%	147 30.4%
<u>Don't Know</u>	3 9.1% 8.3%	15 45.5% 11.7%	1 3.0% 6.3%	5 15.2% 5.2%	3 9.1% 25.0%	6 18.2% 3.1%	33 6.8%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Year of Arrival

(1971--43-59)

Year of Arrival	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Born in S.A.</u>	8 3.6% 34.8%	44 19.6% 84.6%	10 4.4% 76.9%	18 8.0% 40.0%	2 0.9% 13.3%	143 63.6% 100.0%	225 77.3%
<u>1912-1940</u>	8 28.6% 34.8%	4 14.3% 7.7%	1 3.6% 7.7%	12 42.9% 26.7%	3 10.7% 20.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	28 9.6%
<u>After 1940</u>	1 14.3% 4.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 14.3% 7.7%	3 42.9% 6.7%	2 28.6% 13.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	7 2.4%
<u>Don't Know</u>	6 19.4% 26.1%	4 12.9% 7.7%	1 3.2% 7.7%	12 38.7% 26.7%	8 25.8% 53.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	31 10.7%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Year of Arrival	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Born in S.A.</u>	32 19.5% 88.9%	33 20.1% 94.3%	6 3.7% 66.7%	35 21.3% 83.3%	1 0.6% 50.0%	57 34.8% 98.3%	164 90.1%
<u>1912-1940</u>	1 33.3% 2.8%	1 33.3% 2.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 33.3% 2.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 1.6%
<u>After 1940</u>	1 100.0% 2.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 0.5%
<u>Don't Know</u>	2 14.3% 5.6%	1 7.1% 2.9%	3 21.4% 33.3%	6 42.9% 14.3%	1 7.1% 50.0%	1 7.1% 1.7%	14 7.7%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Birthplace

(1971--43-59)

<u>Birthplace</u>	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Transvaal, S.A.</u>	5 12.8% 21.7%	12 30.8% 23.1%	2 5.1% 15.4%	8 20.5% 17.8%	1 2.6% 6.7%	11 28.2% 7.7%	39 13.4%
<u>Cape, S.A.</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 25.0% 2.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 75.0% 2.1%	4 1.4%
<u>Natal, S.A.</u>	4 2.2% 17.4%	32 17.5% 61.5%	8 4.4% 61.5%	10 5.5% 22.2%	1 0.5% 6.7%	128 69.9% 89.5%	183 62.9%
<u>Saurashtra, India</u>	13 72.2% 56.5%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 16.7% 23.1%	2 11.1% 4.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	18 6.2%
<u>Surat, India</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	6 31.6% 11.5%	0 0.0% 0.0%	13 68.4% 28.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	19 6.5%
<u>Bharuch, India</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 50.0% 1.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 50.0% 0.7%	2 0.7%
<u>Baroda, India</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 9.1% 1.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	10 90.9% 22.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	11 3.8%
<u>India--Not Gujarat</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 7.1% 2.2%	13 92.9% 86.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	14 4.8%
<u>Don't Know</u>	1 100.0% 4.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 0.3%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

Birthplace

(1971--26-42)

Birthplace	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Transvaal, S.A.</u>	21 32.8% 58.3%	12 18.8% 34.3%	3 4.7% 33.3%	21 32.8% 50.0%	1 1.6% 50.0%	6 9.4% 10.3%	64 35.2%
<u>Cape, S.A.</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 60.0% 7.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 40.0% 3.4%	5 2.7%
<u>Natal, S.A.</u>	12 12.5% 33.3%	21 21.9% 60.0%	3 3.1% 33.3%	11 11.5% 26.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	49 51.0% 84.5%	96 52.7%
<u>Saurashtra, India</u>	3 50.0% 8.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 50.0% 33.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	6 3.3%
<u>Surat, India</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 100.0% 7.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 1.6%
<u>Bharuch, India</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 100.0% 2.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 0.5%
<u>Baroda, India</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 100.0% 9.5%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 2.2%
<u>India--Not Gujarat</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 50.0% 50.0%	1 50.0% 1.7%	2 1.1%
<u>Don't Know</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 100.0% 2.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 0.5%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

1939 Provincial Address*

(1939--over 42)

Address	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Transvaal</u>	33 23.9% 67.3%	39 28.3% 56.5%	5 3.6% 35.7%	35 25.4% 53.8%	13 9.4% 34.2%	13 9.4% 6.9%	138 32.6%
<u>Cape</u>	4 6.1% 8.2%	7 10.6% 10.1%	1 1.5% 7.1%	11 16.7% 16.9%	17 25.8% 44.7%	26 39.4% 13.8%	66 15.6%
<u>Natal</u>	12 5.5% 24.5%	23 10.5% 33.3%	8 3.7% 57.1%	19 8.7% 29.2%	8 3.7% 21.1%	149 68.0% 79.3%	219 51.8%
Column Total	49 11.6%	69 16.3%	14 3.3%	65 15.4%	38 9.0%	188 44.4%	423 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Address	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Transvaal</u>	25 12.4% 69.4%	69 34.3% 54.3%	1 0.5% 6.7%	71 35.3% 74.7%	8 4.0% 66.7%	27 13.4% 13.8%	201 41.9%
<u>Cape</u>	1 2.6% 2.8%	1 2.6% 0.8%	1 2.6% 6.7%	8 21.1% 8.4%	3 7.9% 25.0%	24 63.2% 12.3%	38 7.9%
<u>Natal</u>	10 4.1% 27.8%	57 23.7% 44.9%	13 5.4% 86.7%	16 6.6% 16.8%	1 0.4% 8.3%	144 59.8% 73.8%	241 50.2%
Column Total	36 7.5%	127 26.5%	15 3.1%	95 19.8%	12 2.5%	195 40.6%	480 100.0%

*Entrants who were either deceased in 1939 or living outside South Africa are excluded.

1971 Provincial Address*

(1971--43-59)

Address	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Transvaal</u>	15 20.5% 65.2%	15 20.5% 30.0%	3 4.1% 25.0%	25 34.2% 62.5%	2 2.7% 13.3%	13 17.8% 9.4%	73 26.3%
<u>Cape</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 10.5% 5.0%	11 57.9% 73.3%	6 31.6% 4.3%	19 6.8%
<u>Natal</u>	8 4.3% 34.8%	35 18.8% 70.0%	9 4.8% 75.0%	13 7.0% 32.5%	2 1.1% 13.3%	119 64.0% 86.2%	136 66.9%
Column Total	23 8.3%	50 18.0%	12 4.3%	40 14.4%	15 5.4%	138 49.6%	278 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Address	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Transvaal</u>	19 29.2% 57.6%	11 16.9% 34.4%	5 7.7% 55.6%	25 38.5% 62.5%	1 1.5% 50.0%	4 6.2% 7.4%	65 38.2%
<u>Cape</u>	1 11.1% 3.0%	1 11.1% 3.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 44.4% 10.0%	1 11.1% 50.0%	2 22.2% 3.7%	9 5.3%
<u>Natal</u>	13 13.5% 39.4%	20 20.8% 62.5%	4 4.2% 44.4%	11 11.5% 27.5%	0 0.0% 0.0%	48 50.0% 88.9%	96 56.5%
Column Total	33 19.4%	32 18.8%	9 5.3%	40 23.5%	2 1.2%	54 31.8%	170 100.0%

*Entrants living outside South Africa are excluded.

Places of Education

(1939--over 42)

Places	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None Listed</u>	8 9.1% 14.0%	20 22.7% 24.4%	4 4.5% 23.5%	10 11.4% 13.9%	6 6.8% 15.0%	40 45.5% 18.7%	88 18.3%
<u>Just India</u>	37 16.7% 64.9%	50 22.6% 61.0%	13 5.9% 76.5%	59 26.7% 81.9%	29 13.1% 72.5%	33 14.9% 15.4%	221 45.9%
<u>India and S.A.</u>	6 33.3% 10.5%	5 27.8% 6.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 11.1% 5.0%	5 27.8% 2.3%	18 3.7%
<u>Just S.A.</u>	6 4.0% 10.5%	7 4.6% 8.5%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 1.3% 2.8%	3 2.0% 7.5%	133 88.1% 62.1%	151 31.3%
<u>Europe</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 25.0% 1.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 75.0% 1.4%	4 0.8%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

Places of Education

(1939--27-42)

Places	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None Listed</u>	2 20.0% 5.6%	4 40.0% 3.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 10.0% 1.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 30.0% 1.5%	10 2.1%
<u>Just India</u>	13 11.3% 36.1%	26 22.6% 20.3%	5 4.3% 31.3%	60 52.2% 62.5%	4 3.5% 33.3%	7 6.1% 3.6%	115 23.8%
<u>India and S.A.</u>	5 8.8% 13.9%	23 40.4% 18.0%	4 7.0% 25.0%	17 29.8% 17.7%	1 1.8% 8.3%	7 12.3% 3.6%	57 11.8%
<u>Just S.A.</u>	15 5.2% 41.7%	67 23.4% 52.3%	6 2.1% 37.5%	16 5.6% 16.7%	7 2.4% 58.3%	175 61.2% 89.3%	286 59.1%
<u>Europe</u>	1 6.3% 2.8%	8 50.0% 6.3%	1 6.3% 6.3%	2 12.5% 2.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 25.0% 2.0%	16 3.3%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Places of Education

(1971--43-59)

Places	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None Listed</u>	1 14.3% 4.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 14.3% 2.2%	2 28.6% 13.3%	3 42.9% 2.1%	7 2.4%
<u>Just India</u>	6 31.6% 26.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 15.8% 23.1%	6 31.6% 13.3%	4 21.1% 26.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	19 6.5%
<u>India and S.A.</u>	5 13.5% 21.7%	9 24.3% 17.3%	3 8.1% 23.1%	16 43.2% 35.6%	4 10.8% 26.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	37 12.7%
<u>Just S.A.</u>	11 4.9% 47.8%	43 19.1% 82.7%	7 3.1% 53.8%	21 9.3% 46.7%	5 2.2% 33.3%	138 61.3% 96.5%	225 77.3%
<u>Europe</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 50.0% 2.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 50.0% 0.7%	2 0.7%
<u>Another Country</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 100.0% 0.7%	1 0.3%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.2%	291 100.0%

Places of Education

(1971--26-42)

Places	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None Listed</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 20.0% 2.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 20.0% 50.0%	3 60.0% 5.2%	5 2.7%
<u>Just India</u>	1 50.0% 2.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 50.0% 2.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 1.1%
<u>India and S.A.</u>	1 7.7% 2.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 15.4% 22.2%	10 76.9% 23.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	13 7.1%
<u>Just S.A.</u>	31 20.5% 86.1%	33 21.9% 94.3%	7 4.6% 77.8%	29 19.2% 69.0%	1 0.7% 50.0%	50 33.1% 86.2%	151 83.0%
<u>Europe</u>	2 25.0% 5.6%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 25.0% 4.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 50.0% 6.9%	8 4.4%
<u>Another Country</u>	1 33.3% 2.8%	1 33.3% 2.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 33.3% 1.7%	3 1.6%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Level of Education

(1939--over 42)

Level	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Less than STD. 7</u>	54 13.9% 94.7%	78 20.1% 95.1%	10 2.6% 58.8%	65 16.7% 90.3%	33 8.5% 82.5%	149 38.3% 69.6%	389 80.7%
<u>STD. 7-10</u>	3 3.9% 5.3%	3 3.9% 3.7%	4 5.3% 23.5%	4 5.3% 5.6%	6 7.9% 15.0%	56 73.7% 26.2%	76 15.8%
<u>Advanced</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 5.9% 1.2%	3 17.6% 17.6%	3 17.6% 4.2%	1 5.9% 2.5%	9 52.9% 4.2%	17 3.5%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Level	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Less than STD. 7</u>	26 7.2% 72.2%	91 25.2% 71.1%	11 3.0% 68.8%	77 21.3% 80.2%	10 2.8% 83.3%	146 40.4% 74.5%	361 74.6%
<u>STD. 7-10</u>	8 9.0% 22.2%	22 24.7% 17.2%	2 2.2% 12.5%	15 16.9% 15.6%	2 2.2% 15.7%	40 44.9% 20.4%	89 18.4%
<u>Advanced</u>	2 5.9% 5.6%	15 44.1% 11.7%	3 8.8% 18.8%	4 11.8% 4.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	10 29.4% 5.1%	34 7.0%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Level of Education

(1971--43-59)

Level	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Less than STD. 7</u>	11 6.5% 47.8%	35 20.7% 67.3%	5 3.0% 38.5%	27 16.0% 60.0%	10 5.9% 66.7%	81 47.9% 56.6%	169 58.1%
<u>STD. 7-10</u>	9 9.2% 39.1%	17 17.3% 32.7%	7 7.1% 53.8%	13 13.3% 28.9%	4 4.1% 26.7%	48 49.0% 33.6%	98 33.7%
<u>Advanced</u>	3 12.5% 13.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 4.2% 7.7%	5 20.8% 11.1%	1 4.2% 6.7%	14 58.3% 9.8%	24 8.2%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Level	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Less than STD. 7</u>	7 11.9% 19.4%	18 30.5% 51.4%	1 1.7% 11.1%	13 22.0% 31.0%	1 1.7% 50.0%	19 32.2% 32.8%	59 32.4%
<u>STD. 7-10</u>	20 22.2% 55.6%	14 15.6% 40.0%	7 7.8% 77.8%	23 25.6% 54.8%	1 1.1% 50.0%	25 27.8% 43.1%	90 49.5%
<u>Advanced</u>	9 27.3% 25.0%	3 9.1% 8.6%	1 3.0% 11.1%	6 18.2% 14.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	14 42.4% 24.1%	33 18.1%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Information on Father-in-Law
and Spouse (name or additional information)

(1939--over 42)

Information	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	55 14.6% 96.5%	76 20.1% 92.7%	17 4.5% 100.0%	68 18.0% 94.4%	38 10.1% 95.0%	124 32.8% 57.9%	378 78.4%
<u>Father-in-law only</u>	2 5.4% 3.5%	4 10.8% 4.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 2.7% 1.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	30 81.1% 14.0%	37 7.7%
<u>Spouse only</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 5.3% 1.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	18 94.7% 8.4%	19 3.9%
<u>Both</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 2.1% 1.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 6.3% 4.2%	2 4.2% 5.0%	42 87.5% 19.6%	48 10.0%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Information	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	26 7.8% 72.2%	102 30.4% 79.7%	14 4.2% 87.5%	88 26.3% 91.7%	11 3.3% 91.7%	94 28.1% 48.0%	335 59.2%
<u>Father-in-law only</u>	8 8.7% 22.2%	24 26.1% 18.8%	1 1.1% 6.3%	4 4.3% 4.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	55 59.8% 28.1%	92 19.0%
<u>Spouse only</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 7.7% 0.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 7.7% 1.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	11 84.6% 5.6%	13 2.7%
<u>Both</u>	2 4.5% 5.6%	1 2.3% 0.8%	1 2.3% 6.3%	3 6.8% 3.1%	1 2.3% 8.3%	36 81.8% 18.4%	44 9.1%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Information on Father
(Name or Other Information)

(1939--over 42)

Information	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Name</u>	18 10.5% 31.6%	22 12.9% 26.8%	6 3.5% 35.3%	19 11.1% 26.4%	9 5.3% 22.5%	97 56.7% 45.3%	171 35.5%
<u>Other</u>	9 19.6% 15.8%	6 13.0% 7.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	6 13.0% 8.3%	4 8.7% 10.0%	21 45.7% 9.8%	46 9.5%
<u>None</u>	30 11.3% 52.6%	54 20.4% 65.9%	11 4.2% 64.7%	47 17.7% 65.3%	27 10.2% 67.5%	96 36.2% 44.9%	265 55.0%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Information	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Name</u>	20 8.0% 55.6%	55 22.1% 43.0%	11 4.4% 68.8%	35 14.1% 36.5%	9 3.6% 75.0%	119 47.8% 60.7%	249 51.4%
<u>Other</u>	13 10.5% 36.1%	37 29.8% 28.9%	4 3.2% 25.0%	25 20.2% 26.0%	1 0.8% 8.3%	44 35.5% 22.4%	124 25.6%
<u>None</u>	3 2.7% 8.3%	36 32.4% 28.1%	1 0.9% 6.3%	36 32.4% 37.5%	2 1.8% 16.7%	33 29.7% 16.8%	111 22.9%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Information on Father
(Name or Other Information)

(1971--43-59)

Information	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Name</u>	11 9.5% 47.8%	15 12.9% 28.8%	7 6.0% 53.8%	16 13.8% 35.6%	6 5.2% 40.0%	61 52.6% 42.7%	116 39.9%
<u>Other</u>	8 6.2% 34.8%	29 22.5% 55.7%	3 2.3% 23.1%	21 16.3% 46.7%	9 7.0% 60.0%	59 45.7% 41.3%	129 44.3%
<u>None</u>	4 8.7% 17.4%	8 17.4% 15.4%	3 6.5% 23.1%	8 17.4% 17.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	23 50.0% 16.1%	46 15.8%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Information	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Name</u>	21 23.6% 58.3%	12 13.5% 34.3%	4 4.5% 44.4%	18 20.2% 42.9%	2 2.2% 100.0%	32 36.0% 55.2%	89 48.9%
<u>Other</u>	2 4.1% 5.6%	15 30.6% 42.9%	3 6.1% 33.3%	13 26.5% 31.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	16 32.7% 27.6%	49 26.8%
<u>None</u>	13 29.5% 36.1%	8 18.2% 22.9%	2 4.5% 22.2%	11 25.0% 26.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	10 22.7% 17.2%	44 24.2%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Birth Order

(1939--over 42)

Birth Order	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Oldest Son</u>	12 12.4% 21.1%	17 17.5% 20.7%	4 4.1% 23.5%	10 10.3% 13.9%	8 8.2% 20.0%	46 47.4% 21.5%	97 20.1%
<u>Not Oldest Son</u>	13 13.8% 22.8%	9 9.6% 11.0%	1 1.1% 5.9%	13 13.8% 18.1%	5 5.3% 12.5%	53 56.4% 24.8%	94 19.5%
<u>Oldest Daughter</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 33.3% 1.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 66.7% 0.9%	3 0.6%
<u>Not Oldest Da.</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	5 100.0% 2.3%	5 1.0%
<u>Don't Know</u>	32 11.3% 56.1%	56 19.8% 68.3%	12 4.2% 70.6%	48 17.0% 66.7%	27 9.5% 67.5%	108 38.2% 50.5%	283 58.7%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

Birth Order

(1939--27-42)

Birth Order	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Oldest Son</u>	16 8.0% 44.4%	51 25.6% 39.8%	8 4.0% 50.0%	40 20.1% 41.7%	4 2.0% 33.3%	80 40.2% 40.8%	199 41.1%
<u>Not Oldest Son</u>	16 11.3% 44.4%	32 22.5% 25.0%	7 4.9% 43.8%	12 8.5% 12.5%	6 4.2% 50.0%	69 48.6% 35.2%	142 29.3%
<u>Oldest Daughter</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 100.0% 0.5%	1 0.2%
<u>Not Oldest Da.</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 100.0% 2.0%	4 0.8%
<u>Don't Know</u>	4 2.9% 11.1%	45 32.6% 35.2%	1 0.7% 6.3%	44 31.9% 45.8%	2 1.4% 16.7%	42 30.4% 21.4%	138 28.5%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Birth Order

(1971--43-59)

Birth Order	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Oldest Son</u>	6 17.6% 26.1%	5 14.7% 9.6%	2 5.9% 15.4%	3 8.8% 6.7%	1 2.9% 6.7%	17 50.0% 11.9%	34 11.7%
<u>Not Oldest Son</u>	3 13.6% 13.0%	2 9.1% 3.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	5 22.7% 12.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	12 54.5% 8.4%	22 7.6%
<u>Don't Know</u>	14 6.0% 60.9%	45 19.1% 86.5%	11 4.7% 84.6%	37 15.7% 82.2%	14 6.0% 93.3%	114 48.5% 79.7%	235 80.8%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Birth Order	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Oldest Son</u>	6 27.3% 16.7%	4 18.2% 11.4%	3 13.6% 33.3%	4 18.2% 9.5%	0 0.0% 0.0%	5 22.7% 8.6%	22 12.1%
<u>Not Oldest Son</u>	12 26.7% 33.3%	4 8.9% 11.4%	2 4.4% 22.2%	13 28.9% 31.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	14 31.1% 24.1%	45 24.7%
<u>Don't Know</u>	18 15.7% 50.0%	27 23.5% 77.1%	4 3.5% 44.4%	25 21.7% 59.5%	2 1.7% 100.0%	39 33.9% 67.2%	115 63.2%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Occupational Field--Actively Employed in 1939

(1939--over 42)

Field	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>General Trade</u>	36 18.8% 78.3%	46 24.0% 70.8%	6 3.1% 60.0%	28 14.6% 45.2%	16 8.3% 47.1%	60 31.3% 36.6%	192 50.4%
<u>Clothing, Jewelry</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 10.0% 4.6%	1 3.3% 10.0%	21 70.0% 33.9%	3 10.0% 8.8%	2 6.7% 1.2%	30 7.9%
<u>Food</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	10 25.6% 15.4%	2 5.1% 20.0%	10 25.6% 16.1%	5 12.8% 14.7%	12 30.8% 7.3%	39 10.2%
<u>Other Trade</u>	5 38.5% 10.9%	1 7.7% 1.5%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 7.7% 1.6%	1 7.7% 2.9%	5 38.5% 3.0%	13 3.4%
<u>Agriculture and Industry</u>	2 6.1% 4.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 3.0% 1.6%	4 12.1% 11.8%	26 78.8% 15.9%	33 8.7%
<u>Sales and Services</u>	3 6.3% 6.5%	5 10.4% 7.7%	1 2.1% 10.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	5 10.4% 14.7%	34 70.8% 20.7%	48 12.6%
<u>Professions</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 3.8% 1.6%	0 0.0% 0.0%	25 96.2% 15.2%	26 6.8%
Column Total	46 12.1%	65 17.1%	10 2.6%	62 16.3%	34 8.9%	164 43.0%	381 100.0%

Occupational Field--Actively Employed in 1939

(1939--27-42)

Field	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>General Trade</u>	23 9.7% 65.7%	94 39.7% 75.8%	10 4.2% 66.7%	34 14.3% 36.2%	9 3.8% 75.0%	67 28.3% 37.2%	237 51.5%
<u>Clothing, Jewelry</u>	4 6.9% 11.4%	4 6.9% 3.2%	2 3.4% 13.3%	43 74.1% 45.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	5 8.6% 2.8%	58 12.6%
<u>Food</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 9.7% 2.4%	1 3.2% 6.7%	8 25.8% 8.5%	0 0.0% 0.0%	19 61.3% 10.6%	31 6.7%
<u>Other Trade</u>	3 18.8% 8.6%	3 18.8% 2.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 6.3% 1.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	9 56.3% 5.0%	16 3.5%
<u>Agriculture and Industry</u>	2 6.9% 5.7%	2 6.9% 1.6%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 10.3% 25.0%	22 75.9% 12.2%	29 6.3%
<u>Sales and Services</u>	3 5.7% 8.6%	11 20.8% 8.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	5 9.4% 5.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	34 64.2% 18.9%	53 11.5%
<u>Professions</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	7 19.4% 5.6%	2 5.6% 13.3%	3 8.3% 3.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	24 66.7% 13.3%	36 7.8%
Column Total	35 7.6%	124 27.0%	15 3.3%	94 20.4%	12 2.6%	180 39.1%	460 100.0%

Occupational Field--Actively Employed in 1971

(1971--43-59)

Field	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>General Trade</u>	11 14.9% 47.8%	18 24.3% 34.6%	3 4.1% 23.1%	20 27.0% 44.4%	7 9.5% 46.7%	15 20.3% 10.5%	74 25.4%
<u>Clothing, Jewelry</u>	3 9.7% 13.0%	8 25.8% 15.4%	4 12.9% 30.8%	12 38.7% 26.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 12.9% 2.8%	31 10.7%
<u>Food</u>	1 4.3% 4.3%	3 13.0% 5.8%	2 8.7% 15.4%	3 13.0% 6.7%	2 8.7% 13.3%	12 52.2% 8.4%	23 7.9%
<u>Other Trade</u>	2 13.3% 8.7%	3 20.0% 5.8%	2 13.3% 15.4%	1 6.7% 2.2%	3 20.0% 20.0%	4 26.7% 2.8%	15 5.2%
<u>Agriculture and Industry</u>	4 7.8% 17.4%	3 5.9% 5.8%	1 2.0% 7.7%	3 5.9% 6.7%	1 2.0% 6.7%	39 76.5% 27.3%	51 17.5%
<u>Sales and Services</u>	2 3.6% 8.7%	15 27.3% 28.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 3.6% 4.4%	2 3.6% 13.3%	34 61.8% 23.8%	55 18.9%
<u>Professions</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 5.0% 3.8%	1 2.5% 7.7%	4 10.0% 8.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	33 82.5% 23.1%	40 13.7%
<u>Don't Know</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 100.0% 1.4%	2 0.7%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

Occupational Field--Actively Employed in 1971

(1971--26-42)

Field	Memam	Ethnic Origins				Not Pa. Origin	Row Total
		Sunni Vhora	Kath. Hindu	Surtee Hindu	Other Pa. I.		
<u>General Trade</u>	15 30.6% 41.7%	12 24.5% 34.3%	6 12.2% 66.7%	13 26.5% 31.0%	1 2.0% 50.0%	2 4.1% 3.4%	49 26.9%
<u>Clothing, Jewelry</u>	2 11.8% 5.6%	4 23.5% 11.4%	1 5.9% 11.1%	10 58.8% 23.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	17 9.3%
<u>Food</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 9.1% 2.9%	1 9.1% 11.1%	3 27.3% 7.1%	1 9.1% 50.0%	5 45.5% 8.6%	11 6.0%
<u>Other Trade</u>	8 66.7% 22.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 8.3% 2.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 25.0% 5.2%	12 6.6%
<u>Agriculture and Industry</u>	3 14.3% 8.3%	5 23.8% 14.3%	1 4.8% 11.1%	2 9.5% 4.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	10 47.6% 17.2%	21 11.5%
<u>Sales and Services</u>	2 5.0% 5.6%	9 22.5% 25.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	9 22.5% 21.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	20 50.0% 34.5%	40 22.0%
<u>Professions</u>	6 19.4% 16.7%	4 12.9% 11.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 9.7% 7.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	18 58.1% 31.0%	31 17.0%
<u>Don't Know</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 100.0% 2.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 0.5%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Class Location--Actively Employed in 1939

(1939--over 42)

<u>Location</u>	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Employed</u>	1	2	0	0	4	21	28
	3.6%	7.1%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	75.0%	7.6%
	2.2%	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	12.9%	13.4%	
<u>Small Bus. Owner</u>	33	46	6	47	22	100	254
	13.0%	18.1%	2.4%	18.5%	8.7%	39.4%	69.0%
	71.7%	73.0%	60.0%	77.0%	71.0%	63.7%	
<u>Large Bus. Owner</u>	12	15	4	13	5	11	60
	20.0%	25.0%	6.7%	21.7%	8.3%	18.3%	16.3%
	26.1%	23.8%	40.0%	21.3%	16.1%	7.0%	
<u>Professional</u>	0	0	0	1	0	25	26
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.8%	0.0%	96.2%	7.1%
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%	0.0%	15.9%	
Column Total	46	63	10	61	31	157	368
	12.5%	17.1%	2.7%	16.6%	8.4%	42.7%	100.0%

(1939--27-42)

<u>Location</u>	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Employed</u>	4	17	0	13	1	24	59
	6.8%	28.8%	0.0%	22.2%	1.7%	40.7%	13.3%
	11.4%	14.3%	0.0%	14.4%	8.3%	14.0%	
<u>Small Bus. Owner</u>	22	80	7	56	9	113	287
	7.7%	27.9%	2.4%	19.5%	3.1%	39.4%	64.9%
	62.9%	67.2%	46.7%	62.2%	75.0%	66.1%	
<u>Large Bus. Owner</u>	9	15	6	18	2	10	60
	15.0%	25.0%	10.0%	30.0%	3.3%	16.7%	13.6%
	25.7%	12.6%	40.0%	20.0%	16.7%	5.8%	
<u>Professional</u>	0	7	2	3	0	24	36
	0.0%	19.4%	5.6%	8.3%	0.0%	66.7%	8.1%
	0.0%	5.9%	13.3%	3.3%	0.0%	14.0%	
Column Total	35	119	15	90	12	171	442
	7.9%	26.9%	3.4%	20.4%	2.7%	38.7%	100.0%

Class Location--Actively Employed in 1971
(1971--43-59)

Location Employed by Indian	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni</u> <u>Vhora</u>	<u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa.</u> <u>Origin</u>	
	1	5	0	0	0	10	16
	6.3%	31.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	62.5%	5.6%
	4.3%	9.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%		7.1%
<u>Employed by</u> <u>European</u>	0	0	0	1	1	7	9
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	11.1%	77.8%	3.1%
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.3%	6.7%	5.0%	
<u>Small Bus. Owner</u>	3	19	3	19	6	79	129
	2.3%	14.7%	2.3%	14.7%	4.7%	61.2%	44.9%
	13.0%	36.5%	23.1%	43.2%	40.0%	56.4%	
<u>Large Bus. Owner</u>	19	26	9	20	7	17	98
	19.4%	26.5%	9.2%	20.4%	7.1%	17.3%	34.1%
	82.6%	50.0%	69.2%	45.5%	46.7%	12.1%	
<u>Professional</u>	0	2	1	4	1	27	35
	0.0%	5.7%	2.9%	11.4%	2.9%	77.1%	12.2%
	0.0%	3.8%	7.7%	9.1%	6.7%	19.3%	
Column Total	23	52	13	44	15	140	287
	8.0%	18.1%	4.5%	15.3%	5.2%	48.8%	100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Location Employed by Indian	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni</u> <u>Vhora</u>	<u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa.</u> <u>Origin</u>	
	1	6	0	2	1	8	18
	5.6%	33.3%	0.0%	11.1%	5.6%	44.4%	9.9%
	2.9%	17.1%	0.0%	4.8%	50.0%	13.8%	
<u>Employed by</u> <u>European</u>	1	0	0	2	0	2	5
	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	40.0%	0.0%	40.0%	2.8%
	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	0.0%	3.4%	
<u>Small Bus. Owner</u>	4	8	3	14	1	20	50
	8.0%	16.0%	6.0%	28.0%	2.0%	40.0%	27.6%
	11.4%	22.9%	33.3%	33.3%	50.0%	34.5%	
<u>Large Bus. Owner</u>	25	17	6	21	0	9	78
	32.1%	21.8%	7.7%	26.9%	0.0%	11.5%	43.1%
	71.4%	48.6%	66.7%	50.0%	0.0%	15.5%	
<u>Professional</u>	4	4	0	3	0	19	30
	13.3%	13.3%	0.0%	10.0%	0.0%	63.3%	16.6%
	11.4%	11.4%	0.0%	7.1%	0.0%	32.8%	
Column Total	35	35	9	42	2	58	181
	19.3%	19.3%	5.0%	23.2%	1.1%	32.0%	100.0%

Prominent Associational Positions

(1939--over 42)

Executive Positions	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	15 14.9% 26.3%	20 19.8% 24.4%	6 5.9% 35.3%	13 12.9% 18.1%	7 6.9% 17.5%	40 39.6% 18.7%	101 21.0%
<u>1 or 2</u>	21 11.2% 36.6%	32 17.1% 36.6%	7 3.7% 23.5%	36 19.3% 31.9%	19 10.2% 35.0%	72 38.5% 47.7%	187 38.8%
<u>3 or more</u>	21 10.8% 36.8%	30 15.5% 36.6%	4 2.1% 23.5%	23 11.9% 31.9%	14 7.2% 35.0%	102 52.6% 47.7%	194 40.2%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Executive Positions	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	19 11.4% 52.8%	43 25.7% 33.6%	6 3.6% 37.5%	39 23.4% 40.6%	4 2.4% 33.3%	56 33.5% 28.6%	167 34.5%
<u>1 or 2</u>	13 8.0% 36.1%	46 28.2% 35.9%	8 4.9% 50.0%	31 19.0% 32.3%	4 2.5% 33.3%	61 37.4% 31.1%	163 33.7%
<u>3 or more</u>	4 2.6% 11.1%	39 25.3% 30.5%	2 1.3% 12.5%	26 16.9% 27.1%	4 2.6% 33.3%	79 51.3% 40.3%	154 31.8%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Prominent Associational Positions

(1971--43-59)

Executive Positions	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	14 12.2% 60.9%	21 18.3% 40.4%	4 3.5% 30.8%	18 15.7% 40.0%	4 3.5% 26.7%	54 47.0% 37.8%	115 39.5%
<u>1 or 2</u>	6 8.0% 26.1%	12 16.0% 23.1%	6 8.0% 46.2%	13 17.3% 28.9%	6 8.0% 40.0%	32 42.7% 22.4%	75 25.8%
<u>3 or more</u>	3 3.0% 13.0%	19 18.8% 36.5%	3 3.0% 23.1%	14 13.9% 31.1%	5 5.0% 33.3%	57 56.4% 39.9%	101 34.7%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Executive Positions	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	28 22.8% 77.8%	25 20.3% 71.4%	6 4.9% 66.7%	31 25.2% 73.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	33 26.8% 56.9%	123 67.6%
<u>1 or 2</u>	5 16.1% 13.9%	7 22.6% 20.0%	2 6.5% 22.2%	6 19.4% 14.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	11 35.5% 19.0%	31 17.0%
<u>3 or more</u>	3 10.7% 8.3%	3 10.7% 8.6%	1 3.6% 11.1%	5 17.9% 11.9%	2 7.1% 100.0%	14 50.0% 24.1%	28 15.4%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Total Association Memberships

(1939--over 42)

Total Association Memberships	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Low</u>	28 20.1% 49.1%	31 22.3% 37.8%	8 5.8% 47.1%	10 7.2% 13.9%	13 9.4% 32.5%	49 35.3% 22.9%	139 28.8%
<u>Medium</u>	23 11.1% 40.4%	36 17.3% 43.9%	7 3.4% 41.2%	44 21.2% 61.1%	22 10.6% 55.0%	76 36.5% 35.5%	208 43.2%
<u>High</u>	6 4.4% 10.5%	15 11.1% 18.3%	2 1.5% 11.8%	18 13.3% 25.0%	5 3.7% 12.5%	89 65.9% 41.6%	135 28.0%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Total Association Memberships	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>Low</u>	23 12.4% 63.9%	52 28.1% 40.6%	7 3.8% 43.8%	42 22.7% 43.8%	5 2.7% 41.7%	56 30.3% 28.6%	185 38.2%
<u>Medium</u>	11 6.0% 30.6%	52 28.4% 40.6%	7 3.8% 43.8%	36 19.7% 37.5%	5 2.7% 41.7%	72 39.3% 36.7%	183 37.8%
<u>High</u>	2 1.7% 5.6%	24 20.7% 18.8%	2 1.7% 12.5%	18 15.5% 18.8%	2 1.7% 16.7%	68 58.6% 34.7%	116 24.0%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Total Association Memberships

(1971--43-59)

Total Association Memberships	Ethnic Origins		Ethnic Origins		Ethnic Origins		Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	14 15.1% 60.9%	18 19.4% 34.6%	5 5.4% 38.5%	14 15.1% 31.1%	5 5.4% 33.3%	37 39.8% 25.9%	93 32.0%
<u>1</u>	6 6.1% 26.1%	17 17.2% 32.7%	6 6.1% 46.2%	19 19.2% 42.2%	5 5.1% 33.3%	46 46.5% 32.2%	99 34.0%
<u>2 or more</u>	3 3.0% 13.0%	17 17.2% 32.7%	2 2.0% 15.4%	12 12.1% 26.7%	5 5.1% 33.3%	60 60.6% 42.0%	99 34.0%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Total Association Memberships	Ethnic Origins		Ethnic Origins		Ethnic Origins		Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	25 25.8% 69.4%	19 19.6% 54.3%	4 4.1% 44.4%	23 23.7% 54.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	26 26.8% 44.8%	97 53.3%
<u>1</u>	9 16.4% 25.0%	10 18.2% 28.6%	4 7.3% 44.4%	17 30.9% 40.5%	2 3.6% 100.0%	13 23.6% 22.4%	55 30.2%
<u>2 or more</u>	2 6.7% 5.6%	6 20.0% 17.1%	1 3.3% 11.1%	2 6.7% 4.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	19 63.3% 32.8%	30 16.5%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Secular Interest Associations

(1939--over 42)

Secular Interest Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	35 17.9% 61.4%	41 21.0% 50.0%	6 3.1% 35.3%	11 5.6% 15.3%	18 9.2% 45.0%	84 43.1% 39.3%	195 40.5%
<u>1</u>	14 8.9% 24.6%	19 12.1% 23.2%	8 5.1% 47.1%	36 22.9% 50.0%	14 8.9% 35.0%	66 42.0% 30.8%	157 32.6%
<u>2 or more</u>	8 6.2% 14.0%	22 16.9% 26.8%	3 2.3% 17.6%	25 19.2% 34.7%	8 6.2% 20.0%	64 49.2% 29.9%	130 27.0%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Secular Interest Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	27 10.8% 75.0%	73 29.2% 57.0%	5 2.0% 31.3%	56 22.4% 58.3%	6 2.4% 50.0%	83 33.2% 42.3%	250 51.7%
<u>1</u>	6 3.9% 16.7%	38 24.8% 29.7%	9 5.9% 56.3%	26 17.0% 27.1%	4 2.6% 33.3%	70 45.8% 35.7%	153 31.6%
<u>2 or more</u>	3 3.7% 8.3%	17 21.0% 13.3%	2 2.5% 12.5%	14 17.3% 14.6%	2 2.5% 16.7%	43 53.1% 21.9%	81 16.7%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Secular Interest Associations

(1971--43-59)

Secular Interest Associations	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic Origin Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	23 12.3% 100.0%	37 19.8% 71.2%	10 5.3% 76.9%	36 19.3% 80.0%	12 6.4% 80.0%	59 36.9% 48.3%	187 64.3%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	8 13.8% 15.4%	1 1.7% 7.7%	7 12.1% 15.6%	2 3.4% 13.3%	40 69.0% 28.0%	58 19.9%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	7 15.2% 13.5%	2 4.3% 15.4%	2 4.3% 4.4%	1 2.2% 6.7%	34 73.9% 23.8%	46 15.8%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Secular Interest Associations	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic Origin Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	34 23.4% 94.4%	30 20.7% 85.7%	7 4.8% 77.8%	35 24.1% 83.3%	1 0.7% 50.0%	38 26.2% 65.5%	145 79.7%
<u>1</u>	2 7.4% 5.6%	4 14.8% 11.4%	1 3.7% 11.1%	7 25.9% 16.7%	1 3.7% 50.0%	12 44.4% 20.7%	27 14.8%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 10.0% 2.9%	1 10.0% 11.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	8 80.0% 13.8%	10 5.5%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

National and Regional Political Associations

(1939--over 42)

Nat'l/Regional Political Associations	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin		<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
			<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>			
<u>None</u>	36 14.6% 63.2%	46 18.7% 56.1%	7 2.8% 41.2%	24 9.8% 33.3%	18 7.3% 45.0%	115 46.7% 53.7%	246 51.0%
<u>1</u>	15 9.6% 26.3%	17 10.8% 20.7%	9 5.7% 52.9%	34 21.7% 47.2%	16 10.2% 40.0%	66 42.0% 30.8%	157 32.6%
<u>2 or more</u>	6 7.6% 10.5%	19 24.1% 23.2%	1 1.3% 5.9%	14 17.7% 19.4%	6 7.6% 15.0%	33 41.8% 15.4%	79 16.4%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Nat'l/Regional Political Associations	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin		<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
			<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>			
<u>None</u>	27 8.6% 75.0%	85 27.2% 66.4%	6 1.9% 37.5%	67 21.4% 69.8%	6 1.9% 50.0%	122 39.0% 62.2%	313 64.7%
<u>1</u>	7 5.0% 19.4%	35 25.0% 27.3%	10 7.1% 62.5%	23 16.4% 24.0%	6 4.3% 50.0%	59 42.1% 30.1%	140 28.9%
<u>2 or more</u>	2 6.5% 5.6%	8 25.8% 6.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	6 19.4% 6.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	15 48.4% 7.7%	31 6.4%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

National and Regional Political Associations

(1971--43-59)

Nat'l/Regional Political Associations	<u>Memar</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin Kath. <u>Hindu</u>	Surtee <u>Hindu</u>	Other <u>Pa. I.</u>	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	23 8.3% 100.0%	50 18.1% 96.2%	11 4.0% 84.6%	42 15.2% 93.3%	15 5.4% 100.0%	135 48.9% 94.4%	276 94.8%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 8.3% 1.9%	1 8.3% 7.7%	3 25.0% 6.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	7 58.3% 4.9%	12 4.1%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 33.3% 1.9%	1 33.3% 7.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 33.3% 0.7%	3 1.0%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Nat'l/Regional Political Associations	<u>Memar</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin Kath. <u>Hindu</u>	Surtee <u>Hindu</u>	Other <u>Pa. I.</u>	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	36 20.1% 100.0%	35 19.6% 100.0%	9 5.0% 100.0%	40 22.3% 95.2%	2 1.1% 100.0%	57 31.8% 98.3%	179 98.4%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 100.0% 4.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 1.1%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 100.0% 1.7%	1 0.5%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Local Community Political Associations

(1939--over 42)

Local Comm. Political Associations	<u>Memam</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin Kath. <u>Hindu</u>	Surtee <u>Hindu</u>	Other <u>Pa. I.</u>	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	56 12.8% 98.2%	75 17.1% 91.5%	17 3.9% 100.0%	62 14.2% 86.1%	40 9.1% 100.0%	188 42.9% 87.9%	438 90.9%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	7 17.9% 8.5%	0 0.0% 0.0%	10 25.6% 13.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	22 56.4% 10.3%	39 8.1%
<u>2 or more</u>	1 20.0% 1.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 80.0% 1.9%	5 1.0%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Local Comm. Political Associations	<u>Memam</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin Kath. <u>Hindu</u>	Surtee <u>Hindu</u>	Other <u>Pa. I.</u>	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	36 8.3% 100.0%	116 26.7% 90.6%	16 3.7% 100.0%	91 20.9% 94.8%	11 2.5% 91.7%	165 37.9% 84.2%	435 89.9%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	10 24.4% 7.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 9.8% 4.2%	1 2.4% 8.3%	26 63.4% 13.3%	41 8.5%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 25.0% 1.6%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 12.5% 1.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	5 62.5% 2.6%	8 1.7%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Local Community Political Associations

(1971--43-59)

Local Comm. Political Associations	<u>Memam</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin Kath. <u>Hindu</u>	Surtee <u>Hindu</u>	Other <u>Pa. I.</u>	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	23 9.9% 100.0%	43 18.5% 82.7%	12 5.2% 92.3%	41 17.7% 91.1%	13 5.6% 86.7%	100 43.1% 69.9%	232 79.7%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	5 10.9% 9.6%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 6.5% 6.7%	1 2.2% 6.7%	37 80.4% 25.9%	46 15.8%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 30.8% 7.7%	1 7.7% 7.7%	1 7.7% 2.2%	1 7.7% 6.7%	6 46.2% 4.2%	13 4.5%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Local Comm. Political Associations	<u>Memam</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin Kath. <u>Hindu</u>	Surtee <u>Hindu</u>	Other <u>Pa. I.</u>	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	36 22.6% 100.0%	31 19.5% 88.6%	7 4.4% 77.8%	40 25.2% 95.2%	1 0.6% 50.0%	44 27.7% 75.9%	159 87.4%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 15.0% 8.6%	1 5.0% 11.1%	2 10.0% 4.8%	1 5.0% 50.0%	13 65.0% 22.4%	20 11.0%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 33.3% 2.9%	1 33.3% 11.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 33.3% 1.7%	3 1.6%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Labor Union Associations

(1939--over 42)

Labor Union Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	57 12.2% 100.0%	82 17.6% 100.0%	17 3.6% 100.0%	60 12.9% 83.3%	40 8.6% 100.0	210 45.1% 98.1	466 96.7%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	9 75.0% 12.5%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 25.0% 1.4%	12 2.5%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 75.0% 4.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 25.0% 0.5%	4 0.8%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Labor Union Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	36 7.8% 100.0%	126 27.3% 98.4%	16 3.5% 100.0%	82 17.7% 85.4%	12 2.6% 100.0%	190 41.1% 96.9%	462 95.5%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 10.5% 1.6%	0 0.0% 0.0%	11 57.9% 11.5%	0 0.0% 0.0%	6 31.6% 3.1%	19 3.9%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 100.0% 3.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 0.6%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Labor Union Associations

(1971--43-59)

Labor Union Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	23 8.1% 100.0%	52 18.2% 100.0%	13 4.6% 100.0%	45 15.8% 100.0%	14 4.9% 93.3	138 48.4% 96.5	285 97.9%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 33.3% 6.7%	2 66.7% 1.4%	3 1.0%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 100.0% 2.1%	3 1.0%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Labor Union Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	36 19.9% 100.0%	35 19.3% 100.0%	9 5.0% 100.0%	42 23.2% 100.0%	2 1.1% 100.0%	57 31.5% 98.3%	181 99.5%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 100.0% 1.7%	1 0.5%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Business Owner Associations

(1939--over 42)

Business Owner Associations	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic Origin</u>		<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	<u>Row Total</u>
			<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>			
<u>None</u>	55 13.2% 96.5%	75 18.0% 91.5%	14 3.4% 82.4%	60 14.4% 83.3%	36 8.7% 90.0%	176 42.3% 82.2%	416 86.3%
<u>1</u>	2 3.8% 3.5%	7 13.5% 8.5%	2 3.8% 11.8%	11 21.2% 15.3%	3 5.8% 7.5%	27 51.9% 12.6%	52 10.8%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 7.1% 5.9%	1 7.1% 1.4%	1 7.1% 2.5%	11 78.6% 5.1%	14 2.9%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Business Owner Associations	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic Origin</u>		<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	<u>Row Total</u>
			<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>			
<u>None</u>	35 8.0% 97.2%	123 28.0% 96.1%	13 3.0% 81.3%	91 20.7% 94.8%	11 2.5% 91.7%	167 38.0% 85.2%	440 90.9%
<u>1</u>	1 2.8% 2.8%	5 13.9% 3.9%	2 5.6% 12.5%	5 13.9% 5.2%	1 2.8% 8.3%	22 61.1% 11.2%	36 7.4%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 12.5% 6.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	7 87.5% 3.6%	8 1.7%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Business Owner Associations

(1971--43-59)

Business Owner Associations	<u>Meman</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin Kath. <u>Hindu</u>	Surtee <u>Hindu</u>	Other Pa. I.	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	23 9.2% 100.0%	48 19.1% 92.3%	13 5.2% 100.0%	41 16.3% 91.1%	15 6.0% 100.0%	111 44.2% 77.6%	251 86.3%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 6.7% 3.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 10.0% 6.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	25 83.3% 17.5%	30 10.3%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 20.0% 3.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 10.0% 2.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	7 70.0% 4.9%	10 3.4%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Business Owner Associations	<u>Meman</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin Kath. <u>Hindu</u>	Surtee <u>Hindu</u>	Other Pa. I.	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	35 20.5% 97.2%	34 19.9% 97.1%	8 4.7% 88.9%	39 22.8% 92.9%	2 1.2% 100.0%	53 31.0% 91.4%	171 94.0%
<u>1</u>	1 10.0% 2.8%	1 10.0% 2.9%	1 10.0% 11.1%	3 30.0% 7.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 40.0% 6.9%	10 5.5%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 100.0% 1.7%	1 0.5%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Professional Associations

(1939--over 42)

Professional Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	57 12.3% 100.0%	82 17.7% 100.0%	17 3.7% 100.0%	72 15.5% 100.0%	40 8.6% 100.0%	196 42.2% 91.6%	464 96.3%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0	0 0.0% 0.0	0 0.0% 0.0	0 0.0% 0.0	0 0.0% 0.0	17 100.0% 7.9%	17 3.5%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0	0 0.0% 0.0	0 0.0% 0.0	0 0.0% 0.0	0 0.0% 0.0	1 100.0% 0.5%	1 0.2%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Professional Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	36 7.7% 100.0%	126 27.0% 98.4%	16 3.4% 100.0%	96 20.6% 100.0%	12 2.6% 100.0%	181 38.8% 92.3%	467 96.5%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0	2 12.5% 1.6%	0 0.0% 0.0	0 0.0% 0.0	0 0.0% 0.0	14 87.5% 7.1%	16 3.3%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0	0 0.0% 0.0	0 0.0% 0.0	0 0.0% 0.0	0 0.0% 0.0	1 100.0% 0.5%	1 0.2%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Professional Associations

(1971--43-59)

Professional Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	23 8.2% 100.0%	52 18.6% 100.0%	13 4.6% 100.0%	44 15.7% 97.8%	15 5.4% 100.0%	133 47.5% 93.0%	280 96.2%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0	1 12.5% 2.2%	0 0.0% 0.0	7 87.5% 4.9%	8 2.7%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 100.0% 2.1%	3 1.0%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Professional Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	35 19.7% 97.2%	35 19.7% 100.0%	9 5.1% 100.0%	42 23.6% 100.0%	2 1.1% 100.0%	55 30.9% 94.8%	178 97.8%
<u>1</u>	1 33.3% 2.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 66.7% 3.4%	3 1.6%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0	1 100.0% 1.7%	1 0.5%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Social Secular Associations

(1939--over 42)

Social Secular Associations	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni</u> <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin		<u>Other</u> <u>Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa.</u> <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
			<u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>			
<u>None</u>	54 12.0% 94.7%	81 18.0% 98.8%	16 3.6% 94.1%	71 15.8% 98.6%	39 8.7% 97.5%	188 41.9% 87.9%	449 93.2%
<u>1</u>	3 10.7% 5.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 3.6% 5.9%	1 3.6% 1.4%	1 3.6% 2.5%	22 78.6% 10.3%	28 5.8%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 20.0% 1.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 80.0% 1.9%	5 1.0%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Social Secular Associations	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni</u> <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin		<u>Other</u> <u>Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa.</u> <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
			<u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>			
<u>None</u>	36 7.7% 100.0%	124 26.6% 96.9%	14 3.0% 87.5%	94 20.1% 97.9%	12 2.6% 100.0%	187 40.0% 95.4%	467 96.5%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 15.4% 1.6%	2 15.4% 12.5%	2 15.4% 2.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	7 53.8% 3.6%	13 2.7%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 50.0% 1.6%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 50.0% 1.0%	4 0.8%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Social Secular Associations

(1971--43-59)

Social Secular Associations	<u>Memam</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin <u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>	Other <u>Pa. I.</u>	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	23 8.5% 100.0%	50 18.5% 96.2%	11 4.1% 84.6%	40 14.8% 88.9%	15 5.5% 100.0%	132 48.7% 92.3%	271 93.1%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 14.3% 3.8%	2 14.3% 15.4%	5 35.7% 11.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	5 35.7% 3.5%	14 4.8%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	6 100.0% 4.2%	6 2.1%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Social Secular Associations	<u>Memam</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin <u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>	Other <u>Pa. I.</u>	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	36 20.3% 100.0%	35 19.8% 100.0%	8 4.5% 88.9%	41 23.2% 97.6%	2 1.1% 100.0%	55 31.1% 94.8%	177 97.3%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 25.0% 11.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 75.0% 5.2%	4 2.2%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 100.0% 2.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 0.5%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Sports (Inclusive) Associations

(1939--over 42)

Sports (Inclusive) Associations	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin <u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	54 14.8% 94.7%	71 19.5% 86.6%	16 4.4% 94.1%	70 19.2% 97.2%	38 10.4% 95.0%	115 31.6% 53.7%	364 75.5%
<u>1</u>	3 6.5% 5.3%	7 15.2% 8.5%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 2.2% 1.4%	2 4.3% 5.0%	33 71.7% 15.4%	46 9.5%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 5.6% 4.9%	1 1.4% 5.9%	1 1.4% 1.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	66 91.7% 30.8%	72 14.9%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Sports (Inclusive) Associations	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin <u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	32 10.0% 88.9%	89 27.9% 69.5%	13 4.1% 81.3%	81 25.4% 84.4%	8 2.5% 66.7%	96 30.1% 49.0%	319 65.9%
<u>1</u>	4 5.6% 11.1%	19 26.4% 14.8%	2 2.8% 12.5%	9 12.5% 9.4%	2 2.8% 16.7%	36 50.0% 18.4%	72 14.9%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	20 21.5% 15.6%	1 1.1% 6.3%	6 6.5% 6.3%	2 2.2% 16.7%	64 68.8% 32.7%	93 19.2%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Sports (Inclusive) Associations

(1971--43-59)

Sports (Inclusive) Associations	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin <u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	19 10.2% 82.6%	30 16.1% 57.7%	10 5.4% 76.9%	36 19.4% 80.0%	13 7.0% 86.7%	78 41.9% 54.5%	186 63.9%
<u>1</u>	2 4.9% 8.7%	6 14.6% 11.5%	3 7.3% 23.1%	9 22.0% 20.0%	1 2.4% 6.7%	20 48.8% 14.0%	41 14.1%
<u>2 or more</u>	2 3.1% 8.7%	16 25.0% 30.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 1.6% 6.7%	45 70.3% 31.5%	64 22.0%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Sports (Inclusive) Associations	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin <u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	31 23.8% 86.1%	22 16.9% 62.9%	6 4.6% 66.7%	37 28.5% 88.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	34 26.2% 58.6%	130 71.4%
<u>1</u>	3 12.0% 8.3%	5 20.0% 14.3%	1 4.0% 11.1%	2 8.0% 4.8%	1 4.0% 50.0%	13 52.0% 22.4%	25 13.7%
<u>2 or more</u>	2 7.4% 5.6%	8 29.6% 22.9%	2 7.4% 22.2%	3 11.1% 7.1%	1 3.7% 50.0%	11 40.7% 19.0%	27 14.8%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Sports (Religious/Ethnic) Associations

(1939--over 42)

Sports (Rel./Eth.) Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	57 11.9% 100.0%	82 17.2% 100.0%	17 3.6% 100.0%	72 15.1% 100.0%	40 8.4% 100.0%	209 43.8% 97.7%	477 99.0%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	5 100.0% 2.3%	5 1.0%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Sports (Rel./Eth.) Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	35 7.7% 97.2%	113 25.0% 88.3%	16 3.5% 100.0%	86 19.0% 89.6%	11 2.4% 91.7%	191 42.3% 97.4%	452 93.4%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	9 39.1% 7.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	9 39.1% 9.4%	1 4.3% 8.3%	4 17.4% 2.0%	23 4.8%
<u>2 or more</u>	1 11.1% 2.8%	6 66.7% 4.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 11.1% 1.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 11.1% 0.5%	9 1.9%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Sports (Religious/Ethnic) Associations

(1971--43-59)

Sports (Rel./Eth.) Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	22 8.1% 95.7%	46 16.8% 88.5%	12 4.4% 92.3%	41 15.0% 91.1%	11 4.0% 73.3%	141 51.6% 98.6%	273 93.8%
<u>1</u>	1 5.9% 4.3%	5 29.4% 9.6%	1 5.9% 7.7%	4 23.5% 8.9%	4 23.5% 26.7%	2 11.8% 1.4%	17 5.8%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 100.0% 1.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 0.3%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Sports (Rel./Eth.) Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	36 20.2% 100.0%	32 18.0% 91.4%	9 5.1% 100.0%	42 23.6% 100.0%	1 0.6% 50.0%	58 32.6% 100.0%	178 97.8%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 50.0% 2.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 50.0% 50.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 1.1%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 100.0% 5.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 1.1%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Welfare (Inclusive) Associations

(1939--over 42)

Welfare (Inclusive) Associations	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin <u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	56 12.7% 98.2%	80 18.2% 97.6%	16 3.6% 94.1%	68 15.5% 94.4%	34 7.7% 85.0%	186 42.3% 86.9%	440 91.3%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 3.2% 1.2%	1 3.2% 5.9%	3 9.7% 4.2%	5 16.1% 12.5%	21 67.7% 9.8%	31 6.4%
<u>2 or more</u>	1 9.1% 1.8%	1 9.1% 1.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 9.1% 1.4%	1 9.1% 2.5%	7 63.6% 3.3%	11 2.3%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Welfare (Inclusive) Associations	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin <u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	36 7.9% 100.0%	125 27.5% 97.7%	14 3.1% 87.5%	95 20.9% 99.0%	12 2.6% 100.0%	173 38.0% 88.3%	455 94.0%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 8.7% 1.6%	1 4.3% 6.3%	1 4.3% 1.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	19 82.6% 9.7%	23 4.8%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 16.7% 0.8%	1 16.7% 6.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 66.7% 2.0%	6 1.2%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Welfare (Inclusive) Associations

(1971--43-59)

Welfare (Inclusive) Associations	<u>Memar</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin Kath. <u>Hindu</u>	Surtee <u>Hindu</u>	Other <u>Pa. I.</u>	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	21 9.1% 91.3%	44 19.0% 84.6%	10 4.3% 76.9%	39 16.8% 86.7%	12 5.2% 80.0%	106 45.7% 74.1%	232 79.7%
<u>1</u>	1 2.6% 4.3%	5 12.8% 9.6%	3 7.7% 23.1%	5 12.8% 11.1%	3 7.7% 20.0%	22 56.4% 15.4%	39 13.4%
<u>2 or more</u>	1 5.0% 4.3%	3 15.0% 5.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 5.0% 2.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	15 75.0% 10.5%	20 6.9%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Welfare (Inclusive) Associations	<u>Memar</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin Kath. <u>Hindu</u>	Surtee <u>Hindu</u>	Other <u>Pa. I.</u>	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	35 21.3% 97.2%	32 19.5% 91.4%	9 5.5% 100.0%	40 24.4% 95.2%	2 1.2% 100.0%	46 28.0% 79.3%	164 90.1%
<u>1</u>	1 10.0% 2.8%	3 30.0% 8.6%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	6 60.0% 10.3%	10 5.5%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 25.0% 4.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	6 75.0% 10.3%	8 4.4%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Welfare (Religious) Associations

(1939--over 42)

Welfare (Religious) Associations	<u>Memar</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin Kath. <u>Hindu</u>	Surtee <u>Hindu</u>	Other <u>Pa. I.</u>	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	54 11.7% 94.7%	80 17.4% 97.6%	16 3.5% 94.1%	66 14.3% 91.7%	39 8.5% 97.5%	206 44.7% 96.3%	461 95.6%
<u>1</u>	3 15.0% 5.3%	2 10.0% 2.4%	1 5.0% 5.9%	6 30.0% 8.3%	1 5.0% 2.5%	7 35.0% 3.3%	20 4.1%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 100.0% 0.5%	1 0.2%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Welfare (Religious) Associations	<u>Memar</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin Kath. <u>Hindu</u>	Surtee <u>Hindu</u>	Other <u>Pa. I.</u>	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	33 7.1% 91.7%	123 26.6% 96.1%	16 3.5% 100.0%	92 19.9% 95.8%	10 2.2% 83.3%	189 40.8% 96.4%	463 95.7%
<u>1</u>	3 14.3% 8.3%	5 23.8% 3.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 19.0% 4.2%	2 9.5% 16.7%	7 33.3% 3.6%	21 4.3%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Welfare (Religious) Associations

(1971--43-59)

Welfare (Religious) Associations	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin		<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
			<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>			
<u>None</u>	21 7.5% 91.3%	47 16.8% 90.4%	13 4.7% 100.0%	40 14.3% 88.9%	15 5.4% 100.0%	143 51.3% 100.0%	279 95.9%
<u>1</u>	2 18.2% 8.7%	4 36.4% 7.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	5 45.5% 11.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	11 3.8%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 100.0% 1.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 0.3%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Welfare (Religious) Associations	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin		<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
			<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>			
<u>None</u>	34 19.7% 94.4%	35 20.2% 100.0%	8 4.6% 88.9%	40 23.1% 95.2%	1 0.6% 50.0%	55 31.8% 94.8%	173 95.1%
<u>1</u>	2 22.2% 5.6%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 11.1% 11.1%	2 22.2% 4.8%	1 11.1% 50.0%	3 33.3% 5.2%	9 4.9%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Welfare (Ethnic) Associations

(1939--over 42)

Welfare (Ethnic) Associations	<u>Memam</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin Kath. <u>Hindu</u>	Surtee <u>Hindu</u>	Other <u>Pa. I.</u>	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	56 12.8% 98.2%	81 18.5% 98.8%	15 3.4% 88.2%	46 10.5% 63.9%	40 9.1% 100.0%	201 45.8% 93.9%	439 91.1%
<u>1</u>	1 2.5% 1.8%	1 2.5% 1.2%	1 2.5% 5.9%	25 62.5% 34.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	12 30.0% 5.6%	40 8.3%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 33.3% 5.9%	1 33.3% 1.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 33.3% 0.5%	3 0.6%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Welfare (Ethnic) Associations	<u>Memam</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Origin Kath. <u>Hindu</u>	Surtee <u>Hindu</u>	Other <u>Pa. I.</u>	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	35 8.0% 97.2%	126 29.0% 98.4%	14 3.2% 87.5%	68 15.6% 70.8%	9 2.1% 75.0%	183 42.1% 93.4%	435 89.9%
<u>1</u>	1 2.1% 2.8%	2 4.2% 1.6%	2 4.2% 12.5%	27 56.3% 28.1%	3 6.3% 25.0%	13 27.1% 6.6%	48 9.9%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 100.0% 1.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 0.2%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Welfare (Ethnic) Associations

(1971--43-59)

Welfare (Ethnic) Associations	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni</u> <u>Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic Origin</u> <u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa.</u> <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	20 7.1% 87.0%	49 17.4% 94.2%	13 4.6% 100.0%	45 16.0% 100.0%	14 5.0% 93.3%	140 49.8% 97.9%	281 96.6%
<u>1</u>	3 30.0% 13.0%	3 30.0% 5.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 10.0% 6.7%	3 30.0% 2.1%	10 3.4%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Welfare (Ethnic) Associations	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni</u> <u>Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic Origin</u> <u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa.</u> <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	36 20.0% 100.0%	35 19.4% 100.0%	9 5.0% 100.0%	40 22.2% 95.2%	2 1.1% 100.0%	58 32.2% 100.0%	180 98.9%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 100.0% 4.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 1.1%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Cultural (Inclusive) Associations

(1939--over 42)

Cultural (Inclusive) Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni</u> <u>Vhora</u>	<u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa.</u> <u>Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	51 11.2% 89.5%	79 17.4% 96.3%	16 3.5% 94.1%	71 15.6% 98.6%	79 8.6% 97.5%	198 43.6% 92.5%	454 94.2%
<u>1</u>	6 23.1% 10.5%	3 11.5% 3.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 3.8% 1.4%	1 3.8% 2.5%	15 57.7% 7.0%	26 5.4%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 50.0% 5.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 50.0% 0.5%	2 0.4%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Cultural (Inclusive) Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni</u> <u>Vhora</u>	<u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa.</u> <u>Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	36 7.9% 100.0%	125 27.4% 97.7%	15 3.3% 93.8%	95 20.8% 99.0%	12 2.6% 100.0%	173 37.9% 88.3%	456 94.2%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 13.0% 2.3%	1 4.3% 6.3%	1 4.3% 1.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	18 78.3% 9.2%	23 4.8%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	5 100.0% 2.6%	5 1.0%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Cultural (Inclusive) Associations

(1971--43-59)

Cultural (Inclusive) Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	20 7.7% 87.0%	50 19.2% 96.2%	12 4.6% 92.3%	42 16.1% 93.3%	14 5.4% 93.3%	123 47.1% 86.0%	261 89.7%
<u>1</u>	3 10.7% 13.0%	2 7.1% 3.8%	1 3.6% 7.7%	3 10.7% 6.7%	1 3.6% 6.7%	18 64.3% 12.6%	28 9.6%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 100.0% 1.4%	2 0.7%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Cultural (Inclusive) Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	31 19.3% 86.1%	33 20.5% 94.3%	8 5.0% 88.9%	40 24.8% 95.2%	2 1.2% 100.0%	47 29.2% 81.0%	161 88.5%
<u>1</u>	4 21.1% 11.1%	2 10.5% 5.7%	1 5.3% 11.1%	1 5.3% 2.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	11 57.9% 19.0%	19 10.4%
<u>2 or more</u>	1 50.0% 2.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 50.0% 2.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 1.1%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Cultural (Religious) Associations

(1939--over 42)

Cultural (Religious) Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	34 12.6 59.6%	38 14.1% 46.3%	8 3.0% 47.1%	41 15.2% 56.9%	21 7.8% 52.5%	127 47.2% 59.3%	269 55.8%
<u>1</u>	18 12.4% 31.6%	33 22.8% 40.2%	6 4.1% 35.3%	24 16.6% 33.3%	12 8.3% 30.0%	52 35.9% 24.3%	145 30.1%
<u>2 or more</u>	5 7.4% 8.8%	11 16.2% 13.4%	3 4.4% 17.6%	7 10.3% 9.7%	7 10.3% 17.5%	35 51.5% 16.4%	68 14.1%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Cultural (Religious) Associations	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	21 6.7% 58.3%	75 24.0% 58.6%	12 3.8% 75.0%	62 19.9% 64.6%	8 2.6% 66.7%	134 42.9% 68.4%	312 64.5%
<u>1</u>	15 11.5% 41.7%	36 27.5% 28.1%	2 1.5% 12.5%	29 22.1% 30.2%	4 3.1% 33.3%	45 34.4% 23.0%	131 27.1%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	17 41.5% 13.3%	2 4.9% 12.5%	5 12.2% 5.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	17 41.5% 8.7%	41 8.5%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Cultural (Religious) Associations

(1971--43-59)

Cultural (Religious) Associations	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Origin Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	17 10.5 73.9%	29 17.9% 55.8%	8 4.9% 61.5%	17 10.5% 37.8%	6 3.7% 40.0%	85 52.5% 59.4%	162 55.7%
<u>1</u>	5 6.1% 21.7%	16 19.5% 30.8%	5 6.1% 38.5%	17 20.7% 37.8%	4 4.9% 26.7%	35 42.7% 24.5%	82 28.2%
<u>2 or more</u>	1 2.1% 4.3%	7 14.9% 13.5%	0 0.0% 0.0%	11 23.4% 24.4%	5 10.6% 33.3%	23 48.9% 16.1%	47 16.2%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Cultural (Religious) Associations	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Origin Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	26 19.0% 72.2%	27 19.7% 77.1%	9 6.6% 100.0%	27 19.7% 64.3%	2 1.5% 100.0%	46 33.6% 79.3%	137 75.3%
<u>1</u>	8 27.6% 22.2%	3 10.3% 8.6%	0 0.0% 0.0%	10 34.5% 23.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	8 27.6% 13.8%	29 15.9%
<u>2 or more</u>	2 12.5% 5.6%	5 31.3% 14.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	5 31.3% 11.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 25.0% 6.9%	16 8.8%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Cultural (Ethnic) Associations

(1939--over 42)

Cultural (Ethnic) Associations	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni</u> <u>Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic Origin</u> <u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa.</u> <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	51 13.5% 89.5%	73 19.4% 89.0%	13 3.4% 76.5%	43 11.4% 59.7%	30 8.0% 75.0%	167 44.3% 78.0%	377 78.2%
<u>1</u>	5 6.0% 8.8%	8 9.6% 9.8%	4 4.8% 23.5%	22 26.5% 30.6%	10 12.0% 25.0%	34 41.0% 15.9%	83 17.2%
<u>2 or more</u>	1 4.5% 1.8%	1 4.5% 1.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	7 31.8% 9.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	13 59.1% 6.1%	22 4.6%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Cultural (Ethnic) Associations	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni</u> <u>Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic Origin</u> <u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa.</u> <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	31 8.1% 86.1%	118 31.0% 92.2%	13 3.4% 81.3%	57 15.0% 59.4%	7 1.8% 58.3%	155 40.7% 79.1%	381 78.7%
<u>1</u>	5 6.1% 13.9%	10 12.2% 7.8%	3 3.7% 18.8%	33 40.2% 34.4%	3 3.7% 25.0%	28 34.1% 14.3%	82 16.9%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	6 28.6% 6.3%	2 9.5% 16.7%	13 61.9% 6.6%	21 4.3%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Cultural (Ethnic) Associations

(1971--43-59)

Cultural (Ethnic) Associations	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	20 8.9% 87.0%	48 21.4% 92.3%	9 4.0% 69.2%	26 11.6% 57.8%	12 5.4% 80.0%	109 48.7% 76.2%	224 77.0%
<u>1</u>	2 3.6% 8.7%	4 7.3% 7.7%	4 7.3% 30.8%	13 23.6% 28.9%	2 3.6% 13.3%	30 54.5% 21.0%	55 18.9%
<u>2 or more</u>	1 8.3% 4.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	6 50.0% 13.3%	1 8.3% 6.7%	4 33.3% 2.8%	12 4.1%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Cultural (Ethnic) Associations	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	36 21.3% 100.0%	33 19.5% 94.3%	6 3.6% 66.7%	36 21.3% 85.7%	2 1.2% 100.0%	56 33.1% 96.6%	169 92.9%
<u>1</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 16.7% 5.7%	3 25.0% 33.3%	6 50.0% 14.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 8.3% 1.7%	12 6.6%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 100.0% 1.7%	1 0.5%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Education (Inclusive) Associations

(1939--over 42)

Education (Inclusive) Associations	Ethnic Origin						
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni</u> <u>Vhora</u>	<u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa.</u> <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	44 11.6% 77.2%	70 18.5% 85.4%	15 4.0% 88.2%	66 17.5% 91.7%	36 9.5% 90.0%	147 38.9% 68.7%	378 78.4%
<u>1</u>	12 14.0% 21.1%	9 10.5% 11.0%	2 2.3% 11.8%	6 7.0% 8.3%	3 3.5% 7.5%	54 62.8% 25.2%	86 17.8%
<u>2 or more</u>	1 5.6% 1.8%	3 16.7% 3.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 5.6% 2.5%	13 72.2% 6.1%	18 3.7%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Education (Inclusive) Associations	Ethnic Origin						
	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni</u> <u>Vhora</u>	<u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa.</u> <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	35 8.3% 97.2%	112 26.6% 87.5%	13 3.1% 81.3%	93 22.1% 96.9%	12 2.9% 100.0%	156 37.1% 79.6%	421 87.0%
<u>1</u>	1 1.9% 2.8%	14 25.9% 10.9%	3 5.6% 18.8%	3 5.6% 3.1%	0 0.0% 0.0%	33 61.1% 16.8%	54 11.2%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 22.2% 1.6%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	7 77.8% 3.6%	9 1.9%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Education (Inclusive) Associations

(1971--43-59)

Education (Inclusive) Associations	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni</u> <u>Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic</u> <u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Origin</u> <u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa.</u> <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	20 9.2% 87.0%	45 20.6% 86.5%	9 4.1% 69.2%	36 16.5% 80.0%	12 5.5% 80.0%	96 44.0% 67.1%	218 74.9%
<u>1</u>	3 6.5% 13.0%	4 8.7% 7.7%	4 8.7% 30.8%	3 6.5% 6.7%	3 6.5% 20.0%	29 63.0% 20.3%	46 15.8%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 11.1% 5.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	6 22.2% 13.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	18 66.7% 12.6%	27 9.3%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Education (Inclusive) Associations	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni</u> <u>Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic</u> <u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Origin</u> <u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa.</u> <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	33 21.0% 91.7%	30 19.1% 85.7%	8 5.1% 88.9%	39 24.8% 92.9%	1 0.6% 50.0%	46 29.3% 79.3%	157 86.3%
<u>1</u>	2 11.8% 5.6%	4 23.5% 11.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 5.9% 2.4%	1 5.9% 50.0%	9 52.9% 15.5%	17 9.3%
<u>2 or more</u>	1 12.5% 2.8%	1 12.5% 2.9%	1 12.5% 11.1%	2 25.0% 4.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 37.5% 5.2%	8 4.4%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Education (Religious) Associations

(1939--over 42)

Education (Religious) Associations	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Origin Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	44 10.1% 77.2%	61 14.0% 74.4%	17 3.9% 100.0%	70 15.1% 97.2%	39 8.9% 97.5%	205 47.0% 95.8%	436 90.5%
<u>1</u>	13 31.7% 22.8%	17 41.5% 20.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 4.9% 2.8%	1 2.4% 2.5%	8 19.5% 3.7%	41 8.5%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	4 80.0% 4.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 20.0% 0.5%	5 1.0%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Education (Religious) Associations	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Origin Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	34 7.6% 94.4%	104 23.2% 81.3%	16 3.6% 100.0%	95 21.2% 99.0%	12 2.7% 100.0%	188 41.9% 95.9%	449 92.8%
<u>1</u>	2 6.1% 5.6%	23 69.7% 18.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 3.0% 1.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	7 21.2% 3.6%	33 6.8%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 50.0% 0.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 50.0% 0.5%	2 0.4%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Education (Religious) Associations

(1971--43-59)

Education (Religious) Associations	<u>Memar</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Kath. <u>Hindu</u>	Origin Surtee <u>Hindu</u>	Other <u>Pa. I.</u>	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	18 7.0% 78.3%	41 15.9% 78.8%	12 4.7% 92.3%	40 15.5% 88.9%	10 3.9% 66.7%	137 53.1% 95.8%	258 88.7%
<u>1</u>	5 17.2% 21.7%	10 34.5% 19.2%	1 3.4% 7.7%	5 17.2% 11.1%	3 10.3% 20.0%	5 17.2% 3.5%	29 10.0%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 25.0% 1.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 50.0% 13.3%	1 25.0% 0.7%	4 1.4%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Education (Religious) Associations	<u>Memar</u>	Sunni <u>Vhora</u>	Ethnic Kath. <u>Hindu</u>	Origin Surtee <u>Hindu</u>	Other <u>Pa. I.</u>	Not Pa. <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	34 19.5% 94.4%	33 19.0% 94.3%	9 5.2% 100.0%	41 23.6% 97.6%	2 1.1% 100.0%	55 31.6% 94.8%	174 95.6%
<u>1</u>	2 25.0% 5.6%	2 25.0% 5.7%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 12.5% 2.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 37.5% 5.2%	8 4.4%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Education (Ethnic) Associations

(1939--over 42)

Education (Ethnic) Associations	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni</u> <u>Vhora</u>	<u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa.</u> <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	54 12.3% 94.7%	81 18.4% 98.8%	16 3.6% 94.1%	60 13.6% 83.3%	38 8.6% 95.0%	191 43.4% 89.3%	440 91.3%
<u>1</u>	3 7.7% 5.3%	1 2.6% 1.2%	1 2.6% 5.9%	12 30.8% 16.7%	2 5.1% 5.0%	20 51.3% 9.3%	39 8.1%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	3 100.0% 1.4%	3 0.6%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Education (Ethnic) Associations	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni</u> <u>Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic Origin</u> <u>Kath.</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee</u> <u>Hindu</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa.</u> <u>Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	33 7.3% 91.7%	123 27.3% 96.1%	16 3.5% 100.0%	85 18.8% 88.5%	9 2.0% 75.0%	185 41.0% 94.4%	451 93.2%
<u>1</u>	3 9.1% 8.3%	5 15.2% 3.9%	0 0.0% 0.0%	11 33.3% 11.5%	3 9.1% 25.0%	11 33.3% 5.6%	33 6.8%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Education (Ethnic) Associations

(1971--43-59)

Education (Ethnic) Associations	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	22 8.2% 95.7%	50 18.7% 96.2%	12 4.5% 92.3%	39 14.6% 86.7%	14 5.2% 93.3%	130 48.7% 90.9%	267 91.8%
<u>1</u>	1 4.8% 4.3%	2 9.5% 3.8%	1 4.8% 7.7%	5 23.8% 11.1%	1 4.8% 6.7%	11 52.4% 7.7%	21 7.2%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 33.3% 2.2%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 66.7% 1.4%	3 1.0%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Education (Ethnic) Associations	<u>Memar</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	Row Total
<u>None</u>	35 20.0% 97.2%	35 20.0% 100.0%	8 4.6% 88.9%	39 22.3% 92.9%	2 1.1% 100.0%	56 32.0% 96.6%	175 96.2%
<u>1</u>	1 16.7% 2.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 16.7% 11.1%	2 33.3% 4.8%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 33.3% 3.4%	6 3.3%
<u>2 or more</u>	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 100.0% 2.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 0.5%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Travel to India

(1939--over 42)

Travel to India	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic Origin</u>		<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	<u>Row Total</u>
			<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>			
<u>None</u>	52	76	14	70	36	184	432
<u>Listed</u>	12.0%	17.6%	3.2%	16.2%	8.3%	42.6%	89.6%
	91.2%	92.7%	82.4%	97.2%	90.0%	86.0%	
<u>1 or more</u>	5	6	3	2	4	30	50
	10.0%	12.0%	6.0%	4.0%	8.0%	60.0%	10.4%
	8.8%	7.3%	17.6%	2.8%	10.0%	14.0%	
Column Total	57	82	17	72	40	214	482
	11.8%	17.0%	3.5%	14.9%	8.3%	44.4%	100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Travel to India	<u>Memam</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Ethnic Origin</u>		<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	<u>Row Total</u>
			<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>			
<u>None</u>	29	115	13	96	12	180	445
<u>Listed</u>	6.5%	25.8%	2.9%	21.6%	2.7%	40.4%	91.9%
	80.6%	89.8%	81.3%	100.0%	100.0%	91.8%	
<u>1 or more</u>	7	13	3	0	0	16	39
	17.9%	33.3%	7.7%	0.0%	0.0%	41.0%	8.1%
	19.4%	10.2%	18.8%	0.0%	0.0%	8.2%	
Column Total	36	128	16	96	12	196	484
	7.4%	26.4%	3.3%	19.8%	2.5%	40.5%	100.0%

Travel to India

(1971--43-59)

Travel to India	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None Listed</u>	15 6.5% 65.2%	44 19.1% 84.6%	11 4.8% 84.6%	25 10.9% 55.6%	8 3.5% 53.3%	127 55.2% 88.8%	230 79.0%
<u>1 or more</u>	8 13.1% 34.8%	8 13.1% 15.4%	2 3.3% 15.4%	20 32.8% 44.4%	7 11.5% 46.7%	16 26.2% 11.2%	61 21.0%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Travel to India	Ethnic Origin						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None Listed</u>	28 18.5% 77.8%	30 19.9% 85.7%	7 4.6% 77.8%	28 18.5% 66.7%	2 1.3% 100.0%	56 37.1% 96.6%	151 83.0%
<u>1 or more</u>	8 25.8% 22.2%	5 16.1% 14.3%	2 6.5% 22.2%	14 45.2% 33.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 6.5% 3.4%	31 17.0%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

Foreign Associational Activities

(1939--over 42)

Foreign Associational Activities	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	42 10.2% 73.7%	62 15.0% 75.6%	15 3.6% 88.2%	56 13.6% 77.8%	32 7.8% 80.0%	205 49.8% 95.8%	412 85.5%
<u>Some</u>	15 21.4% 26.3%	20 28.6% 24.4%	2 2.9% 11.8%	16 22.9% 22.2%	8 11.4% 20.0%	9 12.9% 4.2%	70 14.5%
Column Total	57 11.8%	82 17.0%	17 3.5%	72 14.9%	40 8.3%	214 44.4%	482 100.0%

(1939--27-42)

Foreign Associational Activities	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	30 7.0% 83.3%	106 24.6% 82.8%	13 3.0% 81.3%	86 20.0% 89.6%	7 1.6% 58.3%	189 43.9% 96.4%	431 89.0%
<u>Some</u>	6 11.3% 16.7	22 41.5% 17.2%	3 5.7% 18.8%	10 18.9% 10.4%	5 9.4% 41.7%	7 13.2% 3.6%	53 11.0%
Column Total	36 7.4%	128 26.4%	16 3.3%	96 19.8%	12 2.5%	196 40.5%	484 100.0%

Foreign Associational Activities

(1971--43-59)

Foreign Associational Activities	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	22 7.8% 95.7%	52 18.5% 100.0%	12 4.3% 92.3%	40 14.2% 88.9%	13 4.6% 86.7%	142 50.5% 99.3%	281 96.6%
<u>Some</u>	1 10.0% 4.3%	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 10.0% 7.7%	5 50.0% 11.1%	2 20.0% 13.3%	1 10.0% 0.7%	10 3.4%
Column Total	23 7.9%	52 17.9%	13 4.5%	45 15.5%	15 5.2%	143 49.1%	291 100.0%

(1971--26-42)

Foreign Associational Activities	Ethnic Origins						Row Total
	<u>Meman</u>	<u>Sunni Vhora</u>	<u>Kath. Hindu</u>	<u>Surtee Hindu</u>	<u>Other Pa. I.</u>	<u>Not Pa. Origin</u>	
<u>None</u>	36 20.0% 100.0%	35 19.4% 100.0%	8 4.4% 88.9%	41 22.8% 97.6%	2 1.1% 100.0%	58 32.2% 100.0%	180 98.9%
<u>Some</u>	0 0.0% 0.0	0 0.0% 0.0%	1 50.0% 11.1%	1 50.0% 2.4%	0 0.0% 0.0%	0 0.0% 0.0%	2 1.1%
Column Total	36 19.8%	35 19.2%	9 4.9%	42 23.1%	2 1.1%	58 31.9%	182 100.0%

APPENDIX B

Case Study Interview Excerpts

This appendix consists of interview excerpts used for coding the communal consciousness and political ideology variables appearing in Chapter 5 (along with the original codes and re-codes I issued to them). These excerpts are only a miniscule portion of the complete interviews, which focused primarily on personal and family life experiences. Most interviewees were eager to express certain views about their cultural life and the political situation in South Africa, and their statements appearing below are recorded as accurately as possible.

The first set of excerpts focuses on the realm of cultural life that the interviewee discussed the most. Although some statements are short, many interviewees were brief in expressing their views. I

included all ideological statements, separating statements made at disparate points in the interview by two slash marks (/). I matched the collected statements to the best-fitting codes (defined in Chapter 5), and the inward-turning coded statements are theorized to depict cultural impediments to solidarity with outsiders and the outward-turning cultural potentialities.

I also list a code-name and the ethnic origins and occupational location of the interviewee. The second to last letter of each code-name represents the age-cohort of the interviewee (o for older--over 65, m for middle--35-60, and y for younger--18-30). The distinction between small and large business owner/partner/director was made by meeting the criterion of trade volume (wholesale and import/export being large), or number of salaried employees (over 10 being large). Professionals (doctors, lawyers, teachers) were classified as either employed or self-employed if they were a small business owner.

The second set of statements refers to political ideology. Some communal consciousness statements have obvious political overtones, but they are not expressions of political ideology pure and simple as are these assertions. One can use the code-names to match the 25 interviewees (out of 50) who asserted codable views on both their communal consciousness and political ideology. Likewise, one can go

back to Chapter 5 for definitions of the political ideological codes and methodological constraints in gathering this information. Some of these interviewees also made statements used in Chapter 2 on ethnic culture and ties to India, and their respective code-names appear in that chapter.

1). Communal Consciousness

The Hindus in Kathiawar made the error in expelling the backbone of all of Kathiawar, the Memans, who made Kathiawar flourish because they had the money and they spent the money. The others were living on them. When they left, the economy was retarded. The villages became poor whereas when the Memans came into the villages they willingly spent their money. They came four months in the year because they traded for eight months and then came back home and spent their money. They would get their children married in those villages and bring in dancers from all of India, bring in bands, and all kinds of events. They entertained the whole city, and they spent money lavishly. The majority of people lived on them. Thanks to that, Pakistan has gained from the Memans, and today is flourishing.// A Meman, particularly, is motivated to avoid working for anybody in his life--he wants to do something on his own. This is in him. He doesn't want to sleep, he wants to make money. That's an instinct, that's in him. This is the progress of mankind in the world. If you don't get that kind of people, there would be no progress and people wouldn't be making a living.

(Bzkoa: Inflationary -- Ethnic origins)
(Inward Turning)
(Meman Muslim; large business)

Owing to my daughter's interest in education, learning, I am here. I can't leave her alone here. But I wish to go to my home in India. I love it. I like the country. I like the people. Here I am alone. Everybody is busy in their business here.//She doesn't want to go to Surat to live because all her relatives say India is no good. They say people there are lazy, but they are not lazy. My nephews and nieces have moved to the United States, but not to India.

(Dzcoa: Isolationist -- Regional origins)
(Inward Turning)
(Sunni Vohra Muslim; small business)

I bathe, light my lamp, read the Gita, and ask for God's forgiveness. That's all. I don't believe in asking God for anything else. I don't make offerings. Most other women do that three to four times a day. I rejected that, and I rejected the caste system.//I believe God is one--I don't go to Temple or do ceremonies, not for death or anything. My religion starts with sacrifice. You must give up things you like. I fasted for seven days once with my husband. We were only on water. It was very hard.

(Gznoa: Reflective-Adaptive -- Religion)

(Outward Turning)

(Kathiawadi Hindu female; professional -- small business)

Why I like India is because it is an old, 4000 year old country, and India has got its own art and traditions. I don't mind if the religion is different. Your religion is good enough for you and my Islam is good enough for me. We all have the same God.// The Koran is a wonderful book. I'll give you the meaning of just one verse alone and that will put you on the right track. The verse says, "Before your lifespan is over in this world, whatever you do good, you send it towards the Almighty. Whatever you achieved and left behind after you depart from this earth will also be noted, and on the day of judgement you will be rewarded accordingly."

(Mzhooa: Egalitarian -- Religion)

(Outward Turning)

(Meman Muslim; large business)

When I went to London, I lost my inferiority. I stayed for a few months there and I was mixing like an equal. Here, when you see a Dutchman, you must go, "Oh Bass," or, "Nooi." You had to make them feel big, not as an equal. They say, "I am your superior, so treat me like one." The Indian took it for granted and said, "Oh, what's the difference as long as they pay us." When I came back from London, I thought every human being is the same.// My friends are racially mixed. I mix with anybody who has got the same ideas as mine.

(Mztoa: Integrationist and Egalitarian -- Race)

(Outward Turning)

(Meman Muslim; large business)

We have to work hard for our living. We never used to go out to anything except to the Kathiawari events. The Seva Samaj is like the Kathiawari people all one. It's all Kathiawar people--there's no other people in this Samaj. All my friends are there.// I played football and I played cricket, not for any match or anything. I was only friendly with the members of the club I played with, the Kathiawar Club.

(Mzonoa: Isolationist -- Ethnic Origins)
(Inward Turning)
(Kathiawadi Hindu; small business)

When I arrived in Durban, V.N. Naik came to meet me and I stayed with him. We traveled by donkey carts and horse carts. The rich people had their motor cars. I then traveled to Kimberly. I had no friends there. I had to stay there in the country with only my one family. I stayed very quiet. Fruits and vegetables came from Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, and the Transvaal. My groceries came from Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. I worked from early morning to 10 P.M. I read the Gujarati papers and Gujarati books. There were mostly Afrikaners, but Africans used to come to the shop, Hottentrots and Bushmen and also Coloureds. They were laborers. I preferred to keep to myself.// I now live with my son in Overport. I only have a few friends. They're Gujarati Hindu. If you've got a family and are surrounded by African people, you can't mix, so you develop the habit of staying alone. We are surrounded by Gujarati Muslim people in Overport. We don't mix with them. I don't get into town too often because my daughter-in-law usually stays at home. In England, the royal family only goes out a few times in a year. The same occurs with us.

(Nzioa: Isolationist -- Ethnic origins)
(Inward Turning)
(Surtee Hindu; small business)
(Translated from Gujarati)

Jews, Christians, and Hindus are all children of God, but have different opinions. I don't hate and I believe we must not quarrel.// But as far as our community is concerned, Islam says you must serve the community, because God is so kind. He gives us the sun, rain, and bread. God is so kind and he says, "You mustn't hate anybody for the sake of their religion." You and I are of different religions, but as humans we are one. You follow? I must respect all humanity and never degrade anyone.// The old people are much more fanatic and the younger people are much more flexible in understanding religion. I think this is good because we now realize day by day, more and more, how to respect humanity. I believe very strongly that if the whole world could understand this, we could live in peace.

(Ozmoa: Egalitarian and Reflective-Adaptive -- Religion)
(Outward Turning)
(Sunni Vohra Muslim; small business)

Most of the Hindu Gujaratis belong to Lord Krishna. Some go to Radha Soami, but all belong to Lord Krishna. The younger generation asks, "Why are you worshipping this?" Before we never asked why. We followed one way--what our parents do we do. We didn't ask questions, but now the younger generation wants to know why we do this and why we do that. So now that is what this group is doing, making it easy for the younger generation to follow tradition. We all believe in Lord Krishna.// In every Hindu house, you'll find a Lord Krishna. My granddaughters listen to whatever my daughter-in-law says. She says "You have to do prayers," and they do it. She says "You have to fast on this day," and they do it.

(Pzroa: Fixational -- Religion)
(Inward Turning)
(Kathiawadi Hindu female; large business)
(Translated from Gujarati)

I started by being interested in some of his books, and when I was convinced that this is the Messenger, I wrote to him asking for initiation. He once came to South Africa. To be a member, you must believe that God created everything and that there should be no discrimination. Also, you must be a vegetarian and consume no alcohol or drugs.// We're in a transition period today. When it's over, when everything is back to normal, I suppose people will think in common morals--that this is wrong and this is right. We won't be going backwards in history because we will absorb some things from the West. But we must know where to draw the line, because a lot of things that belong to the West and the East as well are bad.// Many Muslims believe that if you're not a Muslim, you're a heathen. Hindus are not worried about what religion a man belongs to; we're all created by God and religion is man-made, not God-made. We believe in reincarnation, but the main things don't differ in our writings. It is not in the Hindu religion to worship idols. We're actually worshipping God; the idol is only a manifestation of God. Furthermore, I don't hate a Moslem because of his religion. I may dislike him for his personal politics, but not just because of his religion. It depends on the individual.

(Sznoa: Reflective-Adaptive -- Religion)
(Outward Turning)
(Kathiawadi Hindu; small business)

We believe every man who is a Moslem is a brother with each other, whether he's black, white, green, or yellow. This has been proved in the Pilgrimage, because you get everybody from every corner of the earth come in. To show you're a brother and there's equality, everybody is dressed alike in just white.// I don't like to talk against any religion, but the Hindus have got no religion. They've got 500 gods. Someone prays to a snake and they say, "He's a very high man." Somebody prays to the sea and they say, "He's the highest everything--he's a God." Mahatma Gandhi, he's a human being just like us, but they believe that he's God. I don't say he's God. I tell people he's a nice man, but not God. Hinduism is no religion. I don't want to criticize anybody. Somebody said, "An elephant is a God." What is this? It's got no sense. They believe in idols. They pray to idols.

(Tzyoa: Inflationary -- Religion)
(Inward Turning)
(Meman Muslim; large business)
(Translated from Gujarati)

Hinduism has too many restrictions. You mustn't touch this, you mustn't touch that; you mustn't do this, you mustn't do that. The Hindus have caste system. A Hindu is a Hindu, why have caste?// Hindus believe in too many gods. Some just believe in Lord Krishna. I can see that the Muslims have unity--one God gives unity. If we have many gods, we come to arguments. I believe like Muslims--one God. All Muslims get together at mosque at 12 o'clock. We have the Arya Samaj which talks of unity, but no unity. Although we talk that all Muslims are united, I don't believe that. But they help each other financially, which does not happen with Hindus.

(Mzhoa: Reflective-Adaptive -- Religion)
(Outward Turning)
(Kathiawadi Hindu; small business)

Today caste system is gone. There is an adulteration of culture. In University, you don't advance. Boys and girls mix. We believe in good seed. Seed is the man, woman is the ground.// The high caste male is sought after like a precious stallion. Girls come to us with a dowry. But that is all gone now. A man will waste his blood on a girl for 10 rands.// My daughter-in-law won't come in front of us. She is not allowed to. She must cover her face. This is nearly all gone now. Although my grandchildren are university students, they are nowhere near our culture. University culture is parrot like, mechanical. They speak English like a parrot--"put, put, put".// After I arrived in Natal, I went to a shop to buy shoes. Without thinking, I tied the strings. A fellow Hindu came to me and reminded me that I was touching leather, which is polluting to our Brahmin caste. I asked, "But here, does it matter?" I was told, "It matters everywhere. You carry your ritual and your rules with you. Bhai, now you must wash your hands." I humbly left to wash my hands and learned a valuable lesson--you carry your ritual and rules wherever you go.

(Tzaoa: Inflationary and Fixational -- caste)
(Inward Turning)
(Kathiawadi Hindu; large business)

As regards all standards whereby human greatness may be measured, we may well ask is there any man greater than Mohammed? Thomas Carlisle says the word of such a man is a voice from nature's own heart. Men do and must listen to that as to nothing else. All else is wind in comparison. Rubbish. He received many beautiful tributes from Western scholars. But why don't they accept Islam? I have a right to ask. You know, those guys, they're hypocrites. If you say the greatest, most influential man is Mohammed, the greatest leader is Mohammed, in fact, the Encyclopedia Britannica says the most successful of all religious personalities is Mohammed, then why not accept Islam? It is a sickness to say that Mohammed is so great and then to reject Islam.// Forty different authors produced the Bible, all learned men. An illiterate man, one man, produced the Koran, and it answers all your problems, all your questions. You can't help agreeing with him.

(Dzeoa: Inflationary -- Religion)

(Inward Turning)

(Sunni Vohra Muslim; professional -- employed)

The Kathiawar Seva Samaj and the Surat Hindu Association are the main bodies of Gujarati society. They are regional groups. The Arya Samaj movement is general--not for Surat, not for Kathiawar, not for Hindi, and not for Tamil. Most followers are now Hindi-speaking, about 90 percent, but there are some Tamils and Gujaratis also, and in America and other places there are some white followers. It's not a linguistic group or regional group. It's a religious movement with influence from the Hindi-speaking Nationalist movement. We have some members from the Kathiawar Seva Samaj and the Surat Hindu Association. Our temple holds about 300 people.

(Vzdoa: Integrationist -- Ethnic origins)

(Outward Turning)

(Surtee Hindu; professional -- employed)

Up to a few years ago, my contact with whites was mainly with the English-speaking. The Afrikaner seems to have come in large numbers to Natal in the last 10 years or so. You must realize that a great deal of their attitude has been due to misunderstanding. They just have been ignorant and there's been no communication with the other side. You find once they come to know you, there's a greater understanding.// Each country has its own fascination, like India has a tremendous charm, and yet having grown up in Natal and having been educated in English, in many respects I feel more comfortable in London.

(Fzooma: Integrationist -- Race)
(Outward Turning)
(Meman Muslim; large business)

For the last 25, 30 years, I've been trying to meet across the racial border and explain to them my point of view. I would give charity to any of the organizations and get criticism from my people. I say "No, I don't want apartheid in reverse." I want to look after everybody in my own little way.

(Ezrma: Integrationist -- Race)
(Outward Turning)
(Meman Muslim; large business)

There's a book you might find very interesting called Hindu Superiority. I don't think you'll find it in the library. It covers many philosophical and historical topics. It shows the close similarity between Latin and the Sanskrit language. It explains medicine and the science of astronomy. The Hindu astronomers worked out that one year was 365 days 1000 years ago and today it's 365 1/4 days. Lots of information is in this book, like the science of mathematics. It's very, very advanced. It shows the advances of Hinduism in the early days and how they advanced more than any of the other countries and how the influence of Hinduism has spread to many countries of the world.// The way of life of the Moslem and the Hindu are totally different. In India, the Moslems are a very self-centered community and even in this country, too, you will find in Moslem stores, Moslems being employed. They give preference to their own kith and kin. You will find this amongst the Moslems but not amongst the Hindus.

(Pztma: Inflationary -- Religion)
(Inward Turning)
(Surtee Hindu; professional -- small business)

My husband and I go very, very out of our way to make friends with all South Africans. We entertain a lot of Africans, Coloreds, and Europeans in our home. When they invite us, we make a point of going out because we feel that is very important. But, we went as ourselves--as Indians. No one was going to mistake us for anybody else. We made it clear that we were not going to drink, eat meat that was not kosher, or wear western clothing.

(Mzuma: Integrationist -- Race)

(Outward Turning)

(Sunni Vohra Muslim female; professional -- small business)

I regard religion as very important to a person's background. Every religion teaches basically the same thing--to try to keep a person morally and socially proper. Mohammed is to us as Jesus is to Christians.

(Azlma: Egalitarian -- Religion)

(Outward Turning)

(Sunni Vohra Muslim; employed -- manager)

In the Bhagavad Gita, Chapter 4 verse 8, it says, "Whenever there is unrighteousness in this world, I manifest myself and come down to put down unrighteousness and bring about the rule of righteousness." That is why we believe there are so many saints and prophets. We accept Jesus Christ as a great leader and a prophet. Even Mohammad is accepted because he came at a particular time and period when somebody was needed to awaken them from the rot in which society had fallen. Perhaps one is due soon because of the way society is going. We need a re-awakening.

(Bzoma: Egalitarian -- Religion)

(Outward Turning)

(Surtee Hindu; large business)

Most of the guys that I know, that have become socially and politically aware--it is not important where we came from, but this is our country. We don't look at ourselves as being Indians. There are parts of us that may be called Indian like eating with our hands, eating certain foods, but they don't qualify us as being Indians and not South Africans.// I'm quite fair-skinned, but when I say "How's it?" to a black guy, he'll generally say "How's it?"

(Bzoya: Integrationist -- Race)
(Outward Turning)
(Sunni Vohra Muslim; employed -- clerical)

I enjoyed that year in India--I felt really at home. The Indian people treat you very well. You feel you belong to that culture. When I want to Australia, I went to Sydney just for a holiday. You'd see white, white, and maybe once in a week you'd see a black face and you'd feel happy. I'm sure the same would apply in your case if you went to India.// I've only had relationships with some whites from the business point of view. Socially, we haven't mixed that much, basically because we feel at home with our own.

(Bzaya: Isolationist -- Race)
(Inward Turning)
(Surtee Hindu; small business)

We didn't worry about who was Hindu or who was Muslim. I can't remember my parents saying, "Don't go to the Hindu temple." I remember on Eid day when we slaughtered the animals, the Tamils used to help cut up and distribute the meat. In the fasting month, you fast from sunrise to sunset, and a light at the top of the minarat went on at sunset, signalling the end of fasting and call to prayer. Usually there are a few Gujarati words that you say, and the little kids in the neighborhood would shout, "The light is on, the light is on," and these were Tamil and Gujarati Hindu kids, even though they weren't fasting. It was a community thing. If you were too far to hear the "Azaar", the call to prayer, you would sit up on the roof of one of the houses and look. I remember spending my Deepvali, which is the Hindu celebration, at a Hindu guy's home. His father would give us fireworks and they celebrated by bursting fireworks and all the Muslim kids would be there.// I am more tolerant towards non-Muslims and other types of Muslims than are some groups, like the Tabliques. You get some people who appear to be the best Indian Muslims in the world--look at their Mosques--all the external features are there. But in things like paying proper wages, treating servants like human beings, I don't think they carry out those religious instructions as well as they should.

(Czocya: Integrationist and Egalitarian -- Religion)

(Outward Turning)

(Sunni Vohra Muslim; employed -- bank analyst)

My grandparents and my parents and I all think alike. The Muslim religion is a form of life--a way of life--a whole way of life, which is totally different from any other religion, whether it be in business or home life or the type of food that we eat.// I personally don't pray five times a day. It's not that I have a specific reason--I have no argument for not praying five times a day. I cannot say I don't have the time or I'm lame, it's just a point of laziness. Sure, I would like to pray five times a day. That is a goal for me.// The way of dressing, the way of living, the way of education, everything should be perfectly based on the Koran. It is a perfect book. It gives you solutions to all problems. It tells you why you should and why you shouldn't. In other words, it's based on logic.// It's very difficult for me to try and explain the Hindu religion. It's very illogical to me. It's very primitive and different than the Muslim religion. It's difficult to understand the logic because there is no logic. Also, in Christianity, you say that Jesus was the son of God. Why would God want to kill his son for mankind? You know it's no logic. You decide what it is.

(Ezrya: Inflationary and Fixational -- Religion)

(Inward Turning)

(Sunni Vohra Muslim; large business)

Jodiya became a major center in Gujarat because the "Jodiyawalas" are the richest people in South Africa. So what happens is every father's dream is that my daughter should marry into a nice rich family. So, most of the girls from Jodiya married into nice Jodiyawala families and the off-spring of Jodiya itself grew very large even though the village is small.// Very few grandparents of our generation were South African born but almost all of them came from Jodiya. We carry down the line--the blood runs right down.

(Hzsya: Inflationary -- Regional Origins)

(Inward Turning)

(Meman Muslim; large business)

Today people are freer to express their opinions. My parents couldn't have strong viewpoints when they were kids but had to accept the opinions of the older people. They've had to adapt to a lot, as for hundreds of generations, the mother and father had a lot of authority. To marry outside of the Khatri group, even a Meman who speaks almost the exact same language, was unheard of. Although the people were religious, I don't think they followed their religion properly. They only had to read the Koran in Arabic. They didn't know its meaning so much. So, their religion was more ritual than a sort of thinking, living, and understanding religion. These days the youngsters don't accept that. They want to follow their religion in its true form. To not marry someone just because they're not from the same language group is stupid and un-Islamic.// Our parents accepted a lot of things and we would question them and maybe feel a bit selfish. You will think, "No, this is definitely wrong," but at the same time you might feel you're being selfish for thinking or saying that. Our parents might have felt it but they would not question it.

(Jzggya: Integrationist and Reflective-Adaptive -- Ethnic Origins)

(Outward Turning)

(Khatri Muslim female; employed -- accountant)

One of my younger aunts, lower than my parent's generation, was saying, "I wouldn't like to marry a Meman because they're different from us." I said, "That's rubbish." Our generation doesn't think like that. We tend to prefer Muslims, but even then we'll think about it. To them, that would be disastrous. They're particular about Meman, Urdu-speaking, etc. They want us to marry, preferably, someone from our own background. Myself, at this moment in time, background doesn't matter to me.// My parents were very broad-minded. We were never brought up to think in terms of Hindu, Tamil, Meman, Urdu, etc. Everybody was a person and my parents didn't think two hoots about it. When I came to Durban for my last year of schooling, I faced a terribly closed Muslim community. Everyone with my background was totally oriented to one another being a pure Surtee Muslim, who were supposedly superior to everyone else. I wasn't brought up with that.

(Fzocya: Integrationist and Egalitarian -- Ethnic Origins)
(Outward Turning)
(Sunni Vohra Muslim female; professional -- employed)

Hinduism isn't the only religion that worships idols. For instance, Muslims believe that once in their lifetime they should go to their holy place Mecca. In Mecca, they worship a stone. They believe there's God in it. That's the same as I do. They hang pictures of Mecca on their wall and believe that's their home. If it's for show, why not hang other pictures on the wall? The purpose is when you look at that picture, you think about Allah. With Christians, it's the same with a picture of Jesus Christ. When you see the photo, you may say, "Oh Lord, help me." You feel the Lord is there.// Like Gandhi, I believe all religions are equal. Each religion is a branch going to one place, that is, God.// I personally believe that a Brahmin should be married to a Brahmin. My wife is Brahmin. I don't believe that I mustn't mix with a Harijan. I can eat across the table with him. He's not polluting or anything.

(Jzsya: Egalitarian -- Religion)
(Outward Turning)
(Surtee Hindu; employed -- accountant)

In fact, my best friends were either Muslims or Christians, not Gujarati Hindus. I kept my first Ramadan fast when I was about seven or eight simply because my friends kept it--it wasn't a religious decision. Because my friends were fasting, I felt mean having a cool drink in between, so I knew I had to do fast. We would go to the corner and watch for the light at the Mosque and come back shouting, "The light has been lit," and you can break the fast. My mother didn't mind that, but my granny thought I shouldn't be doing that--that it was really bad stuff.// I had a pretty serious religious upbringing in that I was told the tales, I was told the myths and legends, we had the ritual at home, but the whole attitude was I think more liberal and the way it should be taught to children. On the other hand, my cousins were forced every morning to light the lamp and say their prayers and then go to school and come back and do it again as a routine. Mine wasn't a routine. I was asked, "Do you want to take part?" If I didn't want to, but wanted to play with a ball outside, I'd play with the ball. So, although it was there and I was involved in it, it wasn't as rigid as what my cousins had. I used to pass a church on my way to school everyday and I told my mom, "I want to go to the church today." She said, "Go ahead, have a look," so I went in and it's a great place to be--a nice quiet place and that was it. My parents have this open ended attitude that to me was very fruitful.

(Lzkya: Integrationist and Reflective-Adaptive -- Religion)

(Outward Turning)

(Kathiawadi Hindu; professional -- small business)

I went to standard six at Orient, then I went to High School in Swaziland. It was a private school. They taught the British system, and my parents thought it would be a better education. I wasn't hesitant to go there. Even friends I have made there have come and stayed at my house and I've gone to stay at their house. We still keep in touch even now. I met a lot of different people there, people from all over the world, virtually from every country, including England, America, and Australia, but mainly from the surrounding African countries. It was an exclusive school, where diplomat's children went, even Chinese from the Republic of China. It was co-ed, which Orient High School was not, and a boarding school as well. So, the life was completely different, but I didn't have any problems adjusting to this new environment.// I have no hang-ups about any races at all, I've mixed with all types of people. They've been to my home and I've been to their's. At boarding school, we stayed in the same room with each other for five years. I have had girlfriends from all races. Then again it's unusual that I went to Swaziland because I wouldn't have mixed as much if I was here all the time.

(Mzyya: Integrationist -- Race)

(Outward Turning)

(Sunni Vohra Muslim; professional -- employed)

We believe we are the people of the book--we don't pray to any idols or anything like that. We have an answer for everything. It's in the book, it's in the Koran. I believe that the book is genuine. You know something, the Koran was written 1400 years ago and it predicted the moon landing and it also predicted that in a certain year a foreign tribe would storm Mecca, and on that day there was a storming of the Holy Place. The Koran is the only Holy book. I've been to places where the Hindus pray and it sort of scares the hell out of you. You go into a Temple and it's sort of a funeral. They do things in a sort of mystic way. It's not a straight-forward pure thing like getting into the Koran.// I lived with the clan on Albert Street. I had some terrific friends. We were like one big happy family although there were Hindis, Tamils, and banias living there as well. Now, my sort of friends are Muslims. Finally, you sort of get down to your own thing, your own bodies, your own type.// I tell you, I feel very good about being a Muslim. You know you feel a real brotherhood thing because after the prayer you shake hands with the people and come to terms with them. In fact I feel exhilarated and terrific to be honest with you.

(Mztya: Inflationary and Isolationist -- Religion)

(Inward Turning)

(Sunni Vohra Muslim; large business)

I play in a league with whites and I play at every single court and I shower with them. I have a meal at the club's house when the host invites me, which is frequent.// They claim our league is racist. My club has got fifty odd members. We've got sixteen clubs playing in leagues. I have one black African member, about ten white, ten Colored, and about 30 are Indians, which are from all parts of the Indian community. It's never been a case of what you are as long as you want to play and stick to the rules of the club. That's how I look at it. Whoever we play against--if we want to play an association and that association is prepared to treat us equally, then we play. But the other body, SACOS, feels it's fine playing squash with these white guys in the league, but then when you go home, if you take a bus, he must travel in his bus and you must travel in your bus, so that's not morally correct. While I see the merits of the argument, I don't think they are solving the problem.

(Pzaya: Integrationist -- Race)

(Outward Turning)

(Kathiawadi Hindu; employed -- accountant)

The most important aspects of Islam are first of all our five times a day prayers, and then you've got to follow the living style of the prophet Mohammed. We follow his way of dressing, his habits, his etiquette, and his morals. We have a very different way from Western civilization of everything, like the way you sit, the way you eat; we have a method for everything. There's a blessing and prayer for everything we do as well.// When we eat, we have to wash our hands, sit properly on the floor, be relaxed and pray. We don't eat luxuriously with tables, or chairs, or utensils. You eat with your right hand, with three fingers, and you eat a limited amount that satisfies you--you cannot eat too little or too much.// I haven't had much contact with non-Muslims. We do have contact, but we don't mix very much because I feel it's our habits--it's not right. It's not good to knock other religions, but I feel we have to follow our religion and not go to parties and all that. I don't know about your religion, but for many whites, their parties are their life. So if I mix with you, you may be going to a party, but I shouldn't go.// Most of the things today are very westernized. You can look at it yourself--the world is becoming too modern and time is going too fast because of the modern things in life...The use of television in our religion is forbidden. Music is also forbidden because music encourages you to start dancing, dancing encourages you to go to discos to show how good you can dance, and discos encourage you to start drinking. One evil leads to another. Also, you meet women at discos, which is very wrong. In Islam, you cannot mix with women until you are married. After mixing with a woman, you do funny things--it's all evil.//

I am very happy that you are doing your course task on the Moslems and I encourage you to become one. It's left in the hands of the Almighty and it's left to you. We cannot force you to become one, it's just that we can guide you and we'd like to be a brother to you. If you are a Moslem, you are a lot closer to us.

(Rzjya: Fixational and Isolationist -- Religion)
(Inward Turning)
(Sunni Vohra Muslim; student)

You must have already noticed the negative attitude among the race groups. Although we are in one country, we do not mix with each other. Their attitudes are different to ours and our attitudes are different from their's.// Our ideas won't change because we are already at the stage where we aren't mixing.// The African population increases very highly and I don't think there's many of them who know how to set up a family. Their whole lifestyle is different. They still have a lot of old ideas and they aren't getting rid of them, not being educated, so you would expect them to be different from your own group of people.// Everyone needs to keep their culture. otherwise life becomes too much the same, too monotonous. You've got to have your own ways--it's much more interesting.

(Vzsya: Isolationist -- Race)
(Inward Turning)
(Surtee Hindu; professional -- employed)

2). Political Ideology

South Africa is a nice country at the moment to live in. We have our problems, but everybody has their problems all over the world. All governments have to be harsh and ruthless to keep law and order. The people who agitate against a government and get into power are harsher than the previous government. This goes on from government to government and each government that comes in becomes uprooted because it is too ruthless. This is the situation in southern Africa. South Africa is a stable country as a whole. It's a country of honey and milk. The people who want to work can get their daily bread, but these loafers who don't want to work will eventually starve. Those who want to work can make a nice living.// I am politically motivated in my own way of thinking and this country has a lot of restrictions on speaking your own mind, but you express yourself in one way or the other. What's in you must come out of you. But still, the law is there and holds you back. As I've said, one unjust law in this country is the Group Areas Act, which has created a tragedy for the Indian community and likewise for the established Colored community. The African has always had the same tragedy because he had no place to stay and has been a migrant. He has suffered tremendously. The laws in this country have always been one-sided; creating rules without consulting people or understanding their problems. They move them out somewhere twenty miles out of town where no facilities exist, and it creates such frustration and bitterness in one's mind; 20 miles to work, 20 miles back, and there's no conveniences--one merely lives just for the sake of living. You become one of the machines of the economy. No one is consulted about anything that is done in this country. Everybody is told what to do.

(Bzkoa: Contradictory)

(Contradictory)

(Meman Muslim; large business)

I feel that two paths have been revealed to man--the right path and the wrong path. If we choose the wrong path then we will have to pay for it. Also we must not bow down to oppression because it is wrong to do so. But in being oppressed we must not oppress others. The oppression and repression in South Africa is very unjust and the time will come when the oppressors will have to pay for this.

(Czcoa: Liberal to Radical)
(All Subordinate Group Interests)
(Sunni Vohra Muslim female; small business)
(Translated from Gujarati)

If I talk in the politics way, actually I don't want to go into politics but the thing is connected to everything so I want to say that in this country, the politics of practically everyone is armchair politics for armchair works. Very few do politics in a practical way. They live in so much luxury, they can't make the sacrifices. In Gandhi's time, when he was in South Africa, they were not needing what we have and desire today. They were satisfied with a simple life. In that way, they could go to gaol. The new generation can't do that. They don't want to do hard work and do sacrifice, and without sacrifice, you don't get anything. That's a trouble. I hope you understand what I am saying.// In South Africa, the first problem is that there is a color bar. We non-Europeans--Indians, Africans and Coloreds, get half the wages of the European. In fact, Africans get half the wages of Indians. This is the thing we are fighting, and the other thing--they send us to this area but European people can stay where they like. If we stay in this place for 50 or 60 years, they can tell us "Go to Reservoir Hills or to that township." These are the things the people want to fight. Another thing--they are dividing us from the Africans and the Coloreds. We mustn't be one. They want to divide us and rule us. That's what they did in India--they divided the Hindus and the Muslims and kept on ruling until the end. Here they do the same thing; that's what I think. I am not calling myself a very big politician; I am just a single woman. I can't understand very well the politics, but what I say I am thinking.//

In Phoenix township, the Government makes the houses, but the rent is so high. The poor people can't pay. Now the African people are the poorest here, and they are more than us. But their children, they don't get free education--they must pay the fees and buy the books; and for us Indians, we get education free until High School; and for Europeans, they get all the education until college free, and they get the meals served in the school. We don't get meal service. We are fighting this and we are fighting a new Government system where they take some people from the Indian Community and put them on a council, we call them the SAIC and President's Council. We can't go straight to the Government now, we must tell them our views, and if they like, they will go and tell it to the Government. Myself, I'm thinking that's useless--they're just making money and sitting down there and doing nothing for us, because they know very well that if we go against the Government, they will come in trouble. So they just say, "Yes, yes, yes sir!" These people get some things from the Government. If they want their son to go to India, they quickly get a passport, or if they want to get something from India, they quickly get a permit, but the public people get nothing.

(Gznoa: Liberal to Radical)
(All Subordinate Group Interests)
(Kathiawadi Hindu female; professional -- small business)

I was a member of the Transvaal Indian Congress. In those days there was only one organization and then Dr. Dadoo came along and started passive resistance here. The others of us said "We mustn't conflict with the Government--we're simply trying to get as much as we can--we have no other way. We can't get it by fighting or taking up arms because we are such a small community." We were essentially a merchant community in the Transvaal--small businessmen. If our businesses and licenses are taken away, what can we do? So we have to have a compromise.// We found the Transvaal Indian Organization and we ran that for a little while and found it didn't work with the Government so we dissolved that. We said "If you can't help our people, it is better to be out of it."//

I would like to see a compromise with all the racial groups because as an Indian, I find the smallest minority is in the most precarious position. With a majority coming in they say everything, but when they come into power, we are no entity as far as special groups are concerned. We find in Uganda, in Kenya, in Tanzania, anywhere else, the people coming up want to get into business and they see a foreigner making money--they consider Indians as foreigners even though they may be citizens.

(Gzroa: Moderate)

(Ingroup Interests)

(Sunni Vohra Muslim; large business)

Today, a native of this soil, if he's 25 miles from here somewhere and he wants to come down and seek work, there's influx control. You must have heard that. Would you call that just? That breeds inward contempt against these types of laws and that brings rebellion.// I'm not trying to run the natives down, but it's my belief that they have a barbaric instinct. Even when you come across a very educated native, you can't eliminate the tradition.

(Mzyoa: Contradictory)

(Contradictory)

(Sunni Vohra Muslim; large business)

I haven't seen Gandhi because he left this country before I came here. But he left his mark here. For the Indians' sake, he did not do good because we Indians can't choose anything. Beggars cannot be choosers. Whatever we get, we must be thankful for it. Now there is no Indian question left.// In the Koran, it says, "All of this world belongs to God. Who he likes to put up, who he likes to bring down, that's his job."// We Indians are of no consequence. We are 800,000 which is nothing, a drop in the bucket, and that bucket is also leaking.

(Mzhoa: Apathetic-Fatalistic)

(Apathetic-Fatalistic)

(Meman Muslim; large business)

Dadoo was a little bit of a Communist and he was trying to bring everybody together; the black man must have the same rights as an Indian. Nana said, "No, we must look after our own business because if we look after them, we can't win because it would go against the government's policy and that would never help." So, he said, "We should look after ourselves first, and then after that we can help them." I liked Nana he was a good friend of mine. He was a hard worker who all the time looked after Indian interests.// Africans are different than us, but those are petty differences due to culture. A man with a good understanding would not look for all these small things. He will say, "Look at the general vision--all of humanity are one."// You don't find the Indian asking for charity. They'll find some work because they have inborn the idea of making a living. That instinct is among the Indian and the Jew. The African doesn't worry about tomorrow. They only live for today. The English people look after themselves. You don't find an Englishman unemployed. They have a good society and are well off. The Coloreds are happy go lucky. They also don't care about tomorrow.// Before the African had no education. Today they are learning more and more, and the idea of independence is growing in their minds and the idea that they are being treated as inferiors by whites. They think "Why must we work for them and have them getting everything? We are getting no benefits." That idea has come into their minds now, which is actually in a way, right.

(Mztoa: Contradictory)

(Contradictory)

(Meman Muslim; large business)

The British were good for South Africa. Today, the Afrikaners are good. One of the best countries to stay if you want to live is South Africa. No trouble. They give you every opportunity to do what you want. Now you saw in the news just now about the President's Council election. Now you see that is wrong. These people, they don't fight for the public. They fight themselves--that I want to be big--they fight against their members and there is no sense in that. All the fighting is that I want to be a big. Now these people got posts for themselves, but they are not fighting for the public. They're doing nothing for the public. It's their fault, not the South African Government's fault.// After the riots, the African people, bullets and knifing and all that thing, they still do. Before, any part of the night, after supper, we used to go walking as far as the beach on Soldiers Way. Now if you go, they will cut you, kill you, and throw away the knife.

(Mzonoa: Conservative)

(Ingroup Interests)

(Kathiawadi Hindu; small business)

The African people got very little love. Idi Amin in Uganda scooted out 18,000 Indians. Any African country got no feeling. Now, here they say, "That is an Indian, that is a European, that is a Colored and that is an African." The Africans are not religious. Religion makes you feeling, makes you love, and makes you kind.// If this country is given to the Africans, what would happen to the six million whites, the three million Coloreds, and the one million Indians? We will be put in a boat and dumped in the middle of the sea. This Government is doing the right thing. They talk about the bad Afrikaners, but this Government is doing the right thing. The Indian and the Coloured must understand what we must do. Combined, we have the power; separate, we lose the power. The African community gives very little love.// Our shop was in the white area. I had no difficulty with the white community. I had three children born by a white nurse and they gave them health. I couldn't say one word against the White people. They were mostly Afrikaners; very few English or Jew people. They stay in the big cities. I had to stay there in the country with only my one family. I stayed very quiet. Some of the Afrikaner people were rude to my family, but you just ignore them. You must zip your mouth, like or not like, you must not give your opinion. But I can't say the Afrikaner people are bad. They will look after you.

(Nzioa: Conservative)
(Ingroup Interests)
(Surtee Hindu; small business)
(Translated from Gujarati)

As a minority, you must be careful. We can't go against the majority people. They are also human beings who have the same rights as we want for ourselves. We have no right to think of ourselves as superior to them.// There is no intricate problem that you cannot solve. You can solve everything if you try and understand, without prejudice. But when a person comes in with a fixed idea, then you can't solve anything. We must understand each other and think with our conscious. If I feel what you say is just and fair, I will accept it. When we both accept what is just and fair--there is the solution.

(Ozmoa: Liberal)
(All Subordinate Group Interests)
(Sunni Vohra Muslim; small business)

All over the world there are problems, not just in South Africa. Whatever is going to happen is going to happen. You can't avoid it, so what's the use to fight. Which part of the world is peaceful, tell me? In America, there's a lot of trouble; in Canada, lots of trouble; in India, lots of trouble; in Pakistan, lots of trouble; in any African country, lots of trouble. You have to face it, you can't avoid it. What's going to happen to others is going to happen to us.

(Pzroa: Apathetic-Fatalistic)
(Apathetic-Fatalistic)
(Kathiawadi Hindu female; large business)
(Translated from Gujarati)

There must be free education for all and one type of education. There must be a special boost for the fellow at the bottom. He must have a five year program to bring him up on the 3 Rs, a crash program so he comes up and closes the gap. In a period of say 10 years for the Indian and 15 years for the African, they'll be able to solve their difficulties if you bring them all to power. There's no use saying you're going to do this on paper and do nothing in the end. If you say you want to give them something, then it should be done.// Income levels should take an evolutionary course. I don't say that here's an European man who's a technician in a factory and you take an African who does not measure to his standard and pay him the same salary. What you do, you slowly bring this man's salary up to that man's. You say that within five years from now, everybody is going to get equal pay provided that everyone has the same qualifications. If you haven't got it then the Government is not responsible, provided they have given you equal opportunity to attain that. Some occupations like a doctor require more money to qualify than in other occupations, so they should be paid more, but on the other hand, the gap in salaries should not be so great that the man earning less can just make a meagre earning.//

I found in my work, in my own movements, that if I was not an Indian, I would have had better opportunities. You feel disgusted with everything around you, and not only that, race hatred grows into you. I am 75 years of age now and to me they are the same; there is no difference between the English-speaking and the Afrikaans-speaking whites. I've got a feeling within me that an Afrikaans-speaking person is more honest. The English speaking is very diplomatic. He does things in a way that he doesn't hurt your feelings right away. An Afrikaner will abruptly tell you, "I don't want you." That has been my experience, though I don't love the Afrikaner better than the English speaking person. I love neither.

(Sznua: Liberal)

(All Subordinate Group Interests)

(Kathiawadi Hindu; small business)

You see, sometimes we like people who are blunt but honest. Therefore, we tend to like the Afrikaners more than the British people. The British people are very wily, tricky; their language is good, but it is hollow. You can get nothing out of them, but internationally they are praised, because you see, everything on paper is very sound. They can pass the test of the scrutiny of the international world, but give nothing to the people. But Afrikaners here at least, they are honest. They'll say, "Yes, we can give you this," or "No, we can't, our electorate is not prepared for that. If we do this, we'll lose an election which we don't wish to." This is honesty.// We believe in clean methods. I joined this Cultural-Educational Institution because of the dirty type of politics of the Indian people. We like to fight the Government on a nonviolent basis because Gandhi proved that even in those days, you can bend the mighty British Government. It's not impossible to bend this Government also, provided you play your part properly. You must be dedicated, you must believe in what you say, you must have conviction, and we must not try to get for the Indian community by depriving the Africans. Some Indians have the mistaken idea about the intelligence of the African people. It's not such that the Indians can provide the brain and the Africans the muscle because the African people are also capable of thinking. We must play a part, but in such a way that we are a contributory factor to the total effort made to gain real freedom. Even the white people don't have real freedom. When you've got real freedom there is no fear. So, if you want to get rid of that fear, then you must be just and look into the welfare of the total population.//

We don't subscribe to the policies of certain sections, especially the British people, that the English-speaking peoples, the Coloreds, the Africans, and the Indians must unite together to oust the Afrikaners. We don't wish that way. The British people are hostile to the Afrikaners just because of one thing--they are not in the central cabinet--they are not the policy makers. They were once. They take pride in the British traditions--the flag of the British and the national anthem. We love our country of India; that's all right; but we are citizens of South Africa. Gandhi said that you must be loyal to the country where you are, but if the laws of that country are not conducive to the welfare of all people you must fight to change the rules. We draw our subsistence from this country. We must be politically minded.// Gandhi once said, "Don't hate the British people, but hate the British system." This touches a special cord in me. We must talk and solve our problems, not rely on force or external help. The rulers must relinquish some of their power and share the prosperity of the land, not create African homelands on narrow strips of land so that the blacks are deprived of South African citizenship.// One thing I admire about Buthelezi is that he insists on nonviolence. Freedom movements take time. You must have patience. You see, Buthelezi and his type of people can always paralyze by telling their people not to work for the industries. The labor force has a great impact on the politics of this country, but that is the last resort.

(Dzsoa: Liberal)

(All Subordinate Group Interests)

(Kathiawadi Hindu; professional -- small business)

Politics is a dirty game. You must tell lies to lead people. Politics is advanced for gain. All not like M.K. Gandhi! The present Government gives politicians salaries, travelling allowances, and this and that. They become big men. For the sake of salary, they will do anything. How can they follow truth?// The government protects you. The rogue is frightened because the government protects you; the police are there. Good government, bad government, we just need government.

(Tzaoa: Apathetic-Fatalistic)

(Apathetic-Fatalistic)

(Kathiawadi Hindu; large business)

I want to live basically. I don't mind living in South Africa. I don't care who rules the place, as long as I know that the people in this country are happy, looking towards a more secure future, not wanting to create problems.// In terms of political security today I don't think anybody can assure you that because all the countries have some sort of problems. Basically they have politically created problems which is how I see it. I tell myself that if I were in a certain office and I want to hold that office, and not for the good of the office, but for the good of myself, then obviously I'm not interested in what's happening around me. I think that is the way a lot of people look at things.

(Dzuma: Apathetic-Fatalistic)
(Apathetic-Fatalistic)
(Kathiawadi Hindu; large business)

We grew up in the climate of the Passive Resistance Movement. Indians were in the forefront of the demand for a better deal in the country. Locally, my dad was involved in the Indian Congress. For many years they conducted the passive resistance campaign. I don't think he personally went to jail, but so many of them did for defying the Government and they personally elected to go to jail.// With the Colored, it's different than with us. I think they're becoming opportunist. Politically in recent years, they appeared to identify with nonwhites, but there appears to be a swing now towards the other side. We can see this coming. The Colored now fears that he's got to go with the white, to take what is being offered to him, and I think we are going to get less resistance from them. They're just going to link up. With the Indians, there are still a hard core of Congress people, but you know, I think in the end, people will look after themselves.// I tell my children always, "It doesn't matter what they give me now, it's too late. The best years of my life have passed. They can give you everything; it's not going to make a difference to me." There's a long history of hurt. They cannot expect from me just to say, "Everything is behind us, let's forgive and forget." Many of us had the potential to become what we could have become, but with the limitations that were placed upon us, some of us have never realized our full potential. We can't just say, "All is forgiven and forgotten," but on the other hand, the attitudes of a lot of youngsters are totally different. They didn't grow up in those years.//

My son plays soccer in a white league and he's quite happy. I don't dictate to him—he's a young boy, 14. He's an excellent player and he's got Northern Transvaal colors. He can live with the system. I still have my doubts, I still wonder. Many times when offers are made to the Indians, I feel we are just being used. I question whether they are really sincere about what they are trying to offer, or is the offer being made to us so they can get international recognition? When they come to us and say, "Fine now, we're going to take you in a separate Parliament, you're going to be part of the decision making," and so forth, I ask myself, "What is the price we have to pay now? At what cost?" The cost obviously is that someone has to get to the border to defend the country. That's the bottom line.

(Ezooma: Liberal to Radical)
(All Subordinate Group Interests)
(Sunni Vohra Muslim; professional -- employed)

The Indians are a minority. We are but a million here. We're not demanding rights in parliament or anything. OK, you got a few radicals that will say we want that, but only maybe 100,000 want votes and to go into Parliament. The other 900,000 just want to be left in peace with freedom to do what they like. They shouldn't be told, "You can't do this and you can't do that," like any other community in any part of the world. You can't suppress one against the other. This is the black's country and the whites are telling them what to do and what not to do. That can't carry on too long. There has to be an equal sharing, or a bloodbath will take place.// The Government must start talking with the black leaders, not to the puppets they are putting up—they're wasting their time. The Ciskei is a whole waste of time. Who is recognizing their independence other than South Africa? The world isn't going to think something is being done for the blacks. Why not give them the Cape and have the whites live in Ciskei, then eyes will open.// We are very affected by trade restrictions. We can only trade in certain areas. I should be able to trade where I feel like trading. They got the plum of the thing. You take anything, take the beaches; at one time we had the best beach and they took it from us and shoved us further up. The beach doesn't belong to anybody, it belongs to South Africa as a whole. It's the same thing in sports. They're getting a very bad beating internationally in sports; every nation in the world wants to boycott them. Why? There can't be something wrong with the world and South Africa is right.//

You must give every man an opportunity. If you don't, how do you know he's no good. He has to prove he's no good. All the best opportunity in this country is going to the whites. We don't want to sit in Parliament and all of that, but we must be given freedom of choice where to stay, what to do, and how to do it. Now Indians are being given job opportunities, but they should have been given them a long time ago. Now they want the Indians and Coloreds to join with them against the blacks.

(Pzrma: Moderate to Liberal)
(Ingroup Interests)
(Kathiawadi Hindu; small business)

The discrimination in the forties was extremely severe. Indians were not allowed to go to any of the Universities or even study for many of the trades or professions. You couldn't find a single Indian plumber or electrician. They were forbidden to even serve apprenticeships with the implementation of separate development. We, the members of the Indian Council, pushed the Government and informed them of what we term "the positive aspects and the negative aspects of apartheid." The Government was saying, "You know, the Indians, you must go and live in your own areas. You can do what you like in your own areas. You can become the mayor of your town. You can be your town planner, your town clerk. You can have your own doctors and lawyers practicing in your own areas." We said, "Fine, give us the opportunity of learning these trades. You're asking us to go live in these areas, how are we going to provide facilities for our own people?" The Government says, "Go ahead. We'll open up the doors for you." Trade union restrictions were removed and look I want to tell you something. It was only up until five years ago that an accountant could serve an apprenticeship with a white firm of chartered accountants. It was only as a result of representations which the Government and the Indian Council put to the Society of Accountants. The Society of Accountants said, "Oh, if they learn all our secrets of our business activities they might grab some of our customers away." I said, "Now, how does that happen? If you provide a service, and the other guy provides a better service, then customers will go to him. Otherwise, they'll stay with you."

(Pztma: Moderate)
(Ingroup Interests)
(Surtee Hindu; professional -- small business)

We felt tension at a medical conference in East London. Everyone was white except for us and one Colored couple. The Administrator of the Cape Province opened the conference. He said, "Ladies and Gentlemen," and then he suddenly looked at us and said, "Oh yes, and the Indian couple there." My husband's sense of humor was really great. He wouldn't allow himself to feel cut down when other people did foolish things such as this. I just hope that my children never simply accept things like this--then it is time to get out of the country.// I will not live like a European. If you say "Well, you're part of South Africa, so you must live like an African," I say "Then everybody, whether they're from Europe or India, must do that sort of thing." But the European mustn't come in and establish his values. There I draw the line. That I cannot stand!// Whenever there has been tension, the Indians are always in the middle of it. On the one side, the whites have the power and the arms, and on the other, the Africans have the numbers and time is on their side. We are always the little nut between the nutcracker.

(Mzyma: Liberal)

(All Subordinate Group Interests)

(Sunni Vohra Muslim female; professional -- small business)

When I returned from England to South Africa, South Africa seemed better because I had a distorted view. I was trying to piece it together from what I was reading and from little impressions I was getting. It didn't seem too bad when I came back. It's still bad, but it's not as bad as I made it out to be. I might have given as bad an impression of South Africa to the people in England as they had from what they read.// To me the ultimate is "I can vote in a government." That's what I'm aiming for.// The Indian has a lack of identity actually. The fact that we are here but we don't have the vote, we're not really here. I mean for as long as we have the Conservative Party saying, "Look, we'll find a homeland for the Indian or we'll send him back," the attitude leaves you with the feeling that you're not really a part of the country as much as you want to be.

(Azlya: Moderate)

(Ingroup Interests)

(Bhora Muslim; professional -- employed)

At the time before I left for London, there wasn't self awareness. I was 12 or 13, starting to smoke dope, and didn't know what the hell the future held. You don't think about it in terms like that, but unconsciously, living from day to day you get freaked, and basically what you know is that there's white and there's non-white. That was the level of consciousness I left with when I left for England. There is a germ in everybody, and it just needs to be nurtured. I was fortunate that it happened to me--that I met the people in England, but if I met them at home it would have been better. Since I've come back, the level and the overall intensification of awareness has come far more.// A lot of radical people are cynical about the Black Consciousness Movement, but I don't reject it outright. I think people should read books by guys like Franz Fanon to get a better understanding of why people get into black consciousness and so forth. It's partly because they can't deal with their own feelings of inferiority, so you react instead of act. You react by becoming B.C. You say, "I'm going to become black. I'm going to stick to my identity. I reject the white man completely." You can't do that and destroy the system because the system is not black and white; the system is capitalism. Basically, the capitalist system is funded by the so-called white man, but there are black capitalists too, and those guys are just as harmful.// The big merchants are definitely holding back the community. They don't have ideas; they're just exploiting, making a lot of money, moralizing, and that makes me angry. In fact, they're only relevant because they got the money and they're not doing anything but moralizing. They moralize by being religious and going to Mosque.

(Bzoya: Radical)

(All Subordinate Group Interests)

(Sunni Vohra Muslim; employed -- clerical)

You want to identify with the more radical left, so you mustn't be too religious. At the same time, just going to the Mosque on Friday, there was something there that you never find in your schooling--brotherhood, the universality of the faith--that's what came to me.// We have very few Afrikaners working in our organization. Probably my view is, the more sophisticated he becomes, the more English he becomes. One can argue that any type of sophisticated racialism instituted here a long time ago was an English innovation rather than an Afrikaner one. The Afrikaners were generally very crude, straight-forward about how they wanted to govern things. The Englishman very cleverly organizes it, puts it into law and is very nice about it, but in the back it really stings.// There is a major fear that we would have to leave if there is a black takeover. I don't subscribe to the view that blacks are very different from us, but there are people in my community who think so, and there are people who do exploit the African. On the other hand, I feel my community is being manipulated by those in power for their own reasons, and sometimes, being a human being, you can fall prey to these type of things. On account of that, blacks, Africans, might identify Indians as being part and parcel of the oppressing class. However, we do not have the vote, we have had no say in the Government of this place, but also, because we are a minority, we shy away from the political arena. I have a feeling that some in the community would like to go to the same cinema, do those things, and the status quo doesn't change, except that status quo where all the petty restrictions are lifted, and so far as Indians can be accommodated within the structure, they would go along with it. They don't want black majority rule.

(Czocya: Liberal to Radical)
(All Subordinate Group Interests)
(Sunni Vohra Muslim; employed -- bank analyst)

The Koran tells you that you as man must never be oppressed. You fight against oppression, whether morally or joining an army or whatever the case may be.// Since you can't change the laws, you should leave the country, anywhere where it will suit you. If you feel that you cannot afford it, it doesn't mean that you cannot go across the border. It may mean you cannot afford to cross the ocean. Moving doesn't need a desperate situation, you do not wait for a fire down the block to move up to your doorstep, you just move.// Comparing the poverty between India and South Africa, in my eyes it is hard for me to believe that anyone is really poor in South Africa knowing the conditions of India.// The fields of education are very limited for the individual race groups. At the moment, the whites of this country have thousands of computers running in their schools. In the Indian, Colored, or African schools, you will be lucky to find one. That's the equality of education!

(Ezrya: Contradictory)

(Contradictory)

(Sunni Vohra Muslim; large business)

I'm trying not to be political about it, but I blame the fact that I am sitting in a timber and hardware salesman office to the education system. Even up to today, it is nowhere near par. It's nowhere near the white schools. I mean they have computers--every school has several, and not one non-white school has got one. That's a personal grouse of mine. Everytime I meet an educator I hammer it into him, "Why don't you guys apply for computers? Fight for computers, they are the things of tomorrow."// Reading about Russia doesn't make sense to me, because I'm not going to Russia, and one thing I do hate is politics. That's a subject I hate a lot. I would never discuss the politics of any country with anyone, even on the local Indian Affairs Committee or the S.A.I.C. I don't want to know about them. I don't know whether they're good or they're bad. I don't like politics. It's a subject that just bores me to death. So what if Mr. Rajbanski, I know the name because it's printed all over, is having a meal with Buthelezi and Buthelezi decided that we Indians should be more active towards the Africans. All right, that doesn't interest me so much because I'm not politically minded. That's all politics.// I agree South Africa is not ideal, but she is far better economically than England, because she's got different types of laws. South Africa's laws work for South Africa; Britain's laws don't work for Britian. So, the British themselves are to blame, it's not Margaret Thatcher. She is making the best of a bad thing. It's the British people themselves who are lazy nowadays.//

I don't mind an African guy if he talks to me intelligently. If he's quite an intelligent guy, I'm prepared to sit and have a meal with him. The trouble is we tend to group Africans under the laborer--the guy who sweats a lot and smells. I have learned differently a long time ago that it's not so. There are a lot of intelligent African guys.// I feel that if the black man takes rule in this country, it will culminate into something like Uganda and Zimbabwe. It's happening around the world; no one can tell me it's not happening. It's happening in Zimbabwe even with all the British intervention. When the black man rules, this is what happens; it's a laid down law. // As long as the white man is ruling in this country, he is not affecting my daily life and the main thing is he's given me freedom of religion. So, I'm not going to argue. The only thing that I have against apartheid is non-equality; that's about the only thing I mind about apartheid, because look seriously, I've been to the United Kingdom and I've seen what no apartheid does. I'd rather live with apartheid, but give me equality.// Amongst the British in South Africa, I can mix with 25 percent of them and 75 percent I could not mix with. The Afrikaner, it's more a case of five percent and 95 percent. I can't mix with five percent and 95 percent I can mix with. The reason is I have yet to come across an Afrikaner who practices pure apartheid. I have come across two or three who are close to pure, but I have come across quite a few English people who practice pure apartheid. They speak it and they have an attitude towards you as though you are lower in status than they are.

(Hysya: Contradictory)

(Contradictory)

(Meman Muslim; large business)

(Husband): I went to Sastri College. I remember when I was there they were collecting money for a swimming pool and up till today, they've never had a swimming pool. Just opposite us was Mansfield High, a white school. They had such a big and beautiful ground that you would just sit there and wonder what was wrong. We had to discontinue playing football on our field because the turf wasn't growing very well.//(Wife): When the whites come here they hear about all the things in our country and say, "Right, I can become King now." They try and push that complex. Where I'm working, we have two English experts, so they got their heads filled about different things concerning the race groups and the attitude that "White is Right" and they're the number one class. There are others who tell you that they can't stand the policies and they probably mean that sincerely, but they're not going to do anything about it. They just apathetically adopt the status quo.//

(Husband): I've worked with Afrikaners, English, Jews, and Portuguese people from Mozambique. The Englishmen wouldn't say bad things to you but you never trusted them. In my own life, I have experienced that. They're lovey-dovey to you, but what they do behind your back is another story. When the Portuguese arrived from Mozambique, they were fantastically friendly, but within two years time I've noticed in my firm that they have gone to higher positions and then they become politically very staunch for the system.

(Jzgya: Liberal to Radical)
(All Subordinate Group Interests)
(Khatri Muslim; employed -- accountant)

I find in politics that you can sit and argue until you are blue in the face, but you're not going to achieve anything and get anywhere. It is something you just have to live with. South Africa, they want to have their cake and eat it too as such. They want to keep the black man down, exploit him, and at the same time have international luxuries such as sports, olympics, and so forth, but they won't be accepted until they change their ways. South Africa is changing compared to what it was twenty years ago or so. Much of the older generation is still very staunch, but the younger generation realizes more that you have to treat blacks as individuals and respect their individual rights.// If you try and sit down and talk to our elders and tell them, "Look, the Africans are not just your servants, they are human beings like we are," they won't listen. They have their thinking set on one way. This is also true with the white man who thinks that there's no way a black man could be an equal or he could receive an order from a black man. This was a problem with us when we got our accounting articles, and in our second or third year there might be a white chap working with you. I have found that this changes once you work together for awhile. Once you work hard, you can prove to them that you are competent and you will then get them into your confidence.

(Bzaya: Liberal)
(All Subordinate Group Interests)
(Surtee Hindu; small business)

Our squash league is a non-racial breakaway league. You find this across the board in sports, where black players decide to form their own league and not discriminate on account of race. There is a lot of antagonism between the two leagues. They play on squash courts that the nonwhites need a permit to play on.// You know, some chaps come from Europe for about six months and they think they're superior to everyone. He's been here six months; all he knows is that he's a white person--he's superior; that's what's been drummed into him. This upsets me. I usually think, "He's probably a little nobody; who the hell does he think he is? He was probably struggling over there and the South African Government probably begged him to stay. Now he feels superior again."

(Dzsya: Liberal to Radical)
(All Subordinate Group Interests)
Kathiawadi Hindu; small business)

My political views are my own and my parents' political views are their own as well. I have very definite views about how I feel, but I don't prefer to voice them. Generally, obviously, the situation is not ideal for I guess anybody. I mean obviously, no normal human being would like the situation as it stands. Previously, my grandparents came in here with one intention of setting up life--getting a business. We all are now very secure financially and otherwise, and politics comes into it far more than it did in my grandparent's time. We're all far more politically aware; each generation gets stronger and stronger and having gone thru University; obviously that influences how you feel. For me personally, I've been away from this country so long, coming back my political views are very, very definite. I think I feel like most people in this country of my age and standing, however perhaps I have a greater interest because I left the country and came back. I find some of the people here afraid to voice opinions for fear of what can happen, some who are politically active, and some who don't care.

(Fzocya: Liberal to Radical)
(All Subordinate Group Interests)
(Sunni Vohra Muslim female; professional -- employed)

In speech and drama, we did very British elocution style stuff--how now brown cow, speech drills, reciting Wordsworth, Tennyson, and stuff like that plus acting scenes from plays such as by Shakespeare and Bernard Shaw. It was very colonial, very British. In fact, the exams were British exams. I did them through London University's Trinity College and the examiner would come down once a year to examine us. The whole point was to teach you how to talk like a white man--that was the objective. Unfortunately, I think by then I had a political consciousness. I fought that very heavily. It was an important time in my life. I just wouldn't do what I didn't think had to be done. I think that the reason was the security of being a damn good student in school.// I was asked to do an improvised scene entitled The Broken Butterfly. I was in standard 8. This was an all Indian class, but we had a white teacher. Many others did The Broken Butterfly and some took the symbolism of having lost freedom, but it was always being in prison for theft or things like that. The scene I tackled was being a white person who thought he was going to get a super job at the railways, and in the morning at the breakfast table, he gets a letter saying that he has just been re-classified Colored, which became the "broken butterfly". He was suddenly not the pretty white.// I think he was a great guy for that time and that place. I have no patience with people who say that Gandhi's philosophy, for example, will work here and now. I don't buy that. So, what's happened is that we've got organizations that take old cues from the Gandhian philosophy. The point is that the Gandhian philosophy was very much rooted in the time in which it happened. So, I was influenced by Gandhi and I don't think any thinking Gujarati wasn't. He was for all intents and purposes the greatest Gujarati that ever lived.

(Lzkya: Liberal to Radical)

(All Subordinate Group Interests)

(Kathiawadi Hindu; professional -- small business)

University education at Westville wasn't a very free and happy relationship. It starts off with the relationship between the administration and the pupils. All the top positions, from the Rector, is appointed by the Government. The previous one was from the Broderbond, a very staunch Afrikaner. He had views which couldn't be changed--he was for the system--a lot of the top men of the administration were riddled with fascism. It was a really terrible atmosphere. If you drive there, before you even enter, there's gates with guards and you need a disc before you are let in, a disc before you leave, and for security purposes, visitors must sign in. The whole system, the whole atmosphere, is terrible. They also have guys riding around on motor bikes with helmets--all part of the security system there.// I feel in some years, at least 10 years, there will be some sort of takeover, or some real changes. I think it definitely puts the Indians in a vulnerable position. I don't think anybody can deny that, whether they are for it or not. It's happened everywhere, throughout Africa. I mean when the majority took over, obviously a minority who are generally well-to-do are resented. Even though there is a slight difference in South Africa where the majority of Indians are not business class, they are actually indentured class, even they are better off than the Africans on the whole. The Indians are in the middle, they are vulnerable, and they are going to take the chop.

(Mzyya: Moderate to Liberal)

(Ingroup Interests)

(Sunni Vohra Muslim; professional -- employed)

I'm very cool with Afrikaners. I like them. In Natal, Afrikaners are a minority. A couple of guys call the Afrikaner a dumb Dutchman or something. The Englishman is a bullshitter. He'll bullshit you like mad. He'll try and put up a good front with you and con you very easily. I have had experiences like this.// I had an interesting experience with an Afrikaner. We went to Cape Town thru the Garden Route which is by the coast. It was quite late one night and we decided to have a meal. We parked outside a little shop in one of these little towns which was predominantly Afrikaner. It was such a little town that I think we were just a little attraction, and we later learned that it was a dangerous area. We were cooking our own meal on a gas

stove and I could see this guy, an Afrikaner, eyeing us for a long time. After our meal, we threw our rubbish away and put everything else back in the car. After we were finished he came up to our car and said, "Listen, I hope you didn't mind I was there just watching you? I was just watching so you weren't mugged." The man was being good to us. That's quite nice isn't it? He made us feel good.// The blacks here aren't getting a raw deal. I don't know, probably I'm pretty selfish, but I feel that there is a lot of opportunity for everyone. In the education system, however, the whites receive more money and less and less are given to nonwhites. But if you go for it, you get it. I think there is quite a lot of opportunity for the people here. I remember telling you earlier though I'm not very crazy about living here. You know, the Afrikaner runs the Government here. I'm bugged by the Englishman and I'm bugged by the Indians. No, I don't feel bugged by the Africans. I like to have a good relationship with Africans. I like to feel real close to them. The reason they sort of reject you is that the majority of the Indians treat the Africans worse than what the Afrikaner treats him. The general treatment is, "He's a Kaffir, don't worry about him." Generally, there is a lot of discrimination against Africans. No one would ever have a meal with them. I will tell you, those who get involved in politics are hypocrites. I wonder why they do it sometimes, when they don't feel strongly within themselves but just talk about racism.// I don't think the Afrikaner anymore fears the black man--he is more fearing of the Englishman who is taking over with the new Progressive Federal Party, and the Russians and Americans. The blacks are just being used as pawns. You know, they have been trained in Russia to do a little guerilla warfare here. They are just being used as pawns. I know if the Reds come in here, the black man would be just as bad off.

(Mztya: Contradictory)

(Contradictory)

(Sunni Vohra Muslim; large business)

If we didn't have limitations, I think the Indians would be much more powerful in this country. Where people have been thrown out of their homes because the area was banned, where you couldn't open a business--you still can't open a business where you want to, where you don't have access to the right government officials because you are not electing them, while a white person has a councillor in his area can be in contact with him and lean on him, its hard to progress. The enterprising nature of the community has always remained to uplift themselves to a degree. At least, the people we mix with socially all have done well for themselves, but could have done much better. The funny thing is you come across a lot of whites who would say, "Oh, my best friend is an Indian." They're trying to tell you, "I'm on the level, you don't have to worry about me--I'm a good guy." Obviously, it's up to us to make our own decisions. We don't have to listen to what they say.// Our contacts with whites are not too regular with the same people, so we don't get too involved because of the whole set-up in this country. Though they say everything is open, there are limitations where you can go, what you can do, like cinemas, restaurants, pubs and things like that.

(Pzaya: Moderate to Liberal)
(Ingroup Interests)
(Kathiawadi Hindu; employed -- accountant)

You could say we Indians are in the middle of a sandwich because we are very small in number and the blacks are big in number followed by the whites. We really don't know what could happen to us, but we pray and hope for the best. I wouldn't say we are in fear, because whatever has to happen will happen. Whatever God lets happen, he knows why he is doing it and he does it for the best of us.

(Rzjya: Apathetic-Fatalistic)
(Apathetic-Fatalistic)
(Sunni Vohra Muslim; student)

The racial tension is the worst in the Indian community. We are often asked, "Which part are you standing on, the African part or the white part?" We are always inbetween in any of the quarrels that come up. We usually don't know what to do.// You get the same questions, especially when I go to India. They say, "How do you manage to live over there?" You know, it's difficult to tell them because we just live. It's so silly that you can't go to a certain restaurant. When I was in India, it was really fun because you can do what you want to where you want to and no one says "You're not allowed here." I came back to South Africa and it was hard at first, but after a while you settle down.

(Vzsya: Apathetic-Fatalistic)

(Apathetic-Fatalistic)

(Surtee Hindu; professional -- employed)

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